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Epigraph
For if when I speak I am unable to make myself intelligible, then I am not
speaking – even though I were to talk uninterruptedly day and night.
— Søren Kirkegaard, Fear and Trembling
Silence itself is defined in relationship to words, as the pause in music
receives its meaning from the group of notes around it. This silence is a
moment of language; being silent is not being dumb; it is to refuse to
speak, and therefore to keep on speaking.
— Jean-Paul Sartre, What is Literature?
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Abstract
Apart from discourse and yet somehow part of it, silence is a powerfully
ambiguous linguistic phenomenon that blurs the lines between presence and
absence.  Eluding the material aspects of oral and written language, it is only
perceptible as the gaps or spaces between words.  Nonetheless, it plays a role in
all linguistic productions: although silence itself cannot be directly
communicated, it can influence communication.  In a literary text, silence may
takes on many different guises, including rhythmic hesitations, rhetorical
omissions, and poetic oppositions that mimic the audible gaps of spoken
language.  The visual, aural, and fictional interaction of all these components
ultimately induces otherwise unnamed meanings, meanings that exist as part of
the symbolic network of a text, yet beyond the division and difference of
signifiers.  And while traces of this phenomenon may be found in literature from
all historical periods and genres, the three medieval romances in which I have
chosen to explore it – La Vie de Saint Alexis, Le Conte du Graal, and Le Roman de
Silence – exhibit a particularly strong awareness of the communicative problems
and possibilities engendered by silence.  Each one demonstrates – albeit in a
slightly different way – that silence is more than just omission: within their
pages, it becomes an elusive yet create force that shapes thematic development
and structures poetics.  Ultimately, however, silence’s structuralizing force is not
just textual, but also ontological, affecting our existence and perceptions of who
we are.
1Introduction
For what is the presence of silence but the absence of sound?
– Saint Augustine, Confessions
Apart from speech and yet somehow part of it, silence is a powerfully
ambiguous linguistic phenomenon that blurs the lines between presence and
absence.  Indeed, its problematic discursive status has made it an important
source of intellectual reflection for a great many disciplines, including
psychoanalysis, philosophy and, more recently, literary criticism. Both Lacan’s
theory of the unconscious and Heidegger’s philosophy of Being, for example,
accord a privileged discursive role to silence.1  Even linguistics, a field
traditionally concerned almost uniquely with the scrutiny of substantive
signifiers, has come to recognize its communicative potential, finding in the
pauses and hesitations of our speech not just a lack of words, but a meaningful
linguistic act “that communicates just as intensely as anything we might
verbalize.”2  Ultimately, each of these disciplines assigns different linguistic
functions and signifying abilities to silence within its particular theoretical
framework.  Nonetheless, there is a common sentiment that the space between
words – this absence of sound – is also something more than nothing.  For while it
                                                 
1 In Lacanian psychoanalysis, the unconscious (also femininity, the Real) is beyond language, a
tacit domain within the speaking subject that can be intimated, but never directly stated, through
language.  Further information can be found in almost any of Lacan’s texts.  For a general view,
see Ecrits: A Selection, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Norton, 1977).   Silence, especially in the
form of a refusal to speak – reticence – is, for Heidegger, the fundamental space in discourse
where understanding occurs, where Da-sein is articulated.  See, for instance, Martin Heidegger,
Being and Time:  A Translation of Sein und Zeit, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: SUNY Press,
1996) 150-156 as well as On the Way to Language, trans. Peter D. Hertz (San Francisco: Harper
Collins, 1982) 111-138.  Both of these theoretical perspectives are discussed below.
2 Joseph A. Devito, “Silence and Paralanguage as Communication,”Etc.; A Review of General
Semantics 46:2 (1989) 153.
2only becomes manifest in the gaps between phonemes, syllables, words, and
sentences, this same lack of form – its nothingness – is what constitutes its
representational force.
Silence is thus without form, but not without function.  Eluding the
material aspect of language, it is only perceptible to human ears as the gaps or
spaces between words.  Nonetheless, it plays a role in all linguistic productions.
This is perhaps more easily understood in regards to oral expression than to a
written document, but the underlying mechanism is really the same.  After all, a
text is more than just a benign collection of words on a page3; it is also a self-
enclosed symbolic network binding together a unique collection of written
characters, rhythmic hesitations, rhetorical omissions, and poetic oppositions
that mimic the audible gaps of spoken language.4  The visual, aural, and thematic
interaction of all these components ultimately induces, or “conditions” otherwise
unnamed meanings that exist as part of the written text, yet beyond the division
and difference of signifiers.5
Though physically absent, silence would thus be present in language as
part of what Jacques Lacan calls “an encounter with the real.”6  To better grasp
                                                 
3 While this appraisal would be applicable to texts from all literary periods, it is particularly
relevant in the case of medieval manuscripts: because the vellum used for textual composition
was often recycled, a palimpest of shadowy words and images from past tales sometimes appears
behind the newer text.
4 Cf. Muriel Saville-Troike, “The Place of Silence in an Integrated Theory of Communication,”
Perspectives on Silence, ed. Deborah Tannen and Muriel Saville-Troike (Norwood, N.J.: Ablex,
1985) 5.  According to Saville-Troike, one of the more common examples of written silence is the
punctuation marker ‘...’ frequently used in both Japanese and European literature.
5 Sanford Budick and Wolfgang Iser, introduction, Languages of the Unsayable: The Play of
Negativity in Literature and Literary Theory, ed. Sanford Budik and Wolfgang Iser (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1989) xii.
6 Jacques Lacan, Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, trans. Alan Sheridan, ed. Jacques-
Alain Miller (New York: Norton, 1978) 52.  Central to Lacan’s theory, the Real (it is capitalized in
many English translation in order to draw attention to its importance) is explained here in
3the sense of this encounter, it will be helpful to follow Lacan’s own example by
first returning to Freud, and an appropriate choice for such a return is The
Interpretation of Dreams (Dei Traumdeutung). 7  First published in 1900, this lengthy
study of the psychological mechanisms influencing the formation, analysis, and
significance of our dreams has, with time, become one of his most widely
recognized and most important works.8  At its core is a method of interpretation
that emphasizes the contextuality of representation – the unique weaving (Latin
contexere) of images, gestures, and events within each dream.  Of course, Freud
was not the first person with an interest in the deeper significance of human
reverie, but he does take deliberate pains to set his approach apart from previous
ones, which he deems either too specific or not broad enough.9
The first of these two methods is of the same sort used in many Biblical
prophecies, where all the events in a particular dream are interpreted as
symbolic yet analogous representations of some future occurrence.  Freud’s own
example is Joseph’s explanation of Pharaoh’s dream in the forty-first book of
Genesis:
                                                                                                                                                  
Aristotelian terms, where automaton is the “network of signifiers” and tuché that which exists
beyond this network.
7 Beginning in the 1950s, Lacan describe his intellectual journey as a return to Freud (retour à
Freud), whose ideas he would continue to examine, criticize, and refine over the remainder of his
career.
8 In his introduction to the English translation of The Interpretation of Dreams, James Strachey
notes that the renown of this study came long after its initial publication, with sales of only 351
copies during the first six years following its release.  In spite of this, “The Interpretation of Dreams
was always regarded by Freud as his most important work: ‘Insight such as this’ as he wrote in
his preface to the third English edition, ‘falls to one’s lot but once in a lifetime.’”  James Strachey,
introduction, The Interpretation of Dreams (First Part), by Sigmund Freud,  trans. James Strachey,
The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, 24 vols. (London:
Hogarth Press, 1953) 4: xx.
9 Freud provides a summary of these in the first chapter.  Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of
Dreams (First Part), trans. James Strachey, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works
of Sigmund Freud, 24 vols. (London: Hogarth Press, 1953) 4: 1-95.  The interpretation in question is
deliverd in Genesis 41:31
4The seven fat kine followed by seven lean kine that ate up the fat
kine – all this was a symbolic substitute for a prophecy of seven
years of famine in the land of Egypt which should consume all that
was brought forth in the seven years of plenty.10
The problem with this approach, he claims, is that it is not really a method at all,
since it depends not on deliberate examination of the dream content, but on the
fabrication of a plausible link between the dream and some real-world situation.
In such a case, successful interpretation requires no more than “hitting on a
clever idea.”11  The second approach – a ‘translation’ of each image in the dream
achieved with the help of a specialized index – is one toward which Freud is
relatively more sympathetic since it “takes into account not only the content of
the dream but also the character and circumstances of the dreamer.”12  At the
same time, however, he acknowledges the obvious limitations of this approach,
namely that the quality and success of such an analysis is dictated by the
completeness of one’s dream concordance and, furthermore, that “interpretation
is not brought to bear on the dream as a whole but on each portion of the
dream’s content independently.”13
A direct response to these shortcomings, Freud’s preliminary articulation
of his interpretive method relies on two fundamental assumptions.  First, he
holds that the dream is not a unified whole nor a completely haphazard
conglomeration of otherwise disparate elements, but something in-between, a
fractured matrix of constituent parts whose connection can only be elucidated by
                                                 
10 Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams (First Part) 97.
11 Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams (First Part) 97.
12 Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams (First Part) 98.
13 Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams (First Part) 99.
5analyzing each component both separately and in relation to the others in the
matrix.  The illustration he uses is that of a rebus14, or picture-puzzle:
But obviously we can only form a proper judgement of the rebus if
we put aside criticisms such as these of the whole composition and
its parts and if, instead, we try to replace each separate element by
a syllable or word that can be represented by that element in some
way or other.  The words which are put together in this way are no
longer nonsensical but may form a poetical phrase of the greatest
beauty and significance.15
Furthermore, the process of replacement outlined above is not fixed like that of
the decoding procedure, but relative to the individual dreamer, with Freud
willing “to find that the same piece of content may conceal different meaning
when it occurs in various people or various contexts.”16  The structure of this
visual riddle points to the important place of silence in psychoanalysis: as the
above passage suggests, it is what remains unsaid in a dream that is important.
The rebus itself does not state the meaning of the dream, even if it provides all
the clues necessary to arrive at this meaning.  Silence is the dream’s locus of
meaning.
This is true in large part because silence plays a fundamental role in the
primary forces that Freud says govern dream formation, namely wish
fulfillment, which “constructs the wish” expressed in a dream and censorship,
                                                 
14 The Oxford English Dictionary defines rebus (a plural form of the Latin word for ‘thing’, res) as
“an enigmatical representation of a name, word, or phrase by figures, pictures, arrangement of
letters, etc., which suggest the syllables of which it is made up.”
15 Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams (First Part) 278.
16 Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams (First Part) 105.  Here, it becomes clear that popular use of
the term “Freudian” is potentially imprecise: while some components of dreams discussed by
Freud appear to have a specular link with certain physical marks of sexuality, such relations are
particular rather tan general: the meaning of a given image depends not upon itself, but upon its
relation to the other parts of the dream.
6which “forcibly brings about a distortion in the expression of the wish.”17  It is
through this process of distortion that the dream is transformed into the picture-
puzzle to which Freud refers.  The two mechanisms by which these changes
occur, displacement – the movement from one thing to a related thing – and
condensation – the combination of several components into one – both repress
some thought or image in favor of another.  If taken to their extreme, these twin
mechanisms of distortion can create a situation where “what is clearly the
essence of the dream-thoughts need not be represented in the dream at all.”18
This process of censorship – itself a sort of silence or silencing – forces us to, as
Freud says, sniff out the “scent of the true meaning.”19  By virtue of the analytic
process, the sniffing out of this meaning is really a ‘listening to,’ and thus what
Freud is often listening for is what the patient does not say or, in the case of
secondary revision20 what he tries to not say:
The interpolations are easy to recognize.  They are often reported,
with hesitation; they are not themselves particularly vivid and are
always introduced at points at which they can serve as links
between two portions of the dream content or to bridge a gap
between two points of the chasm.21
                                                 
17 Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams (First Part) 144.
18 Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams (First Part) 305.
19 Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams (First Part) 142.
20 The primary revision occurs in the intial presentation of the dream, which because of the
process of censorship is itself not a faithful account of unconscious desires and wishes, “but the
distortion [or as Freud says, a translation] (Entstellung) of the unconscious dream thoughts as
they regress to the level of perception.” Anthony Wilden, “Lacan and the Discourse of the
Other,” Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis, ed. Anthony Wilden (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1968) 262.  To this first ‘translation’ is added a second, which Freud associates
with patients’ voluntary censorship images that, even after the primary revision, seem
incongruously strange or unacceptable. This is secondary revision.  Freud, The Interpretation of
Dreams (First Part) 277-278.
21 Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams (Second Part) and On Dreams, trans. James Strachey,
The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, 24 vols. (London:
Hogarth Press, 1953) 5: 489.
7Thus, within Freud’s theory of dream interpretation, we find the foundation for a
psychoanalytical notion of silence: as the linguistic realm to which repressed
wishes, information, and images are relegated, silence becomes synonymous
with the unconscious.
Since the entire corpus of Freud’s work was available to Lacan from the
start, it is sometimes difficult to identify the provenance of a given reference or
idea.  This is particularly true of Lacan’s later work, in which his own theories
appear in mature form, having benefited from the same kind of continual
revision as Freud’s own writings.22  On the one hand, much of what forms the
basis of Lacanian psychoanalysis can be found in Freud, though under different
names: displacement becomes metonymy (the movement from one signifier to
another), condensation is supplanted by metaphor (the replacement of one
signifier with another), and the id, ego, and superego are traded in for the Real,
Imaginary, and Symbolic.  Yet the advancements made by Lacan are much more
than just semantic in nature.  Whereas Freud strives to understand what might
be called the ‘hidden’ psychological significance of our actions, dreams, and
thoughts, Lacan takes things one step further by elaborating the more general
applicability of Freud’s seminal psychoanalytic structure, particularly where it
concerns our relationship to language and, by the same token, silence.
Still, it is Freud himself who provides much of the necessary intellectual
momentum for this progress.  His work on wit and what we now call ‘Freudian
slips’ clearly attests to his interest in a connection between psychoanalysis and
language, a point upon which he touches in the seventh chapter of The
                                                 
22 During his lifetime, Freud published eight German editions of The Interpretation of Dreams.
8Interpretation of Dreams, when he mentions the relationship between dream
images and linguistic representation:
The work of condensation is seen at its clearest when it handles
words and names.  It is true in general that words are frequently
treated in dreams as though they were things and for that reason
they are apt to be combined in just the same way as are
presentations of things.23
Yet if Freud seems to sense a broader significance within his theories, he does not
always manage to fully articulate it.  One of these ‘diamonds in the rough’ that
Lacan mines and polishes to a new luster is the Fort! Da! episode outlined by
Freud in Beyond the Pleasure Principle.  Observing a young boy at play, Freud
makes the following observations and conclusions:
What he did was to hold the reel by the string and very skillfully
throw it over the edge of his curtained cot, so that it disappeared
into it, at the same time uttering his expressive "o-o-o-o." He then
pulled the reel again by the string and hailed its reappearance with
a joyful "da" [there]. This, then, was the complete game –
disappearance and return. The interpretation of the game then
became obvious. It was related to the child's great cultural
achievement – the instinctual renunciation (that is, the renunciation
of instinctual satisfaction) which he had made in allowing his
mother to go away without protesting.24
Whereas Freud’s analysis of this episode concentrates on a discovery of the
personal sense behind the use of the German words fort and da, Lacan’s
elaboration concentrates not on the words themselves, but on a more general
relationship of these playtime activities to the place of presence and absence in
the child’s – and, by extension, our – world.  For him, this apparently simple
game is a telling demonstration of the fact that “the moment in which desire
                                                 
23 Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams (First Part) 295-296.
24 Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, trans. James Strachey, The Standard Edition of the
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, 24 vols. (London: Hogarth Press, 1953) 18: 14-15.  I
have quoted only the essential points of the case study here.
9becomes human is also that in which the child is born into Language.”25  What
does this mean?  Well, his observation is based on the fact that the child’s
linguistic enunciation occurs at the same time as the toy’s occultation: it is when
the object is lacking – the moment at which the child begins to long for its return
– that this lack is filled with a word, or more precisely a signifier.  Lack is thus
contiguous with the beginning of language, the moment at which we first
embark on a quest to speak the unspoken.26  If there were no lack there would be
no language.
However, as in the case of the dream’s deformed representations of
unconscious desires, this articulation always falls short of its mark: language
never says quite what we want it to say.  Silence is a totality that remains out of
our linguistic reach, an impossible abundance that, suggests Lacan, takes on
many guises, including God, Truth, desire, and femininity.27  Confronted with
these ineffable concepts, our words only manage to draw their own lack into
sharper focus:
Rupture, split, the stroke of the opening makes absence emerge –
just as the cry does not stand out against a background of silence,
but on the contrary makes the silence emerge as silence.”28
                                                 
25 Jacques Lacan, Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis, ed. and trans. Anthony Wilden (Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1968) 83.
26 This perspective is very similar to Martin Heidegger’s suggestion that “[e]verything spoken
stems in a variety of ways from the unspoken, whether this be something not yet spoken, or
whether it be what must remain unspoken in the sense that it is beyond the reach of speaking.”
Heidegger, On the Way to Language 120.
27 Lacan also sexualizes silence when he says: “Il n’y a de femme qu’exclue par nature des choses
qui est la nature des mots.”  However, if a woman is “excluded” from the nature of words, this
does not mean that she herself does not exist, nor that she is unable to communicate using words.
Rather, she is “not-all” (pas-toute), a totality that, like silence, can only enter language as an
approximation of itself.  Jacques Lacan, Séminaire XX: Encore, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller (Paris:
Seuil, 1971) 68.
28 Lacan, Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis 26.
10
As for Freud, this emergence of absence is thus particularly discernable in the
verbal failures and occultations of speech, linguistic turns that contain what
Lacan calls the “significative term” of the psychoanalytic subject’s distorted
linguistic productions.  In them, one must often take “a simple lapsus for a
highly complex statement, or even the sigh of a momentary silence for the whole
lyrical development it makes up for.”29  This phenomenon is not, however,
limited to spoken language.  Something similar occurs in the spatial distribution
of words in a written text, a punctuation that can change how they are read and
understood:
It is a fact, which can be plainly seen in the study of the
manuscripts of Chinese canonicals, that the absence of punctuation
in them is a source of ambiguity.  The punctuation, once inserted,
fixes the sense; changing the punctuation renews or upsets it.30
Whether written or spoken, silence is a void within language that structures
meaning.
As several of the preceding notes in this section have suggested, Lacan’s
ideas about language and silence bear a strong resemblance to certain aspects of
Martin Heidegger’s philosophical writings.  Indeed, Lacan himself acknowledges
Heidegger as one of his theoretical influences, and the two – along with Freud –
share a common view of silence as a potentially significant discursive act. For
Heidegger, this significance hinges on a distinction between ‘speaking’ and
‘saying’:
                                                 
29 Lacan, Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis 13.  Later in the same essay, Lacan desribes the
unconscious as “that chapter of my history which is marked by a blank or occupied by a
falsehood: it is the censored chapter.  However, “the Truth can be found again; it is most often
already written down elsewhere.” Lacan, Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis 21.
30 Lacan, Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis 78.  Like the Chinese manuscripts, Old French uses
almost no punctuation whatsoever, and does not abide by modern rules of capitalization.
11
To say and to speak are not identical.  A man may speak, speak
endlessly, and all the time say nothing.  Another man may remain
silent, not speak at all and yet without speaking, say a great deal. 31
That which is truly said, then, is something apart from the verbal elaboration of
an idea or concept, for it does not need words to be articulated.  Such moments
of silence are times when “language itself has distantly and fleetingly touched us
with its essential being.”32  Like the psychoanalytic unconscious, saying is that
which is expressed beyond the signifier.
Silence is thus a double-edged sword, for it simultaneously opens up a
space for language in our lives and reveals our profound estrangement from that
language.  Our words, in other words, are not entirely our own.  What they mean
– and what we can say with them – is subordinate to a function beyond our
control.  Indeed, the Saying33 described by Heidegger is an essentially passive
exercise, one that is “not of our own making” but merely “comes about, comes to
pass, happens.”34  In order to ‘say’ instead of just ‘speak,’ the subject must,
therefore, acknowledge his inability to signify anything for what it truly is.  It is
only at this moment that the disparate elements of speech and silence are joined
together in meaning, “a renunciation in whose self-denial the relation of word to
thing promises itself [to us].”35  For Lacan, this conference of a relation between
word and thing is the functional domain of the Other, which he defines in
                                                 
31 Heidegger, On the Way to Language 122.
32 Heidegger, On the Way to Language 59.  The entire passage is as follows: “But when does
language speak itself as language?  Curiously enough, when we cannot find the right word for
somethng that concerns us, carries us away oppresses or encourages us.  Then we leave
unspoken what we have in mind and, without rightly giving it thought, undergo moments in
which language itself has distantly and fleetingly touched us with its essential being.”
33 After its initial presentation, this term is capitalized in On the Way to Language.
34 Heidegger, On the Way to Language 57.
35 Heidegger, On the Way to Language 69.
12
various ways, including “the locus in which is situated the chain of the signifier
that governs whatever may be made present of the subject.”36  The relationship
between subject and silence is thus a symbiotic one.  Without the subject’s
reticence, silence would never appear in language as Saying, and silence, in turn,
is what allows a subject to emerge as such, to speak and be understood.  Seen
from this perspective, silence is not just a mark of linguistic impotence:  it also
belies a certain discursive awareness, the ability to use language’s inadequacies
to shift attention toward something extraordinary that has come together in the
silent space between words.
It is this signifying dimension of silence that is most relevant to a study of
literature, for the writer’s task is, at its most basic level, to give form to formless
thoughts, to find a way to articulate his silent ideas.  But while silence has been a
significant part of theoretical disciplines for quite some time, it has only just
begun to receive concerted attention from literary critics.  Most significant
studies have been published within the last ten to fifteen years, and the vast
majority concentrate on nineteenth and twentieth-century writings by or about
historically marginalized groups (e.g., women, racial minorities).37  Such work
has, admittedly, yielded some important insights into how silence can both stifle
and facilitate personal expression, including the ideas about its role in social
oppression and verbal or written resistance, part of what Robin Patric Clair calls
                                                 
36 Lacan, Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis 203.
37 Some examples of this trend are Irène Assiba d'Almeida, Francophone African Women Writers:
Destroying the Emptiness of Silence (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994),  Shirley Marie
Jordan, Broken Silences: Interviews With Black and White Women Writers (New Brunswick, N.J.
Rutgers University Press, 1993), and Leila Brosnan, Reading Virginia Woolf's Essays and Journalism:
Breaking the Surface of Silence (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997).
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an “organizing silence.”38  Yet in many cases, more focus is put on the social
context surrounding textual composition than on the texts themselves.  Here, I
do not wish to imply that cultural or historical realities do not play a role in
literary representations and our understanding of them.  Indeed, the dominant
cultural and political discourses of the Middle Ages clearly influence how silence
is used and portrayed in the medieval narratives discussed in the following
chapters: it would, for instance, be impossible to deny that the speechlessness of
some female characters in medieval texts reflects a certain misogynistic and
repressive element in religious beliefs and social realities of the period.
However, overemphasis on the fictional relevance of such influences can lead to
a sublimation of the text’s own ideas, possibly preventing one from hearing all
that its silences have to say.
The texts which I have chosen for this study – La Vie de Saint Alexis, Le
Conte du Graal, and Le Roman de Silence – all exhibit a particularly acute
awareness of the communicative problems and possibilities engendered by
silence and its related gestures.  By limiting this commentary to writings from
the Middle Ages, I hope not only to correct what I feel is a critical deficiency in
the study of silence’s literary significance, but also to explore how artistic and
intellectual expression from this chronologically distant period accentuate our
contemporary understanding of this fundamental linguistic phenomenon.
Within the symbolic economy of the texts in question, silence is intimated in any
number of possible ways, including hesitations, pauses, omissions, informational
                                                 
38 Though hers is not a work of literary criticism, Robin Patric Clair’s book Organizing Silence
contains many interesting analyses of the role of silence in maintaining and defying modern
organizational structures and social roles as related to minorities and women.  Robin Patric Clair,
Organizing Silence: A World of Possibilities, (Albany State University of New York Press, 1998).
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voids, and physical or fictional separation.  The interplay of these different
modes of silence demonstrates that the signifying potential of this ‘presence of
absence’ goes beyond mere lack, its function more appropriately conceived of as
a creative force that shapes meaning and structures poetics, thereby impacting
internal thematic development of the narrative as well as the poet’s lyrical
artistry.  Furthermore, the different fictional contexts of these works bring silence
into close conceptual contact with some of the major intellectual issues and of the
time.  Ultimately, then, insights provided by these readings will constitute not
just a collection of literary analyses, but also a theory of silence in linguistic
representation.
After a brief introduction to the primary medieval perspectives on
language and silence in Chapter One, Chapter Two offers a reading of the
hagiographical La Vie de Saint Alexis.  Long recognized as one of the most
important works in the history of French literature, it is one of four very early
examples of written French.  At the same time, its surprisingly refined poetic
structures afford a glimpse into many of the rhetorical games that later
vernacular poets will further exploit and perfect.  A number of early studies of
Alexis focus on the historical accuracy of the tale and relative value of its extant
versions, while others concentrate on how the text reflects various historical,
theological, and social influences (Stebbins, Burger). More recently, some critics
have taken note of how the story of this saint’s life engages questions of linguistic
signification, sexuality, and subjectivity (Durling, Leupin).  My analysis builds
on this latter scholarship by asking what the saint’s silence – arguably his most
important attribute – says about the connection between writing and desire at
15
this most important stage in the development of vernacular French language and
literature.
While there is an enormous amount of criticism regarding Le Conte du
Graal and its continuations, no study of significant length concentrates on the
issue of silence in the text as a whole.  Certainly, a great many articles and books
call attention to the fundamental importance of Perceval’s verbal abstinence
during the grail procession (Williams, Bourquin, Dragonetti).  However, silence
also plays an important role in the story of the tale’s other knight, Gawain,
whose knightly adventures both complement and contradict those of his less
polished counterpart.  By treating silence as an integral facet of both characters’
textual exploits and of Chrétien’s writing, Chapters Three and Four show that it
can be both linguistically sterile and productive, a functional nuance is rooted in
a subjective manipulation of language.  In the Conte du Graal, this adaptable
character of silence helps to determine not only the meaning of what is spoken,
but also the identity of who is speaking.
In the fifth and final chapter, I consider the interaction of silence,
sexuality, and social organization in the thirteenth-century Le Roman de Silence.
Though less celebrated than La Vie de Saint Alexis or L e  Conte du Graal, a
considerable amount of criticism regarding this verse romance has recently been
published, including a special issue of the journal Arthuriana (7.2, 1997).  Most of
the available articles focus on gender issues (Blumreich, Brahney, Bullough,
McCracken, Stock, Waters), although some do shift attention to the close
connection between sexuality and language (Allen, Bloch, Cooper).  Indeed, it
would be impossible to read Silence without considering questions of gender and
sexuality, for the text and its transvestite protagonist would hardly allow such
16
negligence.  Positioned at a point at which these imperatives intersect the text’s
fictional political structure, my reading of this provocative narrative provides a
look into the dynamic relationship between silence and truth, both among the
fictional characters of Le Roman de Silence and between the poet and his text.
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Chapter One: Silence in the Middle Ages
Just as one affixes trimmings to clothes and badges to hats, so it behooves every
one of us to write in silent marks.
— Andrea Alciato, Book of Emblems
Major social and intellectual institutions of the Middle Ages, including
Judeo-Christianity, rhetoric, and secular fiction, exhibit a marked interest in the
expressive functions and limitations of human language.1  Consequently, this
period also offers exceptionally fertile terrain for a study of silence.  Of course,
the contemplative paths of these various domains do not always coincide, and
the diverse ways in which each one incorporates silence as part of a more general
discourse on language (e.g., religious or mystical ineffability, monastic
restrictions on speech, rhetorical reticence) ascribe differing values and functions
to this ‘presence of absence.’  Furthermore, since the theoretical imperatives
behind these different modes of silence frequently overlap, isolating their distinct
characteristics can be a difficult proposition.  It would, for instance, be
impossible to fully explain monastic silence without first accounting for the more
general religious concept of God’s ineffability.2  Still, by elucidating the
divergences among them, a typology of silence in the Middle Ages begins to
emerge, one that belies its ambivalent yet indispensable role in all manner of
linguistic expression.
                                                 
1 Eugene Vance has gone so far as to argue that “no important medieval literary text lacks an
awareness of language, whether as a medium of consciousness or as a living expression of the
social order.” Eugene Vance, Marvelous Signals: Poetics and Sign Theory in the Middle Ages (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1986) xi.
2 Vance calls this problem “one of the most consistent linguistic enigmas of the Middle Ages.”
Vance x.
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Religious Silence and the Ineffable God
Because silence is by its very nature formless, this typology cannot
account for different forms of silence, only the different ways in which it is
defined or used in conjunction with more substantive linguistic structures.3
Understanding silence in the Middle Ages thus requires an awareness of
medieval perspectives on language, and one of the most influential forces in this
domain is theology.  Like many of its scriptural foundations, the primary Biblical
law governing representation is intimately linked to Judeo-Christian
monotheism.  Whereas statues and other tangible manifestations of faith are
fundamental components of worship in pantheistic religions like those of ancient
Greece or Rome, the first and second commandments of the Jewish shavuot
explicitly forbid such idolatry while affirming God’s singularity:
Thou shalt have no other gods before me.  Thou shalt not make
thyself any graven image, or any likeness of any thing that is in
heaven above, or that is on the earth beneath, or that is in the water
under the earth.  Thou shalt not bow down to them or serve them.4
The juxtaposition of these two mandates explicitly sets their particular deity
apart from the division and imperfection of any worldly forms that might be
used to represent him.5  Thus, the break with what were previously divine roles
and attributes of several deities in favor one all-encompassing God has more
than just structural implications: this commandment (a key doctrinal foundation
                                                 
3 Joseph A. Devito, who was cited in the Introduction, makes a similar suggestion: “Perhaps the
best way to approach silence is to consider some of the functions it might serve or the meanings it
might communicate.” Joseph A. Devito, “Silence and Paralanguage as Communication,”Etc.; A
Review of General Semantics 46:2 (1989) 154.
4 Exodus 20:3-4.
5 I have chosen to use masculine pronouns when referring to God in order to maintain
conformity with the sources in this chapter.
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of both Judeo-Christianity and Islam) alters the established linguistic relationship
between humans and the divine.
Pursuant to this law, the name previously used for God, represented by
the Tetragrammaton YHVH (Yahweh), is suppressed from speech, its now-
sacred consonants linguistically taboo.  In Hebrew scripture, this forbidden mark
is most often replaced by the more generic adonai (my lord), as though by
simplifying the enunciation one might lessen the severity of the verbal
transgression.  Ultimately, of course, the only truly appropriate way to speak to
or about this ineffable God is not to speak at all.  Thus, in his Guide for the
Perplexed, the twelfth-century Jewish Talmudic authority Moses Maimonides
asserts that, with respect to God, all language is inappropriate:
For of whatever we say intending to magnify and exalt, on the one
hand we find that it can have some application to Him, may He be
exalted, and on the other we perceive in it some deficiency.
Accordingly, silence and limiting oneself to the apprehensions of
the intellects are more appropriate...6
These thoughts are echoed by Saint Augustine who, in the first chapter of De
Doctrina Christiana, considers the possibility of referring to God as ‘ineffable’:
If what I said were ineffable [ineffabilis], it would not be said.  And
for this reason God should not be said to be ineffable, for when this
is said, something is said.  And a contradiction in terms is created,
since if that is ineffable which cannot be spoken, then that is not
ineffable which can be called ineffable.  This contradiction is to be
passed over in silence [silentio] rather than resolved verbally.7
In an insightful volume, Silvia Montiglio shows that the same is not true of
pantheistic religions, which discourage rather than encourage silence in worship,
                                                 
6 Moses Maimonides, A Maimonides Reader, ed. Isadore Twersky (West Orange, NJ: Behrman
House, 1972) 271.
7 Saint Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, trans. D.W. Robertson, Jr. (New York: Liberal Arts Press,
1958) 11 (I.vi.6)
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and thus seem “unaware of the strongest meaning that other traditions,
including Christianity, attach to silence.” 8  So, in the shift to monotheism, silence
takes on a new and paradoxical significance, one brilliantly reflected – albeit
somewhat cryptically – in Saint Augustine’s suggestion that it is the ‘presence‘ of
an ‘absence.’  As the point at which human language arrives at its signifying
limitations vis-à-vis God, silence is the symptom of a representational lack, an
inability to find any appropriate name for this ineffable being.  By the same
token, however, silence is, like God, beyond language and is therefore the only
discursive act that does not betray the perfection of this radical Other.  Silence is
the absence of sound, but it is also the linguistic presence of the divine: in Judeo-
Christian monotheism, silence and the sacred coincide.
Silence Incarnate
Such a state of affairs is nonetheless problematic for the religiously
faithful.  For in addition to the aforementioned invectives against direct linguistic
representation of the divine, there is an implicit obligation to speak of God in
worship or to address him for the purposes of prayer.  This antithetical position,
what could be called a linguistic ‘double-bind,’ is one of Saint Augustine’s most
pressing concerns in his Confessions:
And with all this, what have I said, my God and my Life and my
sacred Delight?  What can anyone say when he speaks of Thee?  Yet
woe to them that speak not of Thee at all, since those who say most
are but dumb.9
                                                 
8 Silvia Montiglio, Silence in the Land of Logos, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000) 9.
Montiglio’s study focuses on the role of silence in Greek tragedy and maintains that its function is
linked to a concept of silence culturally and religiously specific to ancient Greece.  Specifically,
she suggests that, unlike the ineffable silence of Christianity, silence in Greek religion reflects the
power of logos (words) and is most often used as a means to avoid saying something that might
offend the Gods.
9 Saint Augustine, The Confessions of St. Augustine, trans. F.J. Sheed (New York: Sheed & Ward,
1943) 5. (I.iv.20-23)
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In spite of the suggestion that total silence (dumbness) is the only true expression
of the divine, there is in this passage – as elsewhere in the Confessions – clear
evidence of a need to address God with words, to communicate devotion
through language.  Note, for example, the proliferation of stylized names in the
first sentence of the above passage: what is elsewhere said to be too perfect for
even the word ‘ineffable’ is referred to here as ‘my God,’ ‘my Life,’ and ‘my
Sacred Delight.’10  Religious faith thus seems to provoke violation of the very law
that it strives to honor and uphold, forcing those who wish to address God to
multiply their use of – to borrow from Maimonides’ vocabulary – ‘deficient’
signifiers.
Into this apparent linguistic impasse comes to rest the definitive symbol of
Christianity’s doctrinal separation from Judaism: the Incarnation.  Both human
and divine, Jesus partially draws back together the two linguistic realms that the
second commandment drives apart.  As Alexandre Leupin suggests, the
conception of this man-God hybrid necessarily positions the religiously
acceptable use of language somewhere between all and nothing, between pagan
idolatry and Jewish iconoclasm:
The new law rejects the vetero-testimentary “You will make no
graven images” as well as the “You will make only images” of
mythology to demand that every image be an icon.11
                                                 
10 Compare these to the relative linguistic poverty of Maimonides’ pair of terms, ‘Him’ and ‘He.’
See p. 19.
11 Alexandre Leupin, Fiction et Incarnation (Paris: Flammarion, 1993) 14.  The original passage is as
follows: “La nouvelle loi récuse aussi bien le « Tu ne feras pas d’image » vétéro-testamentaire que
le « Tu ne feras que des images » de la mythologie, pour prescrire!: que toute image soit icône.”
Leupin’s work focuses on an exploration of the far-reaching effects of the doctrine of the
Incarnation in the theological, rhetorical, and literary domains.  He argues – successfully, I
believe – that the medieval reaction to this radical teaching is the very source of scientific and
literary modernity.
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It is within the purview of this new representational decree that Augustine
presents his confessio:
After this, from corporeal matter, you produced sacraments,
miracles that men could see, and voices to carry your message
according to the firmament of your Book.  These were meant for the
initiation of unbelievers and also for the blessing of the faithful.12
So, what before lead to derision might now instill devotion.  No longer tainted de
facto by the mark of an empty fascination with the material world, human
representation is granted new signifying potential, endowed with a divine
message.  But while communicated by means accessible to the senses, the actual
content of this message remains unarticulated.  It is not part of the words
themselves, but a silent truth that Augustine says is beyond all languages,
regardless of national origin:
But deep inside me, in my most intimate thought, Truth, which is
neither Hebrew nor Greek nor Latin nor any foreign speech, would
speak to me; though not in syllables formed by lips and tongue.13
Human language is not the Word, but it has become its earthly representation,
the vehicle whereby an ineffable God may be intimated.14
This perspective is similar to the one found in practices of Christian and
Jewish mystics of the Middle Ages, who search for a way to approach the
unspeakable through the only means at their disposal – language.  While
different practitioners’ methods vary in content, all seek to transform words into
                                                 
12 Saint Augustine, Confessions, trans. R.S. Pine-Coffin (Middlesex, Eng.: Penguin, 1961) 345 (XIII,
xxxiv).
13 Saint Augustine, Confessions 188 (XI.iii).  Cf. Leupin, Fiction et Incarnation 69, who notes that this
language beyond language “can only be a silent language.”
14 The relationship between God and language in Saint Augustine’s writing is very close to
Lacan’s view of the relationship between the Real (unconscious) and the Symbolic (language).  In
both, what is most significant remains unsaid, although its significance can be grasped through
contemplation and analysis of what is said.  See p. 5 ff.
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a linguistic path leading a spiritual union with the Other and the empty fullness
of silence.  The general name for an entire collection of medieval Jewish mystic
beliefs, cabala prescribes a variety of practices, including regular meditation and
prayer, severe asceticism, and constant study of scripture meant to lead the truly
devout follower to a perfect knowledge of God and creation.15  Perhaps the most
provocative of all these procedures is the meditative technique known as tzeruf,
or the manipulation of letters.  Working with words yet adhering to the notion of
God as an unspeakable truth, many cabalists try, through meditation, to envision
the dissolution of signifying language, a verbal deconstruction that would allow
them to penetrate the ‘beyond-ness’ inherent in the words:
By taking the word inside out of itself, playfully shaking it loose
from its denotative meaning, and melting it down as he led his rapt
disciples from rational discourse to the realm of pure, non-verbal
perception, the Kabbalah master directed the novice out of the
circular and constricting round of thought.16
Moving into a realm of linguistic otherness by stripping away all worldly
associations from the syllables of God’s Hebrew name, the initiate is expected to
arrive at a perfected vision of divinity.  While this state is generated through a
vocal elaboration, it remains essentially silent.  For, as Abraham Abulafia – a
follower of Moses Maimonides and one of the most ardent supporters of Jewish
mysticism – notes, this spiritual activity should occur in complete isolation:
And this is the secret of the pronunciation when you wish to
mention this glorious [divine] name: Make yourself right and
isolate yourself in a special place, so that no one will hear your
                                                 
15 The Judeo-Christian God has been seen as paving the way for the development of a destructive
attitude toward the natural world, but the Cabalist teachings generally recognized the
omnipresence of God in the natural world, seeing in the various beings (animate or inanimate) a
mark of God’s presence, and thus worthy of the mystic’s reverence and contemplation.
16 Perle Epstein, Kabbalah: The Way of the Jewish Mystic (Boston: Shambhala, 1988) 73-74.
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voice except you, then purify your heart and soul from all thoughts
of this world.17
Consistent with the divine ineffability contained in the second commandment,
this tactic draws the initiate toward a silent knowledge of God, but maintains
divine linguistic alterity through the obliteration and abandonment of signifiers.
This practice is similar to the apophatic (negative) theology that is such an
essential part of medieval Christian theology.  Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagite, the
fifth-century Greek philosopher who is arguably the most recognized advocate
of this mystic approach, lays out his theory in On Divine Names and The Mystical
Theology.  Like the masters of cabala, Pseudo-Dionysius maintains that spiritual
union with God may be attained by means of concerted linguistic meditation and
manipulation, a divine silence that he tries to speak by means a specific sort of
linguistic denial.  For Pseudo-Dionysius, things associated with God may be talked
about with kataphatic (affirmative) statements.  However, God himself, and thus
silence, must be indicated only by negation, as in the following example from The
Mystical Theology:
Ascending higher we say:
It is
not soul, not intellect,
not imagination, opinion, reason and not
understanding,
not logos, not intellection,
not spoken, not thought,…18
                                                 
17 Abraham Abulafia, The Light of the Intellect, in Moses Cordovero, Pardes Rimonim, December
2001, http://www.tabick.abel.co.uk/abulafia.html.
18 Pseudo-Dionysious Areopagite, The Divine Names and Mystical Theology, trans. John D. Jones
(Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1980) 221.  I have quoted only a small portion of the
passage in question, which goes on for well over thirty lines and is similar to others in The
Mystical Theology.
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This linguistic cancellation signals a position in “the darkness beyond intellect”
where logos is “wholly without sound and wholly united to the unspeakable.”19
Gradually moving further and further away from the substantive affirmations of
human discourse, the effort to name God once again ends in silence.  However,
rather than trying to dismantle language with the intellect, Pseudo-Dionysius
uses one of language’s own tools (negation) to methodically advance toward an
eventual revelation and union with the divine.
In both these approaches, silence remains closely allied to the idea of an
ineffable God, but the idea that we may be able, through language, to express
this silence confuses its theological status.  Whereas the initial religious doctrine
of ineffability posits silence as a mark of humanity’s and human language’s
separation from the divine, the philosophy of the mystics casts silence as both the
source and object of human discourse.  As a result, it is not without controversy.
For instance, the idea that, once in their meditative state, cabalistic ‘Masters of
the Name were no longer separated from God, was “sacrilege to the ears of a
Jewish establishment steeped in logic, order, and dualism.”20  As noted above,
such objections are to some extent alleviated by the representational shift
inherent to the Incarnation, but even Pseudo-Dionysian mysticism contains an
inadvertent affirmation of language’s signifying power, concentrated in the ‘not’
of his apophatic denial.  Judeo-Christian mysticism thus teeters precariously on
the frontier between man and God, between the imperfection of human language
and the divine perfection of silence.
                                                 
19 Pseudo-Dionysious Areopagite 217-218.
20 Epstein 78.
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Of Silence and Signs
The separation between the sensual properties of language and its loftier21,
spiritual significance constitutes the basis of an entire theory of the linguistic sign
that Augustine outlines in De Doctrina Christiana.  Here, his goal is to provide
readers with the intellectual tools necessary for an independent exploration of
figurative meaning in scripture, an activity he says deals through and through
with signs:
All doctrine concerns either things or signs [signorum], but things
are learned by signs.22
As Augustine himself readily admits, the division between these two fields is
sometimes hard to define, and just because something is a thing in one context
does not exclude it from being a sign elsewhere.  Words, however, belong to a
special subcategory of signs that is entirely removed from the more literal world
of things:
There are other signs whose whole use is in signifying [significado],
like words.  For no one uses words except for the purpose of
signifying something.23
With this statement, floodgates are unlocked that will require considerable
attention if they are not to fly wide open.  For if words are, as he asserts, solely
used to signify something else, then it stands to reason that they themselves are
devoid of meaning and therefore able to be interpreted to multiple and perhaps
contradictory ends.  Indeed, even for an informed reader such as Augustine,
there are words whose meaning cannot be definitively pinned down:
                                                 
21 Augustine describes the Word of God as being both “silent and eternal” (aeterno in silentio) and
says it is “above” (supra) him.  Saint Augustine, The Confessions 258 (XI.vi).
22 Saint Augustine, On Christian Doctrine 8 (I.ii.2).
23 Saint Augustine, On Christian Doctrine 8 (I.ii.2).
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There are, however, instances in which it is uncertain whether the
signification is to be taken in a good or evil sense, like “in the hand
of the Lord there is a cup of strong wine full of mixture [mixto].”  It
is uncertain whether this may signify the wrath of God but not the
ultimate penalty, or, that is, “the dregs,” or whether it may signify
rather the grace of the Scriptures passing from the Jews to the
Gentiles, because “he hath poured it out from this to that,” certain
practices remaining among the Jews which they understand
carnally because “the dregs thereof are not emptied.”24
Like the Stoics before him, Augustine anticipates Ferdinand de Saussure’s notion
of the arbitrary linguistic signifier by recognizing that what a word means is not
dictated by the thing to which it refers, nor by the word itself, but by random and
ultimately mutable association between word (signifier) and thing (signified).25  In
the case of the ambiguous mixto described above, both interpretations are
theologically acceptable, since both lead to a deeper understanding of Christian
doctrine. At the same time, Augustine’s own example shows that how a word is
interpreted rests with the individual, making a variety of meanings possible,
some permissible and others not.26  But because language itself now embodies
                                                 
24 Saint Augustine, On Christian Doctrine 100 (III.xxv.36).
25 For the Stoics, a similar distinction is made between the signifier and the ‘name-bearer,’ while
the signification or meaning of this relationship is located in an intangible entity called the lekton,
or ‘sayable.’ These lekta, therefore, “change their truth value, and they can "perish'' or go out of
existence. Thus they are not to be identified with what is meant by a sentence where that is
thought of as being timelessly true. On the other hand, they cannot be identified with what is
meant on a particular occasion; otherwise they could not change their truth value.  In this context
what is most important about lekta is that they are what is conveyed in language, and are not to
be identified either with the language itself or with the thing or state of affairs referred to…” Julia
Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind: Hellenistic Culture and Society 8 (Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 1992) 76.  Similarly, Ferdinand de Saussure clearly affirms that “the bond
between signifier and signified is arbitrary” (67).  And although he suggest that this relationship
is “fixed, not free” (71) at any given moment in time, language is also “powerless to defend itself
against the forces which from one moment to the next are shifting the relationship between the
signifier and the signified” (75).  Course in General Linguistics, trans. Wade Baskin, eds. Charles
Bally and Albert Sechehaye (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959).  One could envision this signifying
evolution through time as occurring at an accelerated rate in the linguistic associations and
contradictions of the written text.
26 Indeed, for Augustine, the only proper scriptural interpretation is one that leads the reader
back to God: “Whoever, therefore, thinks that he understands the divine Scriptures or any part of
them so that it does not build the double love of God and of our neighbor does not understand it
at all.”  Saint Augustine, On Christian Doctrine 30 (I.xxxvi.40).
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the Word of God, it cannot be words themselves that contain this faulty meaning,
for this would invalidate the doctrinal truth of the Incarnation, and with it
Augustine’s entire approach to scriptural enlightenment.  Instead, it is “the
desire of the user which is culpable.”27  Elsewhere in his writings, this problem is
illustrated with a metaphor very similar to the one used in the passage cited
above.  This time, however, the vessel containing the duplicitous linguistic
mixture offers meanings both suitable and flawed:
I have nothing against the words themselves.  They are like choice
and costly glasses [vasa], but they contain the wine of error which
had already gone to the heads of the teachers who poured it out for
us to drink.28
Ultimately, then, the means by which Christianity brings its incorporeal divinity
into the corporeal world is far from stable.  The fact that God remains in the
realm of the unsaid means that terrestrial comprehension of the Word is subject
to the potentially faulty desires of human will, a misguided reading that can
transform silence from a locus of the sacred to one of sacrilege.
Monastic Silence and Desire
Controlling this unacceptable desire is one of the primary objectives of the
Rule  of Saint Benedict, a primer to the highly regulated life of medieval
monasticism.  Believed to have been composed in the latter half of the sixth
century at the monastery of Monte Cassino, it demands rigorous obedience to an
intricate set of religious laws, social restrictions, and schedules for daily labor.  In
no less than seventy-six separate chapters, this treatise offers detailed
                                                 
27 Saint Augustine, On Christian Doctrine 90 (III.xii.18).
28 Saint Augustine, Confessions 37 (I.xvi).  Thus, “the only thing that counts is the motivation of
the speaker, who uses language arbitrarily to good or bad ends by plying all rhetorical and
stylistic forms to his vouloir-dire.”  Leupin, Fiction et Incarnation 69.
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recommendations for even the most basic of activities, including the election of
the abbot and other monastic officers, schedules for sleep, the number of psalms
to be read each day, and daily food rations.29
Given his preoccupation with the orderly arrangement of even minute
facets of daily life, it is not surprising that Benedict is also quite anxious to
control speech within the monastery walls, something he makes very clear in the
chapter entitled De Taciturnitate (On Silence):
Indeed, so important is silence that permission to speak should
seldom be granted even to mature disciples, no matter how good or
holy or constructive their talk, because it is written: In a flood of
words you will not avoid sin (Prov 10:19); and elsewhere, The
tongue holds the key to life and death (Prov 18:21).30
So, even though he recognizes a useful side to speech, its potential benefits are
far outweighed by the risk of error inherent in human language.  Of course,
monks following the Benedictine rule would not remain completely silent
throughout the day.  Organized verbal activity in the form of psalms, scriptural
readings, and prayers is also an integral component of the lifestyle.  However,
exceptions to the rule of silence are tolerated only in controlled settings, and any
unauthorized departure from the statute is to be met with stern retribution:
If anyone is found to transgress this rule of silence, he must be
subjected to severe punishment [gravi vindicate], except on
occasions when guests require attention or the abbot wishes to give
someone a command, but even this is to be done with the utmost
seriousness and proper restraint.31
                                                 
29 Cf. C.H. Lawrence, Medieval Monasticism: Forms of Religious Life in Western Europe in the Middle
Ages, (New York: Longman, 1989) 23.
30 Saint Benedict, Abbot of Monte Cassino, RB 1980: The Rule of St. Benedict, ed. Timothy Fry
(Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 1981) 191 (VI.3-6).
31 Saint Benedict, Abbot of Monte Cassino 243 (XLII.9).  This passage is from a later chapter in the
Rule entitled Ut post completorium nemo loquatur (That No One Speak after Compline).
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There are in fact several chapters of the Rule whose titles attest to Benedict’s
distrust of the spoken word,32 which is really just another manifestation of his
abhorrence for desire.  Indeed, the Rule proclaims in both spirit and in letter that
“no one is to follow his own heart’s desire.” 33  Nowhere is this desire more
distasteful than in empty, self-serving applications of language:
We absolutely condemn in all places any vulgarity and gossip and
talk leading to laughter and we do not permit a disciple to engage
in words of that kind.34
Here, as in Augustine’s On Christian Doctrine, a distinction is made between
loving words for what they show and loving words themselves, between using
signs and enjoying them.35  The ultimate goal of these many linguistic
interdictions and reprimands is thus a suppression of earthly desire (words) in
exchange for a desire for God (silence).36  With personal will constantly bent to
that of a master (an abbot, Benedict, the pope, God), the manipulative discourse
of Benedict’s monastic law seeks to assimilate individuals into a faultless whole
by covering over linguistic imperfection with a cloak of silence.
                                                 
32 A full list of such chapters is too long to note here, but it would include!“How the Night Office
is to be Said on Sundays,” “At What Times Alleluia is to be Said,” and “In What Order the Psalms
are to be Said.”
33 Saint Bendict, Abbot of Monte Cassino, RB 1980: The Rule of St. Benedict 181 (III.8).
34 Saint Bendict, Abbot of Monte Cassino, RB 1980: The Rule of St. Benedict 191 (VI.8).  Elsewhere in
the Rule, he refers to such speech as “idle talk” (XLVIII.18).
35 See, for example Augustine, On Christian Doctrine 9 (I.iv.4): “To enjoy something is to cling to it
with love for its own sake.  To use something, however, is to employ it in obtaining that which
you love, provided that it is worthy of love.  For an illicit use should be called rather a waste or
an abuse.”
36 Cf. Jean Leclercq, The Love of Learning and the Desire for God (New York: Fordham University
Press, 1982), especially pp. 11-37.
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Literature and Rhetoric: Silence of the Subject
Yet is it really possible to completely efface desire just by controlling
spoken language?  Even monastic life developed ways to get around the
proscription of speech, including an “elaborate sign language, a kind of deaf-
and-dumb alphabet [that] was developed so that the monk could express his
needs without speaking.”37  Frivolous use of this secondary means of
communication was undoubtedly discouraged, but it does suggest that the
personal will [propria voluntas] so detested by Benedict could be expressed
without making a sound.  In fact, this is precisely what occurs in secular fiction
of the Middle Ages, a feat that it achieves by divesting itself and silence of the
sacred aspect of ineffability.  This is not to say that religious or theological
references cannot be found in medieval writing.  On the contrary, traces of
Christian theology abound in these texts, and readers with even a cursory
knowledge of Scripture will find them easy to identify.  However the literary text
plays by rules other than those drawn up by St. Benedict: a physically isolated
and self-referential collection of signifiers from varying types and sources, fiction
shifts discursive focus from an unattainable and exteriorized God to its own
internal locus of meaning.  In the process, both the subject’s relation to silence
and silence itself are unmistakably transformed.
One of the first necessary steps in this process is to detach the signifier
from any mystical value beyond the linguistic realm.  Here, literature owes a
debt of gratitude to classical rhetoric, which paves the way for this dislocation.
In the Institutio Oratoria, Quintilian describes two types of rhetorical silence.  The
                                                 
37 Lawrence 118-119.
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first, detractionem, is a simple omission of words.  However, far from leaving the
listener in a state of confusion or uncertainty that could be likened to a mystical
encounter with the ineffable, this rhetorical strategy is essentially ornamental,
used to maintain decorum by avoiding immodest or embarrassing statements.
Furthermore, Quintilian notes that it is used only when “the word omitted may
be clearly gathered from the context.”38 The second figure of silence, aposiopesis is
commonly known in literary studies as the inexpressibility topos, a feigned
silence that artificially multiplies the value of the person, event, object, or quality
being described.39  Here, an example from Le Conte du Graal illustrates its use in
medieval narrative:
Si se conbatent par igal
As espees molt longuement.
Assez vos deïsse commant,
Se je m’en vosisse antremetre,
Mais por ce n’i voil paine metre (ll. 2616-2620)
They fought equally
with swords, for quite a long time.
I could easily tell you how long,
if I wanted to take the time.
But what good would that do?40
Somewhat subtler than the omission of words, this silence nonetheless
communicates something that is readily provided by both the surrounding
context and literary tradition.  Given this, it would seem as though literature may
never be able to invest silence with anything more than simple and direct
                                                 
38 Marcus Fabius Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, 4 vols., trans. H.E. Butler
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976) IX.iii.58.
39  For more information, see Ernst Robert Curtius, European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages,
trans. Willard R. Trask, 1953.  (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990) 159-161.
40 This translation is my own, while others from the Conte du Graal are taken from Kibler and
Pickens’ edition.
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referential qualities.  However, the use of aposiopesis is not understood in the
exactly the same way by all writers.  In the Poetria Nova, Geoffrey de Vinsauf
frees this figure from its denotative restriction:
A statement thus born does not arrive at beautiful colors openly,
but reveals itself through signs.  It shines indirectly, nor does it wish
to proceed directly into the light.41
Furthermore, this meaning depends not only upon the discursive framework, but
– as Augustine also suggests – on the physical and mental reception of a given
listener.  Part of the discourse is destined to be heard by the ear (partem dedit auri
l. 1582) and another is the exclusive domain of the intellect (partem servavit animo
l. 1583).42  By locating the ultimate meaning of discourse in neither an
untouchable ‘beyond-ness’ nor perceptible linguistic traces, Vinsauf’s ‘new
poetics’ clears a space in fictional writing for silence.
The path carved out by rhetoric has enormous implications for the literary
exploitation of silence. For, once divested of its theological and mystical
trappings, silence can signify any type of perceived perfection, whether spiritual,
sexual, or textual.  Take, for example, the bold claim made by the poet of Le
Roman de Silence:
Si est li voirs, cho dist l’estorie
Ki de Silence fait memorie. (ll. 2657-2658)
This is the truth, according to the story
which preserves the memory of Silence
[which from Silence makes writing].43
                                                 
41 Geoffrey de Vinsauf, The Poetria Nova, ed. and trans. Ernest Gallo The Poetria Nova and its
Sources in Early Rhetorical Doctrine, (The Hague: Paris, 1971) 99.  (ll. 1585-1586)
42 Geoffrey de Vinsauf 99.
43 Unless enclosed in brackets, translations of Le Roman de Silence are taken from Psaki’s English
edition.
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By telling his story, the poet claims to render a tangible linguistic presence from a
silent absence, to bring the ineffable into language, a totalizing fantasy that is
takes the shape of a protagonist whose body silences linguistic divisions
(masculine/feminine, Nature/Nurture, silence/language).  A complete
expression of all signifying possibilities, Silence becomes the perfect sign of the
writer’s own desire for linguistic perfection.  Like the silence of divine
ineffability, literary silence in Le Roman de Silence and other secular texts is also
the mark of a linguistic fullness.  However, what it expresses is not devotion to
God, but the poet’s own desire.
In both sacred and secular expression of the Middle Ages, silence is thus
more than just the absence of sound.  Whether the intimation of divine
ineffability or the fantastic repository of a poet’s desire, silence is a powerful
discursive tool.  As the locus of that which remains unsaid, it makes a space
within discourse for ideas and desires that surpass language.  Suppressing
individual desire in deference to an ultimate Being, medieval theology strives to
ensure the integrity of religious doctrine by maintaining a strict concordance
between God and silence.  However, because what silence means is always a
function of the words that surround it and the (mis)interpretation of an
individual listener or reader, this attempt can only succeed within well-
delineated confines such as those of Benedictine monasticism.  Freed of such
restrictions in secular writing, it becomes a productive source of expression for
less than sacred aspirations.
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Chapter Two: Silence and Sainthood in La Vie de Saint
Alexis
A voir ce que l'on fut sur terre et ce qu'on laisse
Seul le silence est grand ; tout le reste est faiblesse.
— Alfred de Vigny, “La Mort du loup” (Les Destinées)
Nowhere is medieval Christianity’s ambivalent attitude toward silence
more evident than in its beliefs regarding those whom it deems closest to God.1
While never entirely free from sin, the lives of many saints are marked by an
unwavering concern for the theologically proper use of words and, consequently,
silence.  Nonetheless, just what constitutes such propriety is not altogether clear,
even among the most distinguished Church fathers.  On the one hand, silence is
a necessary and unmistakable mark of linguistic humility, the only truly fitting
description for a deity whose absolute alterity places him beyond any and all
appellations.  In this sense, linguistic profusion is inherently suspect,2 leading
Saint Benedict to declare that a monk in search of divine exaltation “controls his
tongue and remains silent, not speaking unless asked a question.”3  On the other,
                                                 
1 In the Bible, spiritual perfection is often spoken of in terms of one’s proximity to God.  See, for
example, James 4:7-9.  For a brief background on the rapport between these ideas and the
portrayal of saints in medieval writing, see also Brigitte Cazelles, “Introduction,” Images of
Sainthood in Medieval Europe, ed. Renate Blumenfeld-Kosinski and Timea Szell (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1991) 1-3.  The twin themes of separation from the world and proximity
to God have also been tied to an imaginative etymological heritage of the Greek word for saint,
hagios. While its more accurate meaning is merely “holy,” André Vauchez notes that it has often
been associated with the phrase a gios, or “external to the world.”  André Vauchez, “Lay People’s
Sanctity in Western Europe: Evolution of a Pattern (Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries),” Images of
Sainthood in Medieval Europe, ed. Renate Blumenfeld-Kosinski and Timea Szell (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1991) 23.
2 One of the Biblical passages glossed by Saint Benedict, Proverbs 10:19 clearly affirms that with
profuse language comes transgression: “When words are many, sin is not absent, but he who
holds his tongue is wise.”
3 Fittingly, this chapter of the monastic Regla sancti Benedicti carries the title De humilitate (On
Humility).  Saint Benedict, Abbot of Monte Cassino, RB 1980: The Rule of St. Benedict, ed. Timothy
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those who are truly faithful cannot – as Saint Augustine so clearly affirms –
remain completely silent.4  To do so would constitute man’s failure to recognize
God as such, to tacitly reject divine authority by verbal omission.  So, despite the
fact that he describes his confessio as a “secret exultation” (secreta exultatione)
between him and God, Augustine concedes to share his story with others
susceptible of being inspired by it, a recitation to be heard “in the ears of the
believing sons of men, companions of my joy and sharers of my mortality, my
fellow citizens, fellow pilgrims.”5  When taken to its extreme, silence would thus
be rebellious, a form of resistance that borders “dangerously on abstention,
indifference, and disappearance;” a radical void intimating not servile humility,
but free will.6
La Vie de Saint Alexis stands as a marvelously crafted theopoetic
exploration of the precarious frontier between these two related yet ultimately
contradictory uses of silence.  The hagiographic account of a noble layman who
                                                                                                                                                  
Fry  (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 1981) 201 (VII.56).  For additional information
regarding this work, see p. 28 ff.  Though not proof of any intentional Benedictine influence on
this particular version of the Alexis legend, it is interesting to note that St. Alban’s, the abbey
where the L  (Hildesheim) manuscript was composed, belongs to the Benedictine order.
4 The only people Augustine excuses from not speaking are those who are dumb.  Paradoxically,
they are also those who, in his mind, say the most.  See p. 20 f.  Even in secular forms of praise or
eulogy, silence is typically no more than a rhetorical strategy used to amplify the value of the
person in question.  This is the category of rhetorical topoi to which Ernst Robert Curtius gives the
name “inexpressibility.”  European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, trans. Willard R. Trask
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983) 159-162.
5 Saint Augustine, The Confessions of St. Augustine, trans. F.J. Sheed (New York: Sheed & Ward,
1943) 214. (X.iv.6)
6 Lisa Block de Behar, A Rhetoric of Silence and Other Selected Writings (New York: Mouton de
Gruyter, 1995) 6.  Robin Patric Clair makes a similar suggestion concerning an excess of silence on
the part of a mourning widow in the aboriginal Warramunga tribe of central Australia:
“Although the ‘mourning silence’ is imposed on the women for a period of two years, this
woman remained silent for twenty-four years.  Her silence speaks to us.  It speaks of oppression;
it enunciates defiance; it articulates resistance.  Furthermore, it evidences creativity; it
demonstrates control; it languishes in frustration; and it isolates the woman while simultaneously
joining her to others who have known or know of the imposed silence.”  Robin Patric Clair,
Organizing Silence: A World of Possibilities, (Albany, NY: Albany State University of New York
Press, 1998) 147.
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forsakes the material trappings of secular life for a spiritually oriented existence,
this narrative details a series of privations (financial, sexual, alimentary,
vestimentary, and linguistic) meant to serve as apophatic evidence of the saint-
to-be’s absolute devotion to God.  Sanctified upon death, Alexis and his life of
personal denial are cast as the terrestrial realization of God’s celestial talent (OF,
will; plan).7  Yet while verbal asceticism helps to secure his place in the
theological hierarchy of the narrative, the devotional orientation of Alexis’ only
other notable linguistic act – hasty composition of an autobiographical missive
just prior to death – is less certain.  In fact, careful examination of this and other
significant episodes from the saint’s life suggests that his brief deviation into
substantive representation transforms silence from a tacit partition denoting
spiritual obedience and linguistic submission into an articulate space where
anonymity gives way to identity and language melds with desire.
Poetry and Parentage
Though the vague chronological origins of medieval texts make their
dates of composition approximate at best, most linguistic and physical evidence
suggests that this Old French version of the Alexis legend had its genesis near
the middle of the eleventh century before being transcribed into the L
(Hildesheim) manuscript – part of the celebrated St. Alban’s Psalter – sometime
during the first half of the twelfth.8  For this reason, La Vie de Saint Alexis has long
                                                 
7 While other Old French words (e.g., volentet) have more or less the same meaning, talent is the
one use most often by the hand that composed La Vie de Saint Alexis.
8 Gaston Paris was the first to propose this dating, and his work continues to be an authoritative
reference.  Gaston Paris and Leopold Pannier, La Vie de Saint Alexis, Poème du Xième, et
renouvellements du XIIe, XIIIe, et XIVe siècles (Paris: 1872).  MS. L. is part of the St. Alban’s Psalter,
now housed in the collections of St. Godehard’s (Bremen, Germany).  For a discussion of the
significance behind what would be the “lost original” upon which the text in L is based, see
Alexandre Leupin, Barbarolexis: Medieval Writing and Sexuality, trans. Kate M. Cooper (Cambridge:
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been recognized – alongside the Saint Eulalie, the Saint Léger, and the Clermont
Passion – as one of the preeminent works of French literature.9  As such, it was
part of an important evolution in the sociolinguistic diffusion of information and
ideas.  Whereas both religious and secular books composed in Latin and Greek
were, by default, reserved for an intellectual elite, writing in the vernacular
opened new and wider avenues of textual dissemination.  For, if an
overwhelming majority of the medieval populace remained functionally
illiterate, “people were accustomed to hearing, understanding and
acknowledging the authority of the written word.”10
Today, this oral propagation of medieval textual material is most often
associated with the jongleur, that wandering bard who shared his predominantly
secular repertoire with the masses.  However, the Church also played its part:
having no doubt recognized the evangelical and doctrinal advantages of a more
flexible linguistic policy, the council of Tours voted in 813 to require translation
of homilies “in rusticam Romanam linguam” (in the rustic romance language) so
                                                                                                                                                  
Harvard University Press, 1989) 40-44.  There are three other extant versions of this Old French
Alexis (later medieval versions have also been found in thirteenth and fourteenth-century
manuscripts), including MS. A (Bibliothèque Nationale de France), MS. P (No. 19525,
Bibliothèque Nationale de France), and MS. V (the Vatican).  I have chosen to use L because it is
the most complete of the four.  For more information concerning the physical condition and
format of this particular manuscript, see Otto Pächt et al., The St. Alban’s Psalter (Albani Psalter)
(London: The Warburg Institute - University of London, 1960).
9 For a discussion of these and other examples of early hagiographical romance, consult Duncan
Robertson, The Medieval Saints’ Lives (Lexington, KY: French Forum, 1995) 200-252.
10 R.I. Moore, “Literacy and the Making of Heresy c. 1000 – c. 1150,” Heresy and Literacy, 1000-
1530, eds. Peter Biller and Anne Hudson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) 32.  See
also M.B. Parkes, “The Literacy of the Laity,” The Medieval World, ed. David Daiches and Anthony
Thorlby (London: Aldus Books, 1973) 555-577.  It should be noted that there is much debate about
just what might constitute “literacy” when speaking of the European Middle Ages.  Its use in this
sentence refers first and foremost to the ability to read and write, though one could envision the
exceptional case of someone who manipulates language in a creative fashion – a jongleur, for
example – without being able to understand or reproduce its written forms.
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that the general public might understand them.11  With this decision, the catholic
hierarchy not only strengthened clerical influence on the laity, but also helped
legitimize a fledgling tongue: use of Old French as an official ecclesiastical
language both enriched its vocabulary and expanded its discursive registers.
Furthermore, like the celebrated Serments de Strasbourg (c. 842), this directive
attests to the historical progression toward a continuum between use of the
vernacular and national identity in medieval France, a trend that brought
together diverse ideas and terminology from politics, literature, and religion.12
But while this cultural amalgamation shored up the linguistic foundations
of Old French, it also made vernacular poetry an inherently eclectic form of
expression.  From complex notions to simple words, its articulations were often
drawn from these different sources of inspiration with equal vigor.  The
medieval text is thus a heterogeneous one, its language capable of conditioning
any number of relationships and meanings, “a unifying act that establishes and
generates meaning as it is performed.”13  Indeed, like so many other examples of
early vernacular literature, the Hildesheim Alexis shows unmistakable signs of a
                                                 
11 Charles Joseph Hefele, Histoire des conciles, 5 vols., ed. and trans. H. Leclercq (Paris: Letouzey et
Ané, 1910) 5.2:1143.  Hefele’s work provides an excellent summary of all major medieval councils
and their most important decisions and recommendations.  In addition, cf. Nancy Vine Durling,
“Hagiography and Lineage: The Example of the Old French Vie de Saint Alexis,” Romance Philology
40.4 (1987) 458, who also suggests that vernacular hagiographical works like Alexis “grew out of”
these doctrinal linguistic policies.
12 The oldest surviving example of Old French is found in the Serments de Strasbourg (c. 842),
political declarations in which two grandsons of Charlemagne – Louis le Germanique and
Charles le Chauve – proclaim allegiance to each other and form an alliance against their older
brother Lothaire.  For more information regarding the ties between political consolidation and
linguistic development in medieval France, see Peter Haidu, The Subject of Violence (Bloomington:
Indiana UP, 1993).
13 Paul Zumthor, Toward a Medieval Poetics, trans. Philip Bennet (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1992) 81.
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mixed heritage, its pages the offspring of a union between two very different
parents, one pleasing and the other spiritual:
Ici cumencet amiable cançun e spiritel raisun d’iceol noble barun
Eufemien par num, e de la vie de sum filz boneüret del quel nus
avum oït lire et canter.
Here begins the pleasing song and spiritual account of that noble
baron named Euphemian, and of the life of his blessed son, about
whom we have heard reading and singing.14
With broad yet masterful strokes, the fundamental duality of medieval
vernacular hagiography is brought sharply into view: nourished by both factual
accounts and felicitous rumors, it binds the weighty authority of written
documentation to the satisfying evanescence of song.15  It is, in other words,
governed by the contradictory set of motivations that Saint Augustine describes
as part of an ethical choice between enjoyment (fruendum) and use (utendum) of
things:
To enjoy something is to cling to it for its own sake.  To use
something, however, is to employ it in obtaining that which you
love, provided that it is worthy of that love.  For an illicit use
should be called rather a waste or an abuse. 16
                                                 
14 Carl J. Odenkirchen, ed. and trans., The Life of St. Alexius (Brookline, MA: Classical Folios, 1978)
142, emphasis mine.  All passages in Old French from La Vie de Saint Alexis are taken from
Odenkirchen’s edition.  For the English translations, I have used Odenkirchen as a point of
departure but made slight adjustments in places where I deemed his wording cumbersome or
imprecise.
15 As Lawrence Cunningham notes: “One of the most difficult tasks of the scientific
hagiographer, is trying to unravel the skein of fiction to find what historical material might be
hidden in the entire fabric” of a saint’s recorded life.  Lawrence Cunningham, The Meaning of
Saints (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1980) 40. For an informative discussion of many of the
distinctive features of vernacular hagiography versus its Latin counterpart, see Evelyn Birge Vitz,
“From the Oral to the Written in Saints’ Lives,” Images of Sainthood in Medieval Europe, ed. Renate
Blumenfeld-Kosinski and Timea Szell (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991) 97-114.  While
Vitz does not discuss La Vie de Saint Alexis in her article, she does touch on many relevant points,
including an interesting discussion of the vaying influence of textual models in Latin and
vernacular hagiography.
16 Saint Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, trans. D.W. Robertson, Jr. (New York: Liberal Arts
Press, 1958) 9 (I.iv.4).
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Nowhere is this dilemma more prevalent for Augustine than in the ambiguous
‘things’ of language.  Since the only purpose of words is to signify something
else,17 deciding just what this something else might be is a delicate exercise:
whereas “many and varied obscurities and ambiguities deceive those who read
casually,” the rigorous lector will esteem the same words to be “magnificently
and wholesomely modulated.”18  It is not – as was explained in the preceding
chapter – words that are to be despised, but rather their misuse and
misunderstanding.19  Mired in contradictory compositional motivations, it is
almost impossible to tell on which side of this fence the Alexis summary falls.
For, as other critics have noted, careful attention to the audible component of
what appears to be a prose synopsis detects instead a contiguous string of
rhymed verses (signaled by word pairs like raisun/num and bonëuret/canter in the
passage cited above).20  Vacillating between two poles of a rich yet ambivalent
linguistic origin, between spiritual and sensual vocabularies, between a
reasonable use of words and their shallow enjoyment, this introductory passage
joins the story of Alexis to a study of the intricacies of medieval poetic lexis.21
Like the précis to his vita, Alexis is himself descended from two distinct
sources, one worldly and the other divine.  Yet while its conflicting poetic styles
                                                 
17 Saint Augustine, On Christian Doctrine 8 (I.ii.2).
18 Saint Augustine, On Christian Doctrine 37-38 (II.vi.7-8).
19 See p. 28 f.
20 Cf. Leupin 43, who also addresses the relationship between the text’s various ambiguities and
what he calls the “dissimulated versification” of its prologue.  For additional enlightenment on
this section of the poem, see Joseph P. Williman, “The Hidden Proeme in Verse of the Vie de Saint
Alexis,” Romance Notes 14 (1973) 606-612.
21 These and other uncertainties surrounding the legend could, perhaps, explain the Church’s
wavering devotion to it: his vita was not given official status until it became part of Bolland’s
Acta sanctorum (17th century), and other commentators (Odenkirchen, Pächt) have noted that
there is very little evidence of commitment to the saint’s cult in the celebratory calendars of
medieval abbeys.
42
and inspirations make the pseudo-prose summary waver in uncertainty, its
protagonist’s similarly diverse origins are – at least on a first reading – much less
troublesome.  From the start, it is God’s omnipotent authority that holds sway
over earthly and familial influence in Alexis’ life, an unfaltering spiritual
devotion that is the direct result of his parents’ desperate plea for divine
reproductive intervention:
A Deu apelent parfitement:
“E reis celeste, par tun cumandement
Amfant nus done ki seit a tun talent.” (ll. 23-25, emphasis mine)
Both call on God in perfect form:
“Ah heavenly king, by your command
Give us a child who is according to your will.
A rather obvious borrowing from the Biblical story of Abraham and Sarah, this
pious request subjugates the couple’s future offspring de facto to the will of God
and, more generally, human desire to heavenly influence.22  Indeed, Alexis is not
so much a product of sexual copulation as he is the earthly manifestation of
celestial power.  Described as the son of a noble Roman baron, he was
nevertheless “engendered by divine will” (Par le divine volentet il desirrables icel sul
filz angendrat).23
Confused with images of the goddess Natura in later medieval romance,
the role of a Deus creator is given particular weight in the Old French Alexis in
comparison to other versions of the same legend.  For instance, even the ‘official’
hagiographic account in the Acta sanctorum acknowledges – albeit indirectly – a
physical coitus between Euphemian and his wife prior to the future saint’s birth:
                                                 
22 For the story of Abraham and Sarah, see Genesis 16:1-3, 15-16, 17, 21:1-2.  The two stories are,
of course, not identitcal, since the Biblical couple had a multitude of offspring.  However, other
similarities discussed below (see p. 48 f.) reinforce this parallel.
23 Odenkirchen 142.
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...atque statuerut ut deinceps castum et sanctum reliquum vitae
suae tempus ducerunt...
...they decided from then on they would spend what was left of
their lives in chasitity and holiness...24
The Hildesheim manuscript, however, contains no such allusion.  Instead, the
text redirects all traces of a beginning toward God.  Both the mother’s fecundity
and her son are thus the result of symbolic donation rather than physical
generation:
Tant li prierent par grant humilitet,
Que la mulier dunant fecunditet.
Un filz lur dunet, si l’en sourent bon gret.  (ll. 26-28, emphasis mine)
So much they prayed to him with great humility
That he gave the woman fecundity.
He gives them a son, and they were very thankful to him.
With its repetition of the verb doner (OF, to give) and use of the rhyming pair
humilitet/fedunditet, this passage reinforces the general theological distinction
between man (thankful receiver of life) and God (generous provider of life) noted
above.  Furthermore, the parents’ successful plea for a child binds spiritual
devotion and reward to sexual abstention, a saintly standard of conduct that will
be essential to this hagiographical account as well as its complementary
discourse on the linguistic implications of silence.
Refusal and Reticence
But if the text’s initial passages point to a harmonious alignment of
terrestrial and celestial designs for Alexis’ life, their fundamental discord soon
becomes apparent.  Having previously offered up his son for divine stewardship
with great humility (grant humilitet, l. 26), Euphemian begins to act out of
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unabashed self-interest when confronted with the possibility of genealogical
discontinuity:
Quant veit li pedre que mais n’aurat amfant,
Mais que cel sul que il par amat tant,
Dunc se purpensent del secle en avant.
Or volt que prengent mogler a sun vivant.   (ll. 36-39, emphasis mine)
When the father sees that he will have no other children
Except this one alone, whom he loves so much,
He takes to thought about the world to come.
He now wants him to take a wife while he is yet living.
The father is thus willing to subject himself to the dominance of divine talent only
so long as this obedience does not interfere with his own worldly plans for an
orderly inheritance of his extensive lands (larges terres, l. 402) and great palaces
(granz paleis, l. 403).  A common theme in medieval fiction, such concerns are, in
some measure, a reflection of the social structures that governed feudal
heredity.25  But while the content of this passage may not hold exceptional
significance, its contextual placement does.  For the future to which Euphemian
so intently turns his attention is one that has already been condemned by the
text’s own verse:
Bons fut li secles, ja mais n’ert si valiant.
Velz est e frailes, tut s’en vat declinant;
Sist ampairet, tut bien vait remanant. (ll. 8-10)
The world was good, never again will it be as honorable.
It is now old and weak – it all continues to decline.
It has worsened so, all good is left behind.
                                                 
25 Characters in the other two texts examined by this study express similar concerns.  See p. 101
ff., p. 169 ff., and p. 206 ff.  As Bloch notes, such literary perspectives on the topic are a “faithful
echo” of popular and political trends of the time, with one of the first official decrees regarding
the inheritance of feudal holdings having been issued by Charles the Bald in 877, prior to his
military campaign in Italy.  March Bloch, Feudal Society, trans. L.A. Manyon (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1961) 194-197.
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Cast as the denigration of a glorious past to which the scribe also refers as “the
days of Noah and Abraham” (Al tens Noe ed al tens Abraham, l. 6), the future in La
Vie de Saint Alexis is nothing short of sinful, a prurient object of desire that leads
one away from God. 26
This is a significant position, because it paves the way for a censure of not
only the destructive love for material possessions, but also the superfluous
enjoyment of language, both of which are represented by the paternal estate.
For, in addition to the usual marks of familial prosperity mentioned above,
Alexis stands to inherit significant linguistic assets, a verbal largesse that
Euphemian begins to hand down soon after his son is born:
Puis ad escole li bons pedre le mist;
Tant aprist letres que bien en fut guarnit. (ll. 33-34)
And then his good father put him in school;
He learned letters so well that he was well provided with them.
The name Euphemian is itself indicative of such verbal profusion: as a rhetorical
figure of speech, the euphemism operates via the exchange of more mild, indirect,
or vague terms for ones considered exceedingly harsh, blunt, or offensive.  So,
“[a]s a substitution from signifier to signifier…the father’s name would
dissimulate evil and point once again in the direction of the splitting at work in
the text’s beginnings.”27  Alexis’ paternal legacy is, in other words, one that revels
in a clever manipulation of the subtle distinction between spiritel raisun and
                                                 
26 There are a great many examples of this disdain for the present and/or future in medieval
writing, whether secular or religious.  One of the most scathing of such condemnations is Bernard
of Cluny’s De Contemptu mundi which, in addition to insightful reflections on a variety of
theological and philosophical topics, begins with a clear expression of hatred for the present and
pessimism regarding any terrestrial future: “Hora novissima, tempora pessima sunt” (It is the
final hour, the times are wicked – be watchful!).  Bernard of Cluny (Morlaix), Scorn for the World:
Bernard of Cluny’s “De Contemptu mundi,” ed. and trans. Ronald E. Pepin (Lansing, MI: Colleagues
Press, 1991).
27 Leupin, Barbarolexis 45.
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amiable cançun, between a sparing, precise use of language and its more opulent,
melodious subterfuge.
True to his name, Euphemian tries to disguise his irreligious intentions
with a more pleasing and conformative facade, presenting marriage and its
consummation as a divinely ordained task:
Ço dist li padres: “Filz, quar t’en vas colcer
Avoc ta spuse al cumand Deu del ciel.” (ll. 52-53)
His father said, “Son come go to bed now
With your bride, as God in heaven orders.”
Yet the motivation behind this renewed concern for doctrinal compliance is, as
suggested above, not spiritual but sociopolitical.  The bride chosen for Alexis is
thus not just any woman, but one of “distinguished parentage” (halt parentet, l.
41) and the couple’s respective fathers are much more focused on the physical
and political assemblage of their children (Lur dous amfanz volent faire assembler, l.
45) than on any sacred bond between man and wife.  Furthermore, Euphemian’s
claim that God requires Alexis to consummate his marriage is not entirely
accurate.  Though medieval Christianity conceived of marriage as an
“honourable estate,” it was deemed an insufficient alternative to complete sexual
abstention – “an excellent continence” (excellentis continentiae) – particularly for
those devoted to a higher calling.28
Still, the mere fact that the L manuscript and other medieval variants of
the Alexis legend allow this marriage to take place suggests that the father’s plans
may succeed:  earlier Greek and Syrian versions place Alexis’ departure from
                                                 
28 For Augustine, marriage is a viable yet ultimately insufficient solution to a need for total
religious devotion (including that typified by saints), which can only be satisfied by an “excellent
continence” (excellentis continentiae).  Saint Augustine, “On Marriage and Concupiscence,” trans.
Peter Holmes, et al., A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church
(First Series), 14 vols., ed. Philip Schaff (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1971) 5:271 (I.xviii).
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Rome before the wedding.29  But instead of compromising the saint-to-be’s
integrity, this poetic innovation only serves to render his refusal of it all the more
prominent.  Almost as quickly as he enters into the social contract of marriage, he
refuses to honor it out of devotion to God:
Danz Alexis l’espuset belament;
Mais ço est tel plait dunt ne volsist nient;
De tut en tut ad a Deu sun talent. (ll. 48-50)
Lord Alexius marries her in a brilliant ceremony
But this is the sort of contract he wanted none of:
Altogether his will is directed towards God.
Thus, Euphemian’s earlier pact with God has now come back to haunt him, for
Alexis’ desire (talent) is not sexual, but celestial, and the familial contract (plait)
that would join him to this woman cannot hold up against the one that binds him
to God.  Beaten at his own game, the count is betrayed by the inherent
etymological instability of the word plait, which intimates unity and division, the
possibility of sexual rapport and the dark shadow of its lack.
Indeed, soon after this initial refusal, a direct correlation between sexual
and material privation becomes evident.  Still faced with the unwanted task of
physically consummating the symbolic union between him and his bride, Alexis
is torn between faithfulness and obedience.  Though he does not want to disobey
his father (Ne volt li emfes sum pedre carocier, l. 54), he cannot, it seems, forsake
God:
Cum veit le lit, esguardat la pulcela;
Dunc li remembret de sun seinor celeste,
Que plus ad cher que tut aveir terrestre. (ll. 56-58)
As he sees the bed, he looked at the maiden;
He then remembers his heavenly lord,
                                                 
29 Odenkirchen 13-29.
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Whom he holds dearer than all earthly goods.
Whether intentional or not, the scribe’s description of this scene paints a rather
humorous picture of the worried saint-to-be glancing from bed to wife, wife to
bed, all the while thinking of God.  As anticipated, the seinor celeste ultimately
wins out over aveir terrestre, with Alexis sacrificing the tangible but fragile (frailes,
l. 69) rewards of his patrimony for an esoteric but lasting truth (veritet, l. 64)
afforded by absolute spiritual devotion. Even the manuscript’s decorative
accents seem to preclude satisfaction of Euphemian’s request; the image of the
couple on the frontispiece of L shows bodies much too large for the bed in which
they are meant to lie.30  A colorful rejection of reproductive obligation in favor of
paradoxical noces virginels (virginal nuptials),31 this episode serves as a narrative
foundation for the stark asceticism that will characterize Alexis’ existence
throughout the tale.
The concordance between pictorial and lexical features in this part of the
manuscript signals yet another point of differentiation between father and son.
Just as Alexis’ commitment to his seinor celeste entails a rejection of paternal
attitudes regarding material and sexual production, so too, does it predicate a
different linguistic perspective.  Whereas Euphemian tries to coerce his son into
bed by using deceptive verbal arguments, Alexis’ justification for choosing
abstinence is both demonstrative and declarative, relying upon the authoritative
                                                 
30 A monochrome reproduction of this image is available in Odenkirchen 6.  For a high-quality
color image of the same folio, see the Internet website for the University of Aberdeen’s St. Alban’s
Psalter Project, Nov. 2002, Jan. 2003, http://www.abdn.ac.uk/diss/historic/stalbanspsalter/.  A
copy of the latter is included in this study as appendix A.
31 Odenkirchen 142.
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display of a textual raisun and symbolic gestures to support his devotional
discourse:
Quant sa raisun li ad tute mustrethe,
Pois li cumandet les renges de s’espethe,
Ed un anel; a Deu li ad a ço mandethe.
Dunc en eisset de la cambre sum pedre. (ll. 71-74, emphasis mine)
When he had shown her his whole argument,
He entrusted her with the sash from his sword
And a ring; whereupon he commended her to God.
From there he left his father’s room.
But if Alexis’ reasoning is clearly presented to his bride, the vocabulary of the
second and third lines of this passage has long puzzled readers, particularly the
word renges.  In his edition of the text, Odenkirchen provides several possible
etymological antecedents for this term, and the translation I have chosen – “sash”
– is one of those he suggests.32   It is, therefore, surprising that Odenkirchen
instead opts for the relatively awkward “sword-ring,” especially since the
frontispiece shows that the object in question is indeed a decorative bolt of cloth
draped around the handle of a sword.33  As suggested above, these items may be
read as symbols of the saint’s abandonment of his bride (un anel) and feudal
authority (the renges from his sword).  Later in the tale, Euphemian does, for
example, lament what would have been his son’s privileged military status had
he not given up his inheritance:
Tei cuvenist helme e brunie a porter
Espede ceindra cume tui altre per. (ll. 411-412, emphasis mine)
You should have worn helmet and mail;
Girt on a sword like the rest of your peers.
                                                 
32 He associates it with the Syrian word “renda.” Odenkirchen 71-72.
33 See note 30, p. 48.
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Still, once closer attention is given to the whole of this scene, another possible
interpretation comes into view.  Specifically, the illuminator’s positioning of the
sword in this frontispiece – waist high with the handle tilted towards Alexis’
soon-to-be estranged wife as she grasps hold of its discarded ornamentation – is,
I believe, a visually striking reference to another, more religiously inspired pact:
the abrahamic covenant of circumcision.34 Recalling his parents’ initial deference
to divine authority and implying Alexis’ dedication to the bons secles praised in
the opening lines of the poem, adoption of this new contract marks a general
disdain for the material world that will come to define both the language and
identity of this saint.35
Sacrifice, Silence, and the Self
One of the more common motifs in both Latin and vernacular
hagiography of the Middle Ages is that of the pilgrimage, a religious voyage
whose connotations of hermetic isolation were especially popular during the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries.36  Unlike the errant chivalric wanderings
depicted in Arthurian chansons de geste, such physical displacement in the vita
sancti is generally indicative of a spiritual progression toward God.37  It is
                                                 
34 God’s promise of descendants to Abraham required the latter’s acquiescence to the covenant of
circumcision.  Genesis 17:10-14.
35 Thus as Durling asserts, “Alexis is defined by his opposition to lineage.”  Nancy Vine Durling,
“Hagiography and Lineage: The Example of the Old French Vie de saint Alexis.”  Romance
Philology 60.4 (1987): 454
36 Vauchez notes that imitation of the meekness, poverty, and trials of Christ became an
increasingly popular model during the twelfth century. André Vauchez, “Lay People’s Sanctity in
Western Europe: Evolution of a Pattern (Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries),” 26-31.  See also
Monks, hermits, and the ascetic tradition: papers read at the 1984 Summer Meeting and the 1985 Winter
Meeting of the Ecclesiastical History Society, ed. W.J. Sheils (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1985).
37 The opposite is true of Perceval’s departure from his homeland in Le Conte du Graal, during
which time he eventually “no longer remembered God.”  See p. 115 ff.
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therefore of no great surprise that the itinerary of Alexis’ flight from unwanted
paternal aveir in Rome is, like the rest of his life, willed by God:
Drecent lur sigle, laisent curre par mer;
La pristrent terre o Deus les volt mener.
Dreit a Lalice (ço fut citet mult bele)
Iloec arivet sainement la nacele. (ll. 79-82, emphasis mine)
They raise the sail, let the ship speed across the sea,
They find land wherever God wishes to take them,
Straight to Laodicea (which was a very attractive city)
That is where the ship arrives unharmed.
Driven by sacred forces, Alexis goes not where he wants, but where God
chooses, his mortal talent still indistinguishable from that of his seinor celeste.
Accordingly, he “never ceases to serve God” while at this divinely ordained
destination.  Nevertheless, the port city of Laodicea offers no more than a
momentary respite for poet, saint, and reader alike; the whole of Alexis’ time
there is condensed into just three short lines:
Dunc en eisit danz Alexis a certes
Ço ne sai jo cum longes i converset;
Ou qu’il seit de Deu servir ne cesset. (ll. 83-85)
Without hesitation Lord Alexis disembarks.
I do not know how long he sojourns there;
However that may be, he never ceases to serve God.
Whether genuine or feigned, the poet’s ignorance regarding this transitory
sojourn minimizes its fictional significance, diverting attention toward verses yet
to come.  So, as its name in Old French (Lalice) suggests, this city is just a
permeable barrier – une lice – that delimits passage from one place to another,
from the decadent pitfalls of Rome to whatever lies on the other side.38
                                                 
38 Lice was fencing used near medieval castles to demarcate small areas of land for jousts and
other purposes.
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Given the preponderant role of heavenly authority in Alexis’ life and
travels up to this point, it is only natural to assume that the next destination
would stand as a textual counterweight to the oppressive materialism of his
rejected patrimony.  It is thus odd that the future saint’s departure from Laodicea
seems to be motivated by an idolatric fascination not unlike the illicit material
desires of his father:
D’iloc alat a Alsis la ciptet,
Pur une imagine dunt il oit parler (ll. 86-87)
From there he went to the city of Edessa,
Because of an image that he had heard talked about.
Pulling his pilgrimage astray from its strict theological orientation, Alexis’ visual
curiosity throws – at first blush anyway – the legitimacy of his spiritual
commitment into doubt.  Yet nowhere is this imagine described in detail, and not
once during seventeen long years in Edessa does Alexis try to catch even the
slightest glimpse of it.  This, despite the fact that he sleeps, eats and begs for alms
just outside the church where it is housed.39  In fact, the journey from Lalice to
Alsis ultimately points not to an abusive love of things but to their deliberate
abandonment, a concerted scorn for the very sort of desire that initially provoked
this departure.
Indeed, the name Alsis is itself suggestive of deprivation.  Phonetically, it
differs from the proper name Alexis by just a single syllable (eks), represented in
                                                 
39 Thus, when later in the tale this same imagine summons Alexis, he is referred to as “the one
who is seated across the portal” of the church (Cil qui tres l’us set, l. 177).  In a study of the
historical and philological foundations of this legend, Cooper argues that this relic is none other
than the famed Shroud of Turin, the burial cloth said to carry the corporeal image of Jesus.  Linda
Cooper,  “The Old French Life of Saint Alexis and the Shroud of Turin,” Modern Philology 84.1
(1986): 1-17.  Though I do not agree with her thesis in its entirety, the comparison is a fitting one,
since both objects are portrayed as tangible remnants of a divine presence now departed.
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the saint’s name by the privative pairing “-ex-.”40  Thus, while Laodicea is a
“very attractive city” (citet mult bele), Edessa is merely a “city” (ciptet) where,
upon arrival, Alexis promptly rids himself of all superfluous material
belongings:
Tut sun aver qu’od s’ei en ad portet
Tut le depart par Alsis la citet –
Larges almosnes, que gens ne l’en remest (ll. 91-93)
All his possessions that he had brought with him
All of them he distributes throughout the city of Edessa–
Generous alms, so that nothing whatsoever was left to him.
Donating everything carried from Rome to the local poor, the future saint accepts
and retains only those amounts of food or money absolutely necessary for
survival (v. ll. 93-95, 251-253).  Foreshadowed by his earlier rejection of the
patrimonial renges and anel, Alexis’ temperance and generosity in this episode
reinforce his dedication to a Christic selflessness that is clearly opposed to the
selfish materialism espoused by his father, Euphemian.41  He is, as the text
repeatedly claims, not a man of the world, but l’hume Deu (l. 170), the man of
God.42
                                                 
40 As a prefix, ex- denotes someone or something ‘apart from’ or ‘outside of’ an established norm
or relationship.
41 St. Thomas Aquinas defines temperance as a “disposition of the soul which imposes a measure
on any passions or operations.”  St. Thomas Aquinas, Treatise on the Virtures, trans. John A.
Oesterle (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1966) 113.
42 With good reason, Vauchez asserts that the rapport between asceticism and Christ is a
fundamental tenant of medieval hagiography: “As their enthusiastic practice of charitable works
showed, behind all these initiatives lay the conviction that the poor were images of Christ and a
privileged means of access to God.” André Vauchez, “Lay People’s Sanctity in Western Europe:
Evolution of a Pattern (Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries),” 28.  Moreover, this was a model that
surpassed gender divisions, since the life of Jesus was also used as a framework for the literary
interpretations of female saints’ lives.  For an interesting perspective on this topic, see Magdalena
Carrasco, “Sanctity and Experience in Pictoral Hagiography: Two Illustrated Lives of Saints from
Romanesque France,” Images of Sainthood in Medieval Europe, ed. Renate Blumenfeld-Kosinski and
Timea Szell (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991) 33-66.
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Aside from demonstrating his spiritual qualities, such modifications to the
protagonist’s clothes and material accoutrements bring about – as in Le Roman de
Silence – perceptible physical changes on the body.43  In this case, however, their
purpose is not to preserve a familial estate but to embody its rejection.  Like his
furtive escape from Rome, Alexis’ metamorphosis from sire (l. 124) to almosners
(beggar, l. 124) is meant to distance him as much as possible from the role of
paternal heritor.  So, when Euphemian sends a pair of trusted household
servants to search for his wayward son, they are unable to recognize their former
master, even though they see him among a group of beggars in Edessa:
Deus, at li emfes sa tendra carn mudede!
Ne·l reconurent li dui sergant sum pedre. (ll. 116-117)
God! How the boy has changed his tender flesh!
The two servants of his father did not recognize him.
Literally a changed person without the tangible trappings of his high social
estate, Alexis escapes his past by eliminating its physical signs.  Here, bodily
asceticism and identity go hand in hand.
Yet material wealth is only one component of this forsaken inheritance.44
It is therefore fitting that Alexis’ path of self-denial is also a linguistic one, the
saint-to-be subjecting his tongue to the same temperate standards as the rest of
his body.  Thus, when faced with the task of summarizing Alexis’ stay in Edessa,
the poet highlights both carnal and verbal manifestations of his abstinence:
Dis et seat anz n’en fut nient a dire;
Penat sun cors el Dame Deu servise. (ll. 161-162)
                                                 
43 At one point in Le Roman de Silence, the female protagonist’s masculine guise changes her to
such an extent that “everything one can see of her is very nearly male” (Quanque on en voit est
trestolt malles, l. 2478).  See p. 204 ff.
44 See p. 45 ff.
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For seventeen years there was nothing to say
He practices self-denial in the service of the Lord.
Mirroring the privative pain of physical asceticism, linguistic restrain is what
ultimately ensures Alexis’ social isolation.  In fact, when Euphemian’s servants
first fail to distinguish this “man of God,” among the city’s many beggars,
particular care is taken to note that no words have been exchanged between the
two parties:
Ne·l reconurent ne ne l’unt anterciet. (l. 121)
They did not recognize him, nor did they ask him any questions
Similarly, when Alexis makes an unexpected return to his father’s house later in
the text, preservation of his anonymity hinges on not only an altered physical
appearance, but also the quietude of all concerned:
Par nule guise unces ne·l aviserent,
Ni·l ne lur dist ne il ne·l demanderent.
Quels hom esteit ne de quel terre il eret. (ll. 238-240, emphasis mine)
They never had the slightest suspicion about him,
And he did not tell them, nor did they ask him
What sort of man he was or from what country.
Complementing Alexis’ material asceticism, this linguistic self-deprivation leads
to a deprivation of the self: all demonstrable traces of conspicuous existence are
exchanged for the empty signs of nameless anonymity.45  Silence in La Vie de
Saint Alexis constitutes a verbal suppression of identity.
Yet Alexis does not, as one might expect, experience feelings of anxiety as
a result of this social alienation.  There is, for example, none of the “fear and
                                                 
45 Here, self can be opposed to a social group or community. Cf. Lawrence Cunningham 68.
Although Cunningham’s appraisal of this hagiographical theme reverses the flow of events
described above, it asserts a similar rapport between religious devotion, asceticism, and the self:
“[R]eligious conversion gives one a wider horizon than the self…and this widening horizon itself
engenders a certain asceticism.”
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trembling” that Augustine associates with his spiritual salvation.46  Rather, his
new and different state – his otherness – only gives him cause for an unspeakable
joy:
Il fut lur sire, or est lur almosners.
Ne vus sai dire cum s’en firet liez. (ll. 124-125)
He was their lord, now he begs from them.
I cannot tell you how happy this has made him.
Apart from his satisfaction at being released from his genealogical burdens, the
explanation for Alexis’ happiness is found in the text’s theologically inspired
discourse on language.  In it, religious perfection is always tied to linguistic
absence, with divine speech portrayed as an overabundance that can only be
imperfectly translated into terrestrial signs.47  Thus, whenever God speaks in La
Vie de Saint Alexis, it occurs through a passive intermediary using “a voice” (une
voix, l. 292) whose words are not immediately understood by those who hear
them.48  This is, for example, what occurs when the imagine that first drew Alexis
to Edessa asks – at divine behest – a sacristan in the church to “bring the man of
God forward” (Ço dist l’imagena: “Fai l’ume Deu venir,” l. 171).  Confused by this
vague appellation, he asks the image for clarification.  The reply attests not only
                                                 
46 Saint Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, Sermons (94A-147A) on the New Testament, trans. Edmund
Hill, ed. John E. Rotelle (Brooklyn, N.Y.: New City Press, 1991) 317-318. The passage from which
this reference is taken points to the questionable nature of Alexis’ will, a notion that will be
explored in the following chapter: The point is, even those who are already walking along the
road of justice will, if they attribute this to themselves and their own strength of character,
disappear from it.  That's why, to teach us the necessary humility, holy scripture says through the
apostle, With fear and trembling work out your own salvation; and to stop peaople from claiming
anything for themselves because he said ‘work out,’ he immediately added, For it is God who is at
work in you both to will and to work, for his good pleasure (Phil 2:12-13).”
47 As Augustine suggests, God’s word can be intimated but never directly represented or
reproduced. See p. 20 ff.
48  Such misunderstandings crop up both time God makes himself heard (v. ll. 171-177; 291-315).
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to Alexis’ spiritual devotion but also to the shocking linguistic maturity of this
early vernacular text:
Respont l’imagine: “Ço est cil qui tres l’us est
Pres est de Deu e des regnes del ciel;
Par nule guise ne s’en volt esluiner.” (ll. 178-180)
The statue replies, “He is the one, who is seated so near the portal;
He is close to God and to his kingdom of heaven.
Not in any manner does he wish to remove himself therefrom.”
Divine proximity is corroborated by linguistic isolation: like God, Alexis may
only be referred to in tangential fashion.  Alexis’ silence is thus an opening
within which the divine becomes manifest.  As a result, the abandoned renges of
noble stature have been replaced by regnes of divine authority, a promise of
future recompense for present sacrifice realized within the text’s lexical echoes.
Once more, then, we come up against a seemingly inescapable duality first
signaled in the pseudo-prose synopsis.  Even as it highlights the overt religious
imperatives of a hagiographical manuscript, Alexis’ silence is occasion for the
covert linguistic acrobatics of poetic composition.
But regardless of this ambivalence, one thing is clear; silence in La Vie de
Saint Alexis serves as the tacit trace of an estrangement that is inherent to
language, the silent mark of a fundamental separation between the subject and
his signifiers.49  Nowhere in La Vie de Saint Alexis is this presented in more
striking fashion than during Alexis’ unanticipated return to Rome.  Upon arrival,
                                                 
49 “Two lacks overlap here. The first emerges from the central defect around which the dialectic
of the advent of the subject to his own being in the relation to the Other turns – by the fact that
the subject depends on the signifier and that the signifier is first of all in the field of the
Other....The signifier, producing itself in the field of the Other, makes manifest the subject of its
signification.  But it functions as a signifier only to reduce the subject in question to being no
more than a signifier, to petrify the subject in the same movement in which it calls the subject to
function, to speak, as a subject.  There, strictly speaking, is the temporal pulsation in which is
established that which is the characteristic of the departure of the unconscious as such – the
closing.” Lacan, Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis 204-205, 207.
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his first reaction is one of fright; in particular, he is wary of becoming ensnared
by the coercive forces – both linguistic and physical – of his estranged family:
S’or me conuissent mi parent d’icesta terre,
Il me prendrunt par pri ou par poeste;
Se jo·s an creid, il me trairunt a perdra. (ll. 203-205)
If my family in this land now recognize me,
They will seize me by entreaty or by force.
If I believe what they say, they will drag me to perdition.
Despite these fears, the future saint chooses to seek shelter in his own home, a
decision made all the riskier by his request to be lodged under a staircase (degret,
l. 218), in plain sight of all who may pass.  While he does not want to be
recognized, Alexis does want to be seen: instead of the more common lit (bed),
he requests that a grabatum (bed without curtains, l. 218) be placed in his new
habitat.  Of course, it is impossible to say with any degree of certainty whether or
not this distinction was intentional, but the protagonist’s ensuing behavior
would seem to support this notion.
For even with this precarious public exposure, Alexis maintains his
anonymity for another seventeen years, the transparent visibility50 of his
existence under the staircase sustained by – contrary to what one critic suggests51
– a complete refrain from verbal interaction:
Li serf sum pedre ki la maisnede servent
Lur lavadures li getent sur la teste.
Ne s’en corucet, net il ne·s en apelet.
Tuz l’encarnissent, sil tenent pur bricun!;
L’egua li getent, si moilent sun lincol.
                                                 
50 Cf. Jean-Pierre Bordier, “La Maison d’Alexis,” Et c’est la fin pour quoy sommes ensemble: Hommage
à Jean Dufournet professeur à la Sorbonne Nouvelle: Litterature, histoire et langue du Moyen Age, I-III,
ed. Jean-Claude Aubailly et al. (Paris: Champion, 1993) 247.
51 While the rest of his article provides some useful insights, Ulrich Mölk is mistaken when he
says that Alexis “sees and speaks with everyone” (il voit et il parle avec chacun) during his time
under the staircase.  Ulrich Mölk, “La Chanson de saint Alexis et le culte du saint en France aux
Xie et XIIe siècles,” Cahiers de Civilisation Médievale (Xe-XIIe Siècles) 21 (1978): 339-56.
59
Ne s’en corucet giens, cil saintismes hom. (ll. 263-268)
His father’s servants, who serve the household,
Throw their dirty water on his head;
He does not become angry, nor does he call them to task.
They all mock him, they hold him for a fool,
They throw water on him they drench his bedding;
He does not become angry in the slightest, this most holy man.
Like his pilgrimage, Alexis’ silence has obvious christological inspirations: his
refusal to give lip service the harsh treatment doled out by his aggressors is
highly reminiscent of Jesus’ forgiving behavior during the Crucifixion.52  Still,
evidence of spiritual commitment is not the sole result of these silent evasions.
Almost a parody of Alexis’ earlier baptism (ll. 29-30), the imagery of this scene
also points to a close rapport between silence and subjectivity.  Replacing the
“fine name” (bel num, l. 30) given to the saint by his parents, the verbal insults
hurled by this unruly group of servants, emphasizes both their roles as speaking
subjects and the importance of Alexis’ place as symbolic other.53  So, whereas the
bodily sacrifice of Christ’s crucifixion is focused on spiritual salvation, Alexis’
has for aim a linguistic deliverance.  As Jacques Lacan suggests, the true function
of a saint like Alexis is not to give something to those around him, but to empty
himself out so that others may realize the extent of their own subjectivity.  Alexis
                                                 
52 The Biblical corollary for this sentiment is Luke 23:34: “Jesus said, ‘Father, forgive them, for
they do not know what they are doing.’”  For more on the rapport between Alexis and Christ, see
Howard S. Robertson, “La Vie de Saint Alexis: Meaning and Manuscript A,” Studies in Philology 67
(1970): 420-428.
53 This linguistic otherness of sainthood is even perceptible in the vocabulary of beatification,
which distinguishes between two different voices (vox).  While some formal restrictions began to
take shape as early as the eighth century, foundations for the contemporary process of
canonization were not formalized until the eighteenth (under the reign of Pope Benedict IV).
Before that time, the process of sanctification was by and large carried out on a local or regional
level, and the decision to venerate a given individual was generally the result of popular opinion
(vox populi), a public recognition of devotion and sacrifice that was almost systematically
endorsed by clergy from the local church or diocese (vox Dei).
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is here the quintessential other, a living repository for the fundamental
deprivation – what Lacan would call le manqué à être -- of a subject’s desire:
A saint’s business, to put it clearly, is not caritas.  Rather, he acts as
trash [déchet]; his business being trashitas [il décharite].  So as to
embody what the structure entails, namely allowing the subject, the
subject of the unconscious, to take him as the cause of the subject’s
own desire.  In fact, it is through the abjection of this cause that the
subject in question has a chance to be aware of his position, at least
within the structure.54
Like silence, the saint is nothing, the tender flesh (tendra carn, l. 116) of his
deprived body susceptible to the whims and words of those who drag him back
into the world of substantive signification.  But because of this, silence is no
longer merely a linguistic placeholder for God: carrying within itself the
possibility of both celestial devotion and terrestrial derision, it also opens up a
linguistic space to an expression of desire.
Writing and the Will
As the preceding sections of this chapter have demonstrated, one of the
recurring themes in La Vie de Saint Alexis is its protagonist’s unfailing
acquiescence to divine will.  From the moment he first sets foot outside his
father’s room (v. l. 74), Alexis’ actions all point to one very clear and common
objective: spiritual union with God.  Not even when brought face to face with the
dolorous lamentations of his estranged family does he stray from his pious
trajectory, convinced that all is somehow meant to be:
                                                 
54 Jacques Lacan, Television  ed. Joan Copjec,  trans. Denis Hollier et al.  (New York: Norton, 1990)
15.  The connection between this episode and Freud’s famous fort-da case would be difficult to
ignore.  Indeed, Lacan’s appraisal of it clarifies his own comments regarding the saint: “If the
young subject can practise this game of fort-da, it is precisely because he does not practise it at all,
for no subject can grasp this radical articulation.  He practises it with the help of a small bobbin,
that is to say, with the objet a. The function of the exercise with this object refers to an alienation,
and not to some supposed mastery, which is difficult to imagine being increased in an endless
repetition, whereas the endless repetition that is in question reveals the radical vacillation of the
subject.”  Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, trans. Alan Sheridan, ed.
Jacques-Alain Miller (New York: Norton, 1977) 239.
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Soventes feiz lur veit grant duel mener,
E de lur oilz mult tendrement plurer,
E tut pur lui, unces nient pur eil.
Danz Alexis le met el consirer,
Ne l’en est rien, issi est aturnet. (ll. 241-245)
Many a time he saw them grieving deeply,
And tears flowing from their eyes most tenderly:
Always for him, never for anything else.
Lord Alexis gives it due consideration,
But it is of no concern to him, for thus it has been ordained.
Thus, like his deliberate avoidance of visual interaction with the imagine in
Edessa, Alexis’ silence in Rome is indicative of a willing submission to God.
Never losing sight of its saintly destination, the hagiographical itinerary of
Alexis’ life seems the perfect illustration of what Paul Tillich describes as
sainthood’s defining characteristic:
The “saint”(he who is determined by the Spiritual Presence) knows
where to go and where not to go.  He knows the way between
impoverishing asceticism and disrupting libertinism.55
To be a saint is, in other words, to possess an inane awareness of the special
ethical standards that ensure theological dedication and conformity.56  Given the
                                                 
55 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. 3 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967) 3 vols, 270.
56 While not universally accepted during the Middle Ages, the idea of saintly predestination was
– with concerted support from the likes of Saint Augustine – part of official Church doctrine.
During a twenty-five year period in the first half of the fifth century, St. Augustine and followers
of the British monk Pelagius feuded over some of the basic tenants of Christian doctrine,
including original sin and predestination.  For the Pelagians, we are created without sin, and thus
become sinners “in our actions, not by Nature.”  Pelagius’s Commentary on St Paul’s Epistle to the
Romans, trans. Theodore de Bruyn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) 91-92.  Following their logic,
the inverse is also true: a pious individual can be so only when he or she has led a pious life.  As
simple as this may sound, it amounted to a terrible heretical affront for Augustine and the
Church.  For if man is no longer subject to original sin and salvation is his to win or lose, there is
no need for divine grace (L. gratia).  See Saint Augustine, Four Anti-Pelagian Writings, trans. John
A. Mourant and William J. Collinge (Catholic University of America Press: Washington DC, 1992)
262.  Such ideas rattled Augustine who, in spite of his own checkered past, was unforgiving in his
criticism of the Pelagians’ ideas.  Even after Pelagius was cleared of many charges leveled against
him by one council, the Bishop of Hippo continued to hound the adversary and his followers,
and one of the doctrinal points that he took particular care to uphold in defiance of Pelagius’
theories was that of saintly predestination: “Let us, then, understand the calling whereby they
become elected – not those who are elected because they have believed, but who are elected that
they may believe.”  Saint Augustine, On the Predestination of Saints in The Basic Writings of Saint
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methodical resistance to desire and peaceful suffering evident in Alexis’ comings
and goings, his receipt of this cherished title shortly after death (v. l. 372) would
certainly appear to be a fitting end.
But another look at the events surrounding his homecoming suggests that
all is not so straightforward.  In fact, even before this fateful return to Rome, a rift
begins to develop between divine talent and the individual will of l’hume Deu.
Ironically, it all starts with God’s decision to reward Alexis for devoted service
by announcing the future saint’s imminent entrance into Paradise (paradis, l. 173).
Once the full spiritual import of his apophatic existence has been revealed, he is
showered with salutatory praise from fellow inhabitants of Edessa:
Trestuit l’onurent li grant e li petit,
E tuit le prient que de els ait mercit. (ll. 184-185)
Everyone does him honor, both great and humble,
And they beg him to have mercy on them.
Yet what most would find pleasant the future saint can only abhor, since his
severely ascetic approach to life and language is at conceptual odds with both
this revelatory pronouncement and its abundant linguistic offerings.  Driven by a
memory of the encumbering aveir from which he had fled prior to taking refuge
in Edessa, Alexis feels that he must once again pick up stakes:
Quant il ço veit, qu’il le volent onurer,
“Certes,” dist il, “Ni mais ad ester,
D’iceste honur nem revoil ancumbrer.” (ll. 186-188)
When he sees that they wish to accord him honors,
“Surely,” he said, “I can be here no longer:
With these honors I do not wish to burden myself.
                                                                                                                                                  
Augustine, ed. Whitney J. Oates, Vol. 1 (New York: Random House, 1948) 2 vols, 809.  For
Augustine, it is thus not the actions of a man that carve out his path to sainthood, but instead
something he possesses at birth.  In other words, a saintly path is one traced from the start:
sainthood is (like the original sin) given, and not earned.
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However, while Alexis hopes to make a hasty retreat on a boat to somewhere
even further from Rome, the senior celeste has other, very different plans for the
hume Deu:
Andreit Tarson espeiret ariver,
Mais ne puet estra : ailurs l’estot aler;
Andreit a Rome les portet li urez. (ll. 193-195)
He hopes to arrive straightaway in Tarsus,
But that cannot be; it is elsewhere he must go:
A storm carries them straight to Rome.
Pushing him away from the privative isolation of strange lands and back toward
the familiar but dreaded materialism of Rome, this trip is not one he chooses to
take.57  For the first time in this narrative, the wills of Deu and l’hume Deu are not
one and the same.
Thus, as was true of Saint Augustine in the Confessions, Alexis is caught
between two contradictory representational imperatives that govern his
existence.58  On one side, there is silence, the linguistic trace of an ascetic religious
devotion.  On the other, there is an implicit need for public recognition of his
suffering and sacrifice, essential if asceticism is to amount to anything more than
the “disrupting libertinism” described by Tillich.59  Such is the dilemma that so
plainly confronts Alexis when, after seventeen years in Rome, he nears the end of
his terrestrial journey:
Iloc converset eisi dis e set anz,
Ne·l recount nulls sons apartenanz,
Ne neüls him ne sont les sons ahanz
For sul le lit u il ad jeü tant:
                                                 
57 Odenkirchen 43.  The Latin text of Acta sanctorum puts this quite plainly, stating that Alexis’
return to his native city is “against his will” (contra voluntatem).
58 See p.20  ff. as well as p. 35 ff.
59 Tillich 270.
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Ne puet muer n’i seit aparissent. (ll. 271-275)
In this manner he lives for seventeen years
Yet none of his people recognize him
Nor did any one know of his suffering
But there was the bed where he had lain so long:
There he cannot keep it from being quite apparent.
Although there is nothing to suggest that Alexis would either need or want to
alter the silent nothingness that has become his only sign, he is pushed to do
otherwise.  Unable to suppress (muer) the tangible marks of his sacrificial
suffering, he is left to choose between substantive symbols and their absence,
between obedient acceptance of this new turn in his divinely ordained route and
radical defiance of it.
The response to this conundrum is, like much of La Vie de Saint Alexis,
decidedly equivocal, combining elements of both conceptual forces that now
bear down upon its saintly protagonist.  In what is perhaps the text’s most
surprising moment, Alexis breaks his thirty-four year silence just as death
approaches, a rare verbal interjection that he uses to make one very special
request:
“Quer mei, bel frere, ed enca e parcemin,
Ed une penne, co pri, tue mercit.”
Cil li aportet, receit les Alexis. (ll. 281-283)
“Dear brother, find me ink and parchment,
And a pen, this I beg of you, if you will be so kind.”
He brings them, and Alexis takes them.
Suddenly, the future saint embraces all that he had so long denied himself,
employing both the audible and material components of linguistic signification.
Yet like his voluntary rejection of visual interaction with the imagine in Edessa,
Alexis’ substantive use of language may also be read as a rejection of the same,
for his rhetorical brevity intimates a continued commitment to the ascetic ideal.
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Limited to just two short lines, Alexis’ sudden foray into writing is just as
restrained as his sparing use of spoken language:
Escrit la cartra tute sei medisme,
Cum s’en alat e cum s’en revint. (ll. 284-285)
In the letter he writes all about himself:
How he went away and how he came back.
Temperate application of the penne thus replaces verbal restraint and the physical
punishment of his body (Trente quatre anz ad si sun cors penet, l. 276): instead of
detailing his many laudable acts, he chooses to relegate them to a textual silence.
In addition, this is a point upon which the L manuscript places special emphasis.
Whereas other Old French versions of La Vie de Saint Alexis describe the cartra as
a letter “in which he had written all that had happened in his life” (Ou a escrit
testot le suen convers, l. 349), this verse is conspicuously absent from the
Hildesheim Alexis.60
Of course, it could be argued that the underlying motivation for this
silence is not derisive, but devotional; that by striking some sort of balance
between words and their lack, Alexis’ compositional philosophy is not so
different from that espoused by many medieval theologians, who conceived of
the written word as a necessary but particularly insufficient tool, even more so
than speech.61  Indeed, even after his death, Alexis takes steps to try and ensure a
theologically acceptable chain of diffusion for his exceptional document.  Thus,
                                                 
60 Odenkirchen 118.  Odenkirchen substitutes this line from P and A in his translation of L.
61 Previously cited examples of this perspective have focused on the work of Saint Augustine, but
similar ideas are found in the writings of other medieval theologians, including those of Saint
Thomas Aquinas.  In his Summa theologica, Aquinas considers the possible reasons for which Jesus
would not have written down his doctrine.  In all, he give three reasons; writing was not
dignified enough a means of teaching, it could not contain his teaching, and his doctrine would
not have reached everyone in an orderly manner if committed to writing.  Saint Thomas Aquinas,
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 22
vols. (London: Burnes, Oates, & Washbourne Ltd., 1920) 16:222-224.
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before ceding it to the outstretched hand of the pope (v. ll. 371-374), the saint
very flatly rejects his father’s request for the cartra:
Il la volt prendre; cil ne li volt guerpir. (l. 351)
He wishes to take it; but the other refuses to give it up.
By denying his father’s advances, Alexis also denies the text’s most powerful
symbol of human desire, his refusal to relinquish this document an implicit
refusal to submit himself to anything but divine rule.
Yet if the pseudo-prose summary in L can so easily dissimulate verse, it
could be asked how much faith can truly be placed in the piety of this
abbreviated missive and its gaping narrative lacuna.  In fact, I would argue that
Alexis’ sparse words belie a set of motivations altogether contradictory to those
that had initially seemed to dictate his call for pen and parchment.  First, as
others have noted, the saint’s representational minimalism is, particularly in this
Vie de Saint Alexis, but an occasion for further narrative development:
Saint Alexis has signed his name, and the scene of writing has been
closed in a perfectly accomplished manner – but only on the surface
and temporarily.  For the mise en abyme concerns only the first half
of the text; the story that the saint lays out on parchment relates
only his own narrative peregrination and accounts neither for the
reception nor the publication of the double text.62
In addition, the mechanism whereby this second text comes into being ties
Alexis’ writing to a realm other than that for which it was originally intended:
Lui la consent ki de Rome esteit pape.
Il ne la list ne il dedenz ne guardet;
Avant la tent ad un boen clerc e savie. (ll. 373-375)
He surrenders it to him who was the pope of Rome.
He did not read it, nor does he look inside;
He holds it out to a worthy and learned clerk.
                                                 
62 Leupin, Barbarolexis 52.
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Instead of remaining in the hands of a theological authority, Alexis’ vita is
redirected into the poetic domain, an unforeseen deviation that significantly
alters the content of original document.63  Embellished by this gifted clerk, the
saint’s vita balloons from two to eight lines and now includes detailed personal
information.64
Yet perhaps it is too easy to lay all the blame – or credit – for this
posthumous textual expansion in the poetically skillful hands of the clerk.  In
fact, Alexis’ own document even more suspect than the overtly “poetic” text that
supplants it.  Once again, the unique features of the L manuscript come into play,
particularly its frontispiece.  Earlier in this chapter, it was shown that these
illuminated scenes of the saint’s initial departure from Rome warrant careful
attention for their pictorial representation of Alexis’ ascetic impulses.  What they
do not show us also speaks volumes.  In all other illustrated Alexis manuscripts,
the frontispiece shows an image of the saint as he composes his autobiographical
cartra.65  By eliminating this pictorial counterpart to Alexis’ compositional
gesture, all attention is focused on the text produced in this episode, rather than
on any interpretive symbolic embellishments; words alone carry the weight of
Alexis’ message.66
                                                 
63 The misdirection this saintly document from Alexis to the pope to the poet is an interesting
parody of the process of textual subjugation carried out with novitiates or underage children in
the Benedictine orders.  “He states his promise in a document drawn up in the name of the saints
whose relics are there, and of the abbot, who is present.  The novice writes out this document
himself, or if he is illiterate, then he asks someone else to write it for him, but himself puts his
mark to it and whit his own hand lays it on the altar. […] Then the novice prostrates himself at
the feet of each monk to ask his prayers, and from that very day he is to be counted as one of the
community.”  Saint Benedict 269 (LVIII.19-23).
64 Durling 461-462.
65 Pächt 120-121, 140.
66 Brian Stock explains that the charter is a document that has particular significance in regards to
its communicative intent:  “The new charter was smaller in dimensions and lacked many of the
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In this light, Alexis’ supposedly pious text takes on a new and more
insidious hue.  For, once the lines of his original work are taken à la lettre (at face
value), the divine talent that had so completely controlled the saint’s existence
during this narrative pilgrimage is no more, confined to a silent gap between the
two extremes of his narrative course: Cum s’en alat e cum s’en revient.
Complemented by use of the reflexive verb se revenir, the ascetic brevitas of
Alexis’ writing changes the forced return voyage to Rome into a trip chosen by
the saint himself.  In this moment, it is not God’s desire but the saint’s longing for
nothingness that becomes manifest, a rhetorical sublimation of divine talent
within the textual silences of the saint’s writing.  As a result, silence is
transformed from an absent mark of spiritual devotion into a linguistic space
where personal will finds its first tentative expressions, an asceticism that no
longer implies submission to divine power but, as Nietzsche suggests, the love of
power itself:
Sometimes the saint exercises a defiance against himself, which is a
close relative of the love of power, and which gives even the most
solitary man a feeling of power; sometimes this bloated sensibility
leaps from the longing to give his passions free rein, to the longing
to make them collapse like wild stallions, powerfully driven by a
proud soul…67
Whether malicious or unwitting, Alexis’ literacy leads to a heresy of sorts, for
even with careful navigation of sainthood’s linguistic paths, he is unable to avoid
                                                                                                                                                  
traditional formulae.  Eventually it was simply called scriptum, pagina, or carta, indicating that the
text rather than its symbolic trappings constituted the message.”  Brian Stock, The Implications of
Literacy: Written Language and Models of Interpretation in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries,
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983) 58.
67 Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, trans. Marion Faber and Stephen Lehmann
(Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska Press, 1996) 100.
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the sinful snares of written expression.68  Caught between the same contradictory
forces at its origin, that to which La Vie de Saint Alexis ultimately attests is not
religious and spiritual piety, but the impossibility to express this piety within
language, the saint’s devotion twisted and torn by a radical silence that is both
the negation and nourishment of desire.
                                                 
68 Saint Benedict, for one, was very suspicious of this medium, and therefore did not allow the
monks to posess any personal writing implements: “We mean that without an order from the
abbot, no one may presume to give, receive or retain anything as his own, nothing at all [nullam
omino rem] – not a book, writing tablets or stylus – in short, not a single item, especially since
monks may not have the free disposal even of their own bodies and wills.” Saint Benedict 231
(XXXIII.2-4).
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Chapter Three: Silence and Sin in Le Conte du Graal
(Perceval)
Homo sapiens tacebit usque ad tempus lascivus autem et inprudens non servabunt
tempus.
Ecclesiasticus 20:7
Reading Le Conte du Graal can at times be difficult.  Diverse historical and
literary references, linguistically ambiguous passages, and an elaborate poetic
style: all these factors contribute to what is an extremely enjoyable but
challenging verse romance.  While there are, as Chrétien de Troyes suggests,
many fine conjointures1 in his writing, there are also moments when this
particular text seems disjointed, of which the most striking example is its final,
enigmatic couplet:
Et quant la roïne le voit,
Si li demande qu’ele avoit.2 (ll. 9233-9234)
When the queen saw her
she asked her what was the matter.3
                                                 
1 This is a term used by Chrétien de Troyes to describe his writing in Erec et Enide.  Chrétien de
Troyes, Erec et Enide, ed. Mario Roques (Paris: Honoré Champion, 1953) l. 14.
2 Chrétien de Troyes, Le Roman de Perceval ou le Conte du Graal, ed. William Roach (Geneva: Droz,
1959) ll. 6514-6518.  All references to the Old French manuscript are taken from this edition,
which is based on MS Fr. 12576.
3 My translations are based on Roach’s edition of the Old French text.  Modern English
translations of the Graal are available, including a fairly recent one by William Kibler: Rupert T.
Pickens, ed. and William W. Kibler, trans., The Story of the Grail (Li Contes del Graal) or Perceval
(New York: Garland Publishing, 1990).  However, Pickens and Kibler based their edition on a
different manuscript (Bibliothèque Nationale f. fr. 794), so I have usually chosen to provide my
own translation in order to maintain consistency within the present study.  Passages that have
been quoted from Kibler’s translation include the appropriate page reference to his work.  Other
translated editions include: Nigel Bryant, trans., Perceval / The Story of the Grail (Cambridge: D.S.
Brewer, 1982); Ruth Harwood Cline, trans., Perceval or the Story of the Grail (Athens: University of
Georgia Press, 1985); Robert White Linker, trans., The Story of the Grail (Perceval) (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1952).  Roger Sherman Loomis and Laura Hibbard Loomis,
trans., “Perceval, or the Story of the Grail by Chrétien de Troyes,” Medieval Romances (New York:
Modern Library, 1957).
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Grammatically, this sentence is altogether complete, but the person expected to
answer the query (Dame Lore) never does, leaving the queen – as well as readers
of the Graal – in a state of suspended anticipation.4  As a result, continuations and
adaptations had already begun to appear in the latter half of the twelfth century,
only a few years after Chrétien is thought to have composed the original.  In fact,
this dialogic void was so troubling that every effort was made to eliminate all
textual evidence of it, the first continuation picking up exactly where the Graal
left off:
Et qui si l’a espoëntee.
“Ha! franche roïne honoree5
and who had frightened her so.
“Alas! Noble and honored queen
Spliced directly onto Chrétien’s last verse, the continuator’s opening words
create a seamless transition between the two tales, paving the way for Dame
Lore’s long-awaited answer and eventual rhetorical closure.  Equally striking is
the physical rendering of this poetic confluence: in all but one of the extant
manuscripts containing both texts, the scribe has inserted the first verse of the
continuation immediately after the Graal, without changing folios or otherwise
signaling any narrative separation.6  Historically, then, there was a concerted
                                                 
4 Here, I use the term “grammatically” in a purely relative sense: Old French manuscripts do not
follow the basic rules of punctuation and capitalization to which we are now so accustomed. As a
result, the parsing of a given passage into discrete sentences is largely dependent upon a
contextual interpretation of its meaning.
5 William Roach, ed., The Continuations of the Old French Perceval (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1949) ll. 1-2.  The manuscript used for Roche’s edition of the Graal (MS FR.
12576) is the same from which the above quotation is taken.  The English translation is my own.
6 Roach, Continuations xvi-xxxii.  For further information regarding the contents and condition of
extant manuscripts containing the Conte du Graal (there are a total of twelve that include the
entire tale and three more with fragments of it) and certain of its continuations, see Alexandre
Micha, La Tradition manuscrite des romans de Chrétien de Troyes (Geneva: Droz, 1966) 28-64.
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attempt to retroactively eliminate any fictional and physical emptiness, to
substitute the relative certainty of linguistic signs for an ambiguous silence.7
When considered in conjunction with narrative breaks between the stories
of Perceval and Gawain (v. ll. 4812-4815, 6214-6216, 6514-6518), this premature
ending does much to account for a certain critical tradition that, like the
continuations, treats the work as unfinished or incomplete, its termination
rationalized as the unfortunate result of Chrétien’s precocious death.8  Of course,
the idea that Chrétien de Troyes passed away prior to having completed his most
celebrated work is – particularly in light of the practical and physical constraints
on textual composition in the Middle Ages – a tenable one.9  At the same time,
however, there is no real proof of such a poetically untimely demise, and
although the complete absence of a conclusion is not typical of medieval
romances, their closing verses are never as rhetorically prominent as their
opening ones.  In fact, the endings of vernacular texts are often very brief,
consisting of a terse indication from the author or scribe that the tale is through.
                                                 
7 Such medieval experiments in textual revision are instructive to the contemporary reader,
reminding us that literary interpretation and criticism are supplementary to the text itself. Not
surprisingly, continuators also did their best to tie up the romance’s other loose ends,
incorporating, for example, several return visits to the Grail Castle.
8 Another of Chrétien de Troyes’ other Arthurian romances, the Chevalier de la Charette, has
traditionally been associated with this same theory.  While it does not appear to be ‘missing’
anything like the Graal, another writer claims -- within the text itself -- to have undertaken the
task of completing Chrétien’s unfinished work.  Above all else, such claims are a visible symptom
of the generally uncertain status surrounding the relationship between writer and text in the
Middle Ages.  Gregory B. Stone, “Chrétien de Troyes and Cultural Materialism,” Arthuriana 6.2
(1996) 69-87.
9 All medieval manuscripts were produced entirely by hand.  This included not only the written
text and intricately colored illuminations, but also the physical preparation of vellum and
binding of completed folios.  Perhaps Ernst Robert Curtius is not far from the truth when he
suggests that, “[t]he most natural reason for ending a poem in the Middle Ages was weariness.
Writing poetry was such a strenuous thing.” European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, trans.
Willard R. Trask (Princeton UP: Princeton, 1983) 90.
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Such is the case in Yvain, another of Chrétien de Troyes’ most famous Arthurian
romances:
Del chevalier al lion fine
Crestïens son romant issi.
Onques plus dire n’en oï,
Ne ja plus n’en orés conter
S’on n’i velt mençogne ajoster.10
Thus Chrétien ends his tale
of the Knight on the Lion.
I never heard any more told of it,
nor will you ever hear anything further
unless some one wishes to add some lies.
Simple but effective, these few short lines accord Yvain the structural and
fictional integrity that the Conte du Graal lacks.11  Still, given all the other irregular
starts and stops that punctuate this text, perhaps an abrupt ending is the only
truly fitting way to bring it to a close.  Indeed, Roger Dragonetti has suggested
that, while internally fractured, the Graal is conceptually complete.  For
Dragonetti, Chrétien de Troyes’ text maintains – from start to finish – a coherent
poetic structure founded on the instability of the signifier.  Thus, in his reading,
the arcane ending is an appropriate – if somewhat puzzling – culmination for an
œuvre assomée (completed work).12
                                                 
10 Chrétien de Troyes, Le Chevalier au lion, ou, Le roman d’Yvain, trans. David F. Hult (Paris: Livres
de Poche, 1994) ll. 6804-6808.  Translation is my own.
11 Preemptively criticizing any potential continuations of his tale by labeling them as lies
(menchonnes), the poet – while probably doing very little to impede future revisions of his work –
lends his work additional cohesiveness.  This rhetorical distinction between “truth” and “lies” is
popular in medieval writing and is addressed in more detail on pp. 176 ff.
12 Roger Dragonetti, La Vie de la Lettre au Moyen Âge (Paris: Seuil, 1980). This topic is an integral to
Dragonetti’s entire study, but is particularly developed in the last chapter, 241-264.  Here, my
English translation does not preserve the original expression’s double meaning: the French word
assomée suggests both a state of conceptual completion and physical submission or destruction.
In the Graal, this term is used to describe Perceval’s detailed description of Gornemans de
Gorhaut’s castle (l. 1889).!
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The fact that this question continues to be an important source of
intellectual reflection among scholars points to its broader significance:
regardless of one’s stance concerning the relative completeness of this romance,
there is an inextricable link between what the Conte du Graal is – its identity as a
text – and silence.  Although new readers of the Graal will invariably fall on one
side or other of the debate regarding completion, to do so prematurely is a
mistake.  This text can only be adequately appreciated by experiencing all of its
complexities, contradictions, and ambiguities. For, along the wandering paths of
his protagonists’ knightly adventures, Chrétien de Troyes explores not only the
fictional marvels of an enchanted Arthurian landscape, but also the marvelous
possibilities and limitations of language, a quest whose supreme reward is a
deeper understanding of how silence shapes and is shaped by individuals and
their words.  In the Conte du Graal, all roads lead to silence, but the ultimate
topography of this destination has more to do with who we are than what silence
is not.
Structure, Semence and Sen
Drawing on a theme popular to both ancient and medieval rhetoric, the
prologue of the Conte du Graal intimates a metaphorical rapport between the acts
of planting and writing.13  Chrétien de Troyes, however, goes beyond the merely
illustrative properties of this figure, using it to cultivate an ethical model for
                                                 
13 For further information on the occurrences and origins of this particular figure in classic and
medieval literature, see Curtius 313-315, who notes that similar associations are found in Plato,
while Isidore de Séville and other medieval poets substitute “ploughshare” for “stylus.”  Many
readers have signaled that the first line of the Graal is a rather faithful adaptation of the Biblical
proverb found in II Corinthians 9:6.
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fictional writing.14  Specifically, the text’s opening lines link literary productivity
to a standard of compositional propriety, making the value of a given work
dependent upon how well a poet uses the linguistic semence at his disposal:
Ki petit semme petit quelt
Et qui auques requeillir velt
En tel liu sa semence espande
Que Diex a cent doubles li rande
Car en terre qui riens ne valt
Bone semence seche et faut. (ll. 1-6)
He who sows little, reaps little,
and he who wishes to reap plentifully
casts his seed in such a place
that God will increase his fruit a hundred fold;
for in worthless soil
good seed withers and dies.15
Writing thus becomes essentially a matter of placement, an organizational
exercise in which the propitious location (liu) must be chosen for each word or
idea.16  Such emphasis on poetic arrangement is not altogether surprising: the
ancient rhetorical tradition upon which a good deal of medieval poetics is based
ranks dispositio (arrangement) second only in importance to the capacity for
inventio (invention).17  In the Institutio Oratoria, Quintilian even goes so far as to
                                                 
14 St. Augustine, for example, says that the only valid interpretations of figurative language are
those that conform to Christian doctrine.  “Whoever, therefore, thinks that he understands the
divine Scriptures or any part of them so that it does not build the double love of God and of our
neighbor does not understand it at all.” On Christian Doctrine, trans. D.W. Robertson, Jr. (New
York: Liberal Arts Press, 1958) 36.
15 Kibler 3.
16 The etymological tie between the verb semer and linguistic signs is a well-founded one.  As
used by Homer, the Greek word semata denotes linguistic or symbolic evidence, as when
Odysseus is asked by his father to provide proof of his identity (XXIV, 330-345).  It is interesting
to note that many of these proofs are themselves references to plants in Laertes’ garden.  As
Martin Heidegger notes, this bond is also evident in the Latin word signum: “Most of us know the
word “sign” only in its debased meaning – lines on a surface.  But we make a design also when
we cut a furrow into the soil to open it to seed and growth.”  Martin Heidegger, On the Way to
Language, trans. Peter D. Hertz (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1971) 121.
17 See, for example, Geoffrey of Vinsauf’s Poetria Nova. Ernest J. Gallo, The Poetria Nova and Its
Sources in Early Rhetorical Doctrine (The Hague: Mouton, 1971) 54-55.  In this case, what a word
76
claim that the latter would be useless without the former, comparing unordered
inventio to, among other things, an unassembled pile of building materials.18
However, the underlying framework of the above model is neither rhetorical nor
grammatical, but religious: distinguishing good poetic judgment from bad, God
(Diex) acts as its arbiter, meting out punishments or rewards as he sees fit.  Here,
as in Alain de Lille’s De Planctu Naturae, linguistic rules are subsumed by divine
laws, and grammatical errors or rhetorical excesses become tantamount to
religious transgressions.19  For those whose work is structurally insufficient or
unsound, the harvest is a bitter one, yielding nothing but the dry and shriveled
remains of their own failure.  Conversely, observance of this edict all but
guarantees literary success, a compensatory poetic abundance from which
Chrétien himself claims to benefit:
Crestïens semme et fait semence
D’un romans que il encomence
Et si le seme en si bon leu
Qu’il ne puet [estre] sanz grant preu (ll. 7-10, emphasis mine)
Chrétien sows and casts the seed
of a romance that he begins;
and sows it in such a good place
                                                                                                                                                  
means – or what we understand it to mean – is dictated not by any inherent signification, but by
how and where it is used.
18 Book VII, 1-2: “But just as it is not sufficient for those who are erecting a building merely to
collect stone and timber and other building materials, but skilled masons are required to arrange
and place them, so in speaking, however abundant the matter may be, it will merely form a
confused heap unless arrangement be employed to reduce it to order and to give it connexion
and firmness of structure.” Other analogies include a disfigured statue and a boat with no
helmsman.  Marcus Fabius Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, 4 vols., trans. H.E.
Butler (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976) 3: 3.  Etymologically, this exercise is at
the very heart of medieval metaphorics, commonly referred to by its Latin moniker, translatio
(translation, displacement).
19 Alain de Lille describes those who push the rules of grammar past acceptable limits as
grammatical “barbarians,” claiming that these linguistic faults reflect a defiance of both sexual
normalcy and religious rectitude.  Plaint of Nature, trans. James J. Sheridan (Toronto: Pontifical
Institute for Medieval Studies, 1980).  See, for example, pages 69-70 where Alain describes the
negative consequences of a conversion of subject (active) and predicate (passive).  Incidentally,
this passage furnishes yet another example of the planting-writing metaphor discussed above.
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that it cannot be without great value.
Aurally reinforced by this rhyming pair of bon leu and grant preu, the structural
mandate and proverbial tenor of the prologue’s first lines transform poetry into a
token of the divine charity (carité) described elsewhere by the poet (v. ll. 43-59),
his words a terrestrial upshot of the generative power in the Word.
While not explicitly elaborated, sexual implications of his theopoetic
imperative are quite clear.  A stylized vision of the mechanics behind human
copulation, the agrarian image of an organic union between seed (semence) and
soil (leu) ties grammatically and rhetorically acceptable forms of representation
to a Judeo-Christian vision of heterosexual normalcy.20  Turning once more to the
De Planctu Naturae, we see that a correspondence between proper use of
language and natural (i.e., morally acceptable) sexual behavior is, there too,
transposed into the agricultural register:
That man, in whose case a simple conversion in an Art causes
Nature’s laws to come to naught, is pushing logic too far.  He
hammers on an anvil which issues no seeds.  The very hammer
itself shudders in horror of its anvil.  He imprints on no matter the
stamp of a parent-stem: rather his ploughshare scores a barren strand.21
In other words, “the sexual pervert is a barbarian - he forgets the arts of fine
speech, and destroys rhetoric in a fundamentally vicious figure, something
exceeding even the limits of metaphorical translation.”22  Like these sexually
                                                 
20 Here, the poet plays on yet another poetic tradition, one that represents the feminine as a fertile
and potentially productive soil and the masculine as an active agent capable of exploiting the
generative possibilities inherent in that leu.
21 Alain de Lille 69, emphasis mine.
22 Alexandre Leupin, Barbarolexis: Writing and Medieval Sexuality, trans. Kate M. Cooper
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989) 63.  Leupin shows that these allusions to
sexuality are not just gratuitous or coincidental, but an integral feature of Alain’s writing and the
text’s exploration of the complex medieval web of relationships uniting writing, sexuality, and
theology.
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charged condemnations of linguistic irregularity, Chrétien’s promise of poetic
creativity assumes the viability of heterosexual copulation, a productive union
between masculine and feminine.  Imperfect language and, in the extreme, lack
of poetic production – silence – would thus be unmistakable traces of sexuality’s
failure, its ultimate impossibility.  Therefore, while Chrétien claims to offer up an
example of religious, grammatical, and sexual perfection, one has to wonder –
given the halting spasms of his narrative – if this is really the case.
But whether or not the poet lives up to the boastful promises of his
prologue, one thing is clear: this bounty does not come without a cost, for it
demands that creative power be ceded to God, who would alone possess the
faculties necessary to transform finite units of language (semence) into something
greater (cent doubles).  Reproducing the implied hierarchical imperative of the
Biblical proclamation Deus verbum est, Chrétien designates God as the sole active
agent from which all creation necessarily flows, reducing his own role to that of a
Platonic divine mouthpiece.23  Though less common than feigned humility
(humilitas), such exaggerated self-belittlement is another established feature of
the captatio benevolentiae, that rhetorical preamble where the poet plays to his
audience in order to garner their attention and goodwill.  In this case, Chrétien’s
deference to authority extends to his benefactor Philip of Flanders, whose great
generosity is praised (v. ll. 52-53) and on whose order the poet claims to compose
his tale:
Crestïens, qui entent et paine,
                                                 
23 For the most part, Plato is not a great supporter of poetry and its purveyors.  Nonetheless, in
the Ion, he does concede that some poetry is of great value.  However, such poetry is not the
product of the poet’s own art (technae), but of a divine inspiration, the poet merely a possessed
terrestrial conduit for godly wisdom.  Plato, The Dialogues of Plato, 4th ed., ed. and trans. Benjamin
Jowett (Oxford, Eng.: Clarendon Press, 1953).
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Par le comandement le conte
A rimoier le meillor conte
Qui soit contez a cort roial.
Ci est li Contes del Graal
Dont li quens li bailla le livre (ll. 62-67, emphasis mine)
Chrétien, who strives and aims
by command of the count
to rhyme the best story
that has ever been told in royal court
it is the Story of the Grail
of which the book was given to him by the count.24
If Chrétien is a vehicle for divine linguistic intervention, it is thus only by
extension of a political affiliation with Philip, the source of his scribal
comandement.25  From this perspective, composition of the Graal would be no
more than an act of obedience, the servile completion of an assigned task.  If so,
the authority of this ruler encompasses not only the political, but also poetic and
linguistic domains. In fact, the book given (bailla) to Chrétien is but a thinly
veiled reminder of the poet’s symbolic subjugation to the count, the Old French
verb baillier a judicial term implying both donation and domination.26  This
                                                 
24 Kibler 5.
25 One of the traits of the rapidly evolving political landscape of twelfth-century France – one that
coexisted with the feudal system still present during that period – was a growing tendency to
regard political power as divinely ordained, and the king as God’s sovreign on Earth.  In
medieval literary criticism, this political shift has been explored by Peter Haidu who, in his
impressive study of La Chanson de Roland, sees in the story of Roland’s death at Ronceval and
Charlemagne’s eventual victory over the ‘infidels’ an ideological transformation of society, from
the reciprocal yet vague system of feudalist obligation to the radical separation between king and
citizens in a monarchical nation-state.  Peter Haidu, The Subject of Violence (Bloomington: Indiana
UP, 1993).
26 Cazelles 5.  This is one of the key mechanisms of the medieval don, a particularly important
part of feudal society, especially for poets like Chrétien who depended on wealthy sponsors.
While the word itself may be translated as “gift,” this neglects an underlying sense of reciprocity
inherent to the don.  Within this system, every offering generates a debt for the one who accepts
it.  While Chrétien claims to benefit from carité – gifts without any ‘strings’ attached, as it were –
he is nonetheless subject to the system of the don, an unpronounced obligation expressed in his
acquiescence toward the count.  Cazelles notes the cultural specificity of the word bailla, which
has direct historical ties to Philip of Flanders: he created government agents called baillis to
enforce rule throughout his land, maintaining political consistency throughout his disparate
domains.  Here, the legislative power of these agents is transferred to a text.
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duality is reinforced by the homonymic play of conte (count, l. 63) with conte
(story, l. 64), a linguistic conflagration that embodies the perceived inseparability
of these two entities.  Obeying the verbal and textual embodiments of Philip’s
(and, by association, God’s) laws of proper representation, Chrétien appears to
abandon all artistic control, assuming the lowly role of versificator, a sort of
linguistic technician whose work is not creative, but manipulative, consisting
only of the rhythmic arrangement of another’s words.27  For the second time in
the prologue, poetic writing has been mechanized, stripped of its linguistic
independence through the social matrices that dominate the poet and his work.
So, although he continues to toil with words and sounds, Chrétien has, in effect,
been silenced.
This textual alliance of authority and writing is by no means unique to the
Graal, or even to vernacular composition as a whole.  The same two concepts
were, for example, theologically inseparable for the medieval Church: as tangible
manifestations of a divine verbum, the Bible and other sacred writings were held
up as infallible sources of sagacity and standards of linguistic artistry.  Hence, St.
Augustine asserts in De Doctrina Christiana that divine texts are infused with
wisdom (sapientur) and eloquence (eloquentur); ultimate models of writing next to
                                                 
27 The versificator is quite often negatively portrayed as a sort of literary ‘hack’ who merely
recycles the work of true poeta. In De vulgaria eloquentia, Dante implies something of a distinction
between the best of poets (excellentissime poetantes) and a wider category encompassing all
versifiers (omnibus versificantibus), whose privileges for using the vernacular should, he claims, be
more restrained because “most of them write their verses without knowledge or intelligence”
(Sed optime conceptiones non possunt esse nisi ubi scientia et ingenium est).  Steven Botterill, ed. and
trans., Dante: De vulgari eloquentia (London: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 49.  The same
word is also used by George Orwell in 1984, where it refers not to a man, but a rhyming machine.
“The tune had been haunting London for weeks past.  It was one of countless similar songs
published for the benefit of the proles by a sub-section of the Music Department. The words of
these  songs  were  composed  without  any  human  intervention whatever  on  an  instrument
known  as a versificator. But the woman sang so tunefully as to turn the dreadful rubbish into an
almost pleasant sound.”  George Orwell, 1984 (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1949) 115.
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which all other works pale.28  Theological texts were not, however, the only
forms of writing granted such exemplary status in the Middle Ages.  The seven
liberal arts (artes liberales)  at the foundation of medieval pedagogy were
themselves based upon the work of a select group of auctores – writers like Virgil,
Horace, and Cicero – whose secular works were the authoritative sources on
select academic topics – attained an almost sacred status.29  The extensive role of
the Church in medieval education (it held a virtual monopoly until the advent of
major secular universities in the thirteenth century) undoubtedly contributed to
this situation, for instruction in both grammar and rhetoric – the most important
of the seven liberal arts – was widely regarded as an indispensable prerequisite
to scriptural interpretation.30  Like the textual dogma of Judeo-Christianity,
academic or institutional sacralization of classical authors is evidence of a more
general anthropological conception of the text as origin, a repository of linguistic
                                                 
28 Such allusions may be found throughout De Doctrina Christiana, but especially in Book Two
(II.ii.21), where Augustine closes his arguments with the following assertion: “And while
everyone may find everything which he has usefully learned elsewhere there, he will also find
very abundantly things which are found nowhere else at all except as they are taught with the
wonderful nobility and remarkable humility of the Holy Scriptures.”! St. Augustine, On Christian
Doctrine 78.
29 The trivium included grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic, while the quadrivium was made up of
arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy.  Of course, not everyone would have agreed with
this comingling of secular and sacred authorities. St. Augustine, for example, concedes that the
work of secular writers may sometimes be instructive, but only when the lessons therein are
directed towards a deeper understading of God's word by the reader and never for their own sake
(II.xl.60).  “If those who are called philosophers, especially the Platonists, have said things which
are indeed true and are well accommodated to our faith, they should not be feared; rather, what
they have said should be taken from them as from unjust possessors and converted to our use.”
St. Augustine, On Christian Doctrine 75.
30 St. Thomas Aquinas explores the Biblical use of various rhetorical figures and poetic
dissimulations in his Summa Theologica and, like St. Augustine, asserts that these linguistic
deceptions are not harmful if a devout reader uncovers their hidden meanings since the exercise
of textual interpretation reveals certain beneficial theological truths.  Aquinas’ fourfold system of
interpretation would eventually be applied to fictional works by the likes of Dante (in the Letter to
Can Grande Della Scala) and Boccaccio (in Genealogy of the Gentile Gods).
82
and intellectual information whose value is chiefly supported by its archaic
status.
To be sure, the role of sources was significant in vernacular literature of
the Middle Ages, particularly during the genre’s early stages, when most
manuscripts were translations of celebrated texts in Latin or Greek.  However,
the distinguishing feature of medieval writing is not a faithful translation of
source material, but a transformation of that content.31  Rather than accepting
literary antecedents wholesale, medieval composition encourages an openly
critical view of them, requiring a vision of the text markedly different from that
which would appear to be at work in the Graal prologue. 32  Interestingly, it was
during the same period in which the Conte du Graal was composed that this
vision textual development began to achieve a certain level of institutional
acceptability.  Often portrayed as a cultural forerunner to Italy and Europe of the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, twelfth-century France was witness to its own
cultural renaissance.  And while the intellectual impulses of this renaissance are
perhaps not as uniform as those of its more familiar predecessors, many do
exhibit similar humanist tendencies.  Chief among these is an attempt to evaluate
and understand man’s place within dominant theological, temporal, and
ontological structures.  One of the social institutions that came under this new
scrutiny was the formerly untouchable pleiad of auctores, whose works were
critically reappraised based on individual achievement and intellectual merit
                                                 
31 For an in-depth discussion of this topic, see chapter 5.
32 Of course, an ambivalent attitude toward sources is not unique to the Middle Ages, but part of
a much older intellectual antagonism known as the ‘quarrel of the ancients and the moderns.’ As
Curtius and others have shown, examples of literary manipulation similar to that practiced
during the Middle Ages may be found in classical Greek, Latin, and even Arabic sources. Curtius
251-255.
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instead of religious conformity or mere tradition.  John of Salisbury, one of the
most celebrated thinkers of the period, makes it clear that an authority should be
one whose ideas are viable, whether elucidated thousands of years ago or just the
day before:
But these opinions of the ancients are admitted, simply because of
their antiquity, while the far more probable and correct opinions of
our contemporaries are, on the other hand, rejected merely because
they have been proposed by men of our own time.33
Further evidence of this trend is found in certain thirteenth-century indexes of
auctores, where insightful works by contemporary thinkers are situated alongside
those of more legendary counterparts, overturning any notion of a preeminent
claim to intellectual authority.
One writer to benefit from this situation was Geoffrey de Vinsauf, whose
Poetria Nova – a pedagogical manual for young poets – was included among the
newer authoritative texts.34  Replete with illustrations of major rhetorical and
grammatical figures borrowed from some of the greatest auctores, his work is
clearly descended from earlier models of poetic writing.  At the same time,
however, Geoffrey’s advice hinges not so much on identifying linguistic
examples as it does on playing with and transforming them, a process of
linguistic and literary renewal that he depicts with his own agrarian imagery:
Noli semper concedere verbo
In proprio residere loco : residentia talis
Dedecus est ipsi verbo ; loca propria vitet
Et perigrinetur alibi sedemque placentem
Fundet in alterius fundo : sit ibi novus hospes,
                                                 
33 Daniel D. McGarry, trans., The Metalogicon of John of Salisbury: A Twelfth-Century Defense of the
Verbal and Logical Arts of the Trivium (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1955) 145.
34 See, for example, the didactic poem Laborintus by Aberhard the German to which Curtius
refers.  Edmond Faral, Les arts póetiques du XIIe et du XIIIe siècle; recherches et documents sur la
technique littéraire du moyen âge (Paris: Champion, 1924) 358 ff.
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Et placeat novitate sua
Do not always allow a word to reside in its usual place; such
residence does not suit it; let it avoid its proper place and wander
elsewhere, to find a pleasing seat in another’s ground: let it be a
new sojourner there and please by its novelty.35
So, even if inspired by well-known rules of classical grammar and rhetoric,
Vinsauf's poetics is not characterized by a slavish imitation of sources, but their
novel modification.  Based upon the deliberate redistribution of words from their
proper place (loca propria) to another (alterius fundo), his model of linguistic
regeneration subverts, to some degree, the aforementioned notion of a bon leu in
poetic writing.  In it, the poet's talent is not so much an inherited or derived
power as it is a learned capacity for linguistic manipulation: by rearranging
words in an innovative fashion, he is capable of cultivating his own redoubled
harvest.36
In light of this evolved perspective on textual revision and poetic
innovation, Chrétien’s deference to the secondhand livre of Philip is perhaps less
certain than it first seemed.  Indeed, another look at the morales philosophias of the
Graal prologue suggests that its strict adherence to this intratextual model of
writing is unclear:
Crestïens semme et fait semence
D’un romans que il encomence. (ll. 7-8, emphasis mine)
Chrétien sows and makes seed
Of a romans that he begins [for the first time]37
                                                 
35 Gallo 54-55.  I have taken both the Latin and English versions of the passage from this edition.
Also, see Leupin, Barbarolexis  17-38.
36 Leupin, Barbarolexis 17-38.  In addition to providing enlightening analyses of a number of
critical passages, Leupin shows that this doctrine of poetic transformation finds its inspiration not
only in rhetorical slight-of-hand, but also in the theological doctrine of the Incarnation.
37 Although “begins” is an adequate rendering of this word’s root, the deliberate addition of the
prefix en- suggests a more forceful connotation, a more absolute beginning.
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Not a conte (the homonymic symbol of his benefactor) but a romans, Chrétien
hints at the originality of his work with this delicate semantic distinction.  The
calculated addition of the suffix en- to the conjugated verb commencer in the
second line of this rhymed couplet further solidifies the potentially radical
character writing in the Graal: it is neither a beginning (commencement) nor a
rebeginning (recommencement), but an innovative genesis (encommencement),
propagated by Chrétien’s pen.  This same subversive linguistic germination is
used again in the prologue’s final lines, where, immediately after Philip has
handed down his livre to be rhymed (rimoier), the poet brings his introduction to
a close with a verse that simultaneously acknowledges and refutes its designated
source:
Ci est li Contes del Graal
Dont li quens li bailla le livre
Oëz coment il s’en delivre. (ll. 66-68, emphasis mine)
It is the Story of the Grail
Of which the book was given to him by the count.
Hear how he acquits himself of it.38
On the one hand, the verb se délivrer can be read as further proof of the poet’s
subjugation, denoting – as in the above translation – the simple completion of an
assigned task.  On the other, completion necessarily implies a sort of liberation
(i.e., deliverance), another of the verb’s more common meanings in Old French.39
A simple yet defiant mark, the disjunctive prefix de- thus has important authorial
implications, for it casts off the weight of symbolic authority embodied by the
count’s archetypal livre.  In this sense, Chrétien’s recitation of the conte is an
                                                 
38 Kibler 5.
39 One of the definitions of the English word ‘deliver’ is equivalent to this second meaning of se
délivrer, suggesting a freedom from oppression or suffering.
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attempt not only to rhyme (rimoier) words, but also to take them apart (rimoier).40
From within the oppressive realm of versification thus springs a cry of
subjectivity (ri-moi-er).
Therefore, if the Conte du Graal seems disjointed, perhaps it is so by
design, since this same poetic ‘spacing’ – manipulation of words, letters, and the
silent gaps between them – is what allows new and different meanings to take
root. Destroying to (re)create, Chrétien uses silence in the Graal to undo
language, clearing a space for his own creative agenda.  And, “[i]n the hands of a
master, techniques become heightened means of expression.  Artifice passes over
into art and is absorbed in it.”41  As an expression of identity, poetic writing is
thus closely related to silence, a bond whose weaknesses and strengths are
explored in the tandem stories of Perceval and Gawain.
Perceval: The Silent Knight
Long recognized as a pivotal text within the Arthurian literary corpus, the
Conte du Graal enjoys this privileged status at least in part thanks to its curious
hero, the young Welsh knight Perceval.42  In fact, the narrative and this
somewhat infamous protagonist have, over time, become virtually inseparable,
such that every contemporary edition and translation of the tale includes his
                                                 
40 Both these meanings are common to the word rimoier in Old French.
41 Curtius 390.
42 This character provides yet another example of the persistent question of textual origins that
was addressed earlier in this chapter.  Many scholars believe that Perceval is based on the
character Peredur, whose story – Peredur, Son of Efrawc – is part of a collection of ancient Welsh
writings known as the Mabinogion.  However, while the two personages have much in common,
there is no conclusive evidence of either tale’s anteriority.
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name as part of its revised title.43  Many critical references to the text even go so
far as to replace the name given by Chrétien (li Contes del Graal, l. 66) with, quite
simply, Perceval.  Of course, editorial manipulation of medieval titles is fairly
common, and several of Chrétien’s other works, including Le Chevalier de la
Charette and Le Chevalier au Lion, have endured similar modifications.44  Not only
convenient, but also fairly accurate, these abbreviations correspond to their
narratives’ respective foci.  The fictional relevancy of the nominative supplement
used for the Graal is, however, less certain: with nearly half of its 9,234 verses
devoted to the story of another knight, it is not clear to what extent the Graal
really is the Perceval (anymore than it is, say, the Gawain).45  Nonetheless, the
story of this decidedly different knight is clearly an integral component of both
the Conte du Graal and the larger legend in which Chrétien’s tale plays a
founding role.46  In some ways, his itinerant adventures evoke habitual themes of
Arthurian knighthood, with repeated battlefield victories confirming his status –
at least among members of Arthur’s court – “as a proven knight of great prowess
and beauty” (Come chevaliers esprovez / De haute proëce et bele, ll. 4593-4594).  But
                                                 
43 Take, for example, the two editions of the Graal used in this study.  In both cases, Perceval’s
name has been integrated into the revised title; Le Roman de Perceval ou le Conte du Graal (Roach),
The Story of the Graal (Li Contes del Graal) or Perceval (Pickens and Kibler).
44 Like Le Conte du Graal, Le Chevalier de la Charette is commonly referred to by the name of its
protagonist (Lancelot), as is Le Chevalier au Lion (Yvain).
45 Some of the first critical readings of the Graal treated Gawain’s story as separate from that of
Perceval, its inclusion in the grail legend seen as the result of clerical oversight or poor
manuscript arrangement, but such ideas were dispelled quite early on.  See, for example, Jean
Frappier, Autour du Graal (Geneva: Droz, 1977) 169-210.  Frappier acknowledges that there are
some inconsistencies between the heroes’ respective narratives, but suggests that these points of
contention are ultimately outweighed by the tale’s overall continuity.
46 The Conte du Graal is the first known source of the grail legend in Arthurian literature.  In
addition to numerous continuations, it inspired a number of new stories in which this vessel – an
increasingly sanctified version of Chrétien’s spiritually ambiguous graal – becomes the central
focus.  See, for example, Robert de Boron’s Roman del Graal and, the Vulgate cycle’s Queste del
Saint Graal.
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Perceval’s success and renown as a knight are mitigated by one specific failure, a
shortcoming that is neither chivalric nor amorous, but overtly linguistic.47  Like
the Graal itself, Perceval is best known for what he does not say.
Given shelter for the evening by a mysterious king whose physical
infirmity prevents him from participating in any activity apart from fishing in
the waters just outside his castle, Perceval is witness to a procession that is as
visually remarkable as it is puzzling.  While dining with the aptly named Fisher
King (li Roi Pescheor), he watches, intrigued, as several servants carrying
extraordinary objects pass through the room.  Chief among these items is a grail,
whose physical features are nothing short of superlative:
Li graaus, qui aloit devant,
De fin or esmeré estoit;
Prescieuses pierres avoit
El graal de maintes manieres
Des plus riches et des plus chieres
Qui en mer ne en terre soient. (ll. 3232-3237)
The grail, which came first,
was of fine, pure gold.
Set in the grail were
precious stones of every kind
the best and costliest
to be found on earth or in the sea.
Like the equally remarkable lance that emits an unending trickle of blood from
its tip (v. ll. 3197-3201), this brilliantly bejeweled chalice is a captivating example
                                                 
47 Perceval is not the only less-than-perfect knight created by Chrétien, but he is the only one
whose fault lies so far outside the usual scope of chivalric activity.  See, for example, the Chevalier
de la Charette, in which Lancelot is tormented by his adulterous love for the queen (Guenivere), or
Le Chevalier au Lion, in which Yvain fails in his promise to return to his wife, Laudine, thus losing
her love and, to some extent, his sanity.
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of a merveille,48 an object that provokes not only visual excitement, but also a
desire to know (savoir):
Par devant lui trespasser voit
Le graal trestot descovert,
Ne ne set pas cui l’en en sert
Et si le volroit il savoir. (ll. 3300-3303)
In front of him he saw pass
the grail, completely uncovered,49
but he did not know who was served from it
and yet he wanted to know.
Perceval’s fascination here recalls an earlier moment in the tale when he sees a
group of knights for the first time (v. ll. 100-363): enthralled by the seductive
luster of their various accoutrements, the young Welshman seeks to satisfy his
curiosity with a rapid succession of interrogatives, asking for the name and use
of each piece of armor.  He is, in fact, so verbose that the party’s leader gets nary
a word in edgewise, a lack of politesse attributed to the young squire’s ignorance
of certain laws:
— “Il ne set pas totes les lois,
Fait li sire, se Diex m’amant,
C’a rien nule que li demant
Ne me respont il ainc a droit,
Ains demande de quanqu’il voit
Coment a non et c’on en fait.” (ll. 236-241, emphasis mine)
— “He doesn’t know all the laws,
so help me God,” replied the lord,
for whatever I may ask him,
he will not answer straightforwardly,
but instead asks for everything he sees
                                                 
48 The Bleeding Lance, which also piques Perceval’s curiosity, is referred to as cele merveille (this
marvel, l. 3202).  For a detailed study of this term and its varied meanings in the works of
Chrétien de Troyes, see Lucienne Carasso-Bulos, The Merveilleux in Chrétien de Troyes’ Romances
(Geneva: Droz, 1976).  For more on the merveilleux in the Conte du Graal, see p. 164 ff.
49 This line contains what is probably one of the most discussed expressions in Chrétien’s corpus.
The basic translation of the phrase trestot descovert is itself fairly straightforward, but just what it
means in this particular passage is less clear.  For a brief, yet informative discussion of its possible
significance, see Frappier 129-132.
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its name and how it is used.
There is no elaboration on the precise substance of these rules, but the knight’s
remarks clearly imply that at least one aspect of proper (i.e., law-abiding) speech
is that it adheres to a definite order, one in which straightforward answers follow
questions and words are always placed in the right place (bon leu).  Although
well intentioned, Perceval’s loquaciousness is thus an unmistakable sign of
naiveté, for it reveals his ignorance of any such conventions.50
Like the apocryphal maxim that introduced this section51, the knight’s
criticism of Perceval points to a correlation between intelligence and silence, of
which the Graal offers several compelling illustrations.52 Arthur, for example, is
repeatedly said to be silent (mus, l. 911) as a result of intense mental reflection (li
rois fort pense et mot ne sone, l. 926).53  Meanwhile, Arthur’s seneschal Keu –
described as one “who could never keep himself from saying treacherous things”
(Et Kex, qui onques ne se pot / Taire de felonie dire, ll. 4274-4275) – serves as a
negative proof of the same rule.   Indeed, this would seem to be the motivation
behind advice given to Perceval by Gornemans de Gorhaut, a knight who offers
to tutor him in the ways of chevalerie.  In addition to initiating his pupil to the use
                                                 
50 In several instances, Chrétien uses the Old French word nice (i.e., naive, stupid, ignorant) to
describe Perceval and his actions.
51 See p. 86.
52 Quintilian affirms that it is the “duty of sagacity to decide what we should say and what we
should pass by in silence or postpone” (VI, 4, v).
53 Another, almost identical description of Arthur is found just two verses earlier: “The king was
thinking and did not say a word” (Li rois pensa et ne dist mot, l. 924).  Cf. Dragonetti 188.
Dragonetti calls attention to the rapport between this portrayal of the king as silent and his name
(art-tu).
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of armor and weaponry, this preudom54 suggests that the young knight not be too
hasty to speak, claiming that such verbal precociousness has negative
consequences:
Ne ne parlez trop volontiers:
Nus ne puet estre trop parliers
Qui sovent tel chose ne die
Qui torné li est affolie;
Car li sages dit et retrait:
‘Qui trop parole, il se mesfait.’ (ll. 1648-54, emphasis mine)
Nor should you talk too readily
anyone who is too talkative
soon says something
that makes him look like a fool.
Thus the wise man says and declares,
‘He who talks too much wrongs himself.’
The connection between wisdom and silence is frequent in medieval and
Renaissance literature, the two characteristics sometimes becoming so
intertwined that it is no longer clear just which one holds sway.  By remaining
silent, Perceval would thus create at least the illusion of a certain savoir, “for
when he is silent, a foolish man differs not a bit from the wise.” 55
At the same time however, verbal prudence is what ultimately prevents
Perceval from asking about the grail, and thus from acquiring the knowledge
that he so desperately wants.  For when he awakens the next morning, the castle
is empty, and the servants with whom he had planned to speak are nowhere to
be seen.  Granted, one of the things at which Perceval does not excel is following
                                                 
54 This word is used several times to refer to Gornemans.  Usually translated as ‘gentleman,’ the
content of the above passage points to its more literal denotation, an individual (homme) who
possesses knowledge or wisdom (preu).
55 “Cum tacet, haud quicquam differt sapientibus amens.”  Andrea Alciati, Emblematum liber, trans.
William Barker et al., November 1997, October 31, 2002, http://www.mun.ca/alciato/f011.html.
Also well known for his legal and linguistic scholarship during the early sixteenth century,
Alciati is perhaps best known today for this Book of Emblems, which eventually contained over
two hundred small poems, each one accompanied by a corresponding illustration.
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directions, and the effects of his selective memory are a source for some of the
text’s more humorous passages.56  Yet in this case, Perceval seems to have
followed the advice of his mentor to the letter, and the result is still far from
desirable, a fact of which the young knight is often reminded:
Molt est maleürous qui voit
Si bel tans que plus ne coviegne;
S’atent encor que plus biax viegne.
Che iez tu, li maleüreus,
Qui veïs qu’i[l] fu tans et leus
De parler et si te teüs;
Assez grant loisir en eüs. (ll. 4662-68, emphasis mine)
How miserable is one who recognizes
such a wonderful and fitting time
yet waits until a better one comes along.
Such are you, miserable one,
who saw that it was the time and place
to speak and you rested silent
even though you could well have spoken.
Like the unfortunate poets who cast their semence upon infertile ground,
Perceval’s error here is one of placement: having chosen to remain silent rather
than speak, he misses the rhetorically bon leu.  The rapport of this verbal miscue
with the earlier poetic alignment of composition and cultivation is reinforced by
a suggestion that Perceval poorly exploited (esploitié mal, l. 3555) his visit to the
Fisher King’s castle.57  Then again, perhaps the situation itself is at fault.  The
grail was, after all, uncovered too early (trestot decovert, l. 3301).  Either way, both
linguistic surplus and shortage – gab and silence – are condemned in the Graal,
                                                 
56 Before allowing her son to leave the familial manoir, Perceval’s mother offers her son several
pieces of advice, including just how to render service to needy ladies and under what conditions
gifts may be accepted from them.  Later, when he comes across a maiden left alone by the rest of
her party, he seems to remember only the rudimentary features of this advice.  For example,
whereas his mother suggested that he might accept a ring if a lady were to offer such a gift (v. ll.
550-554), Perceval takes the maiden’s ring by force (v. ll. 710-722).
57 This connotation of esploitié is identical to one of the meanings for the English word ‘exploited.’
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their common lack of linguistic moderation making identification of the
appropriate leu impossible.58
A similar link between language and regulated temporal presentation is
among the more fundamental components of ancient Greek rhetoric, which
distinguishes between two different senses of time.  The first – chronos – is
concerned with linear time, or the chronological passage of events.  The second –
called kairos – is more akin to timing, or the relative disposition of events within
chronos.  A moment of kairos might thus be defined as “the right or opportune
time to do something, or right measure in doing something.”59  As such, it is
closely related to the rhetorical conformity mandated in the Graal prologue,
where linguistic semence (words) were said be placed at either the correct or
incorrect rhetorical leu (place).  The notion of linguistic and rhetorical propriety
in kairos  is thus tied to the temporal specificity of a given moment.
Consequently, one of the offshoots of the basic definition of kairos is what may be
called “loaded time,” where an implicit or explicit recompense makes one
particular moment more opportune than another.  As Dale Sullivan has shown,
the most widespread use of this meaning of kairos is found in the New
Testament, where a particular instant is frequently linked to promises of divine
reward or fulfillment, either gained or lost.60
                                                 
58 During the grail procession, Chrétien interjects that he is concerned that Perceval’s silence may
have negative effects, since he has “heard it said that one can just as easily be too quiet as too
talkative” (Por che que j’ai oï retraire / Qu’ausi se puet on bien trop taire / Com trop parler a la foie[e], ll.
3249 – 3251).
59 James L. Kinneavy, “Kairos: A Neglected Concept in Classical Rhetoric,” Rhetoric and Praxis:
The Contribution of Rhetoric to Practical Reasoning ed. Jean Dietz-Moss (Washington, D.C.: Catholic
University Press, 1986) 80. While this definition is too brief to be complete, the basic notion of
appropriateness it conveys is at the center of nearly all understandings of kairos.
60 Dale Sullivan, “Kairos and the Rhetoric of Belief,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 78 (1992) 321.  “The
other three meanings of kairos, which are rhetorical in their associations, can be distributed along
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Here, the relation to Chrétien’s prologue is unmistakable, and Perceval’s
visit to the Grail Castle offers many indications of its special status.  For example,
in addition to its otherworldly appearance, the grail later levitates in and out of
the main chamber during dinner:
Et li graals endementiers
Par devant als retrespassa,
Ne li vallés ne demanda
Del graal cui on en servoit. (ll. 3290–3293)
And during this time, the grail
passed in front of them once more,
but the squire asked neither
about the grail nor whom was served from it.
Furthermore, the verses leading up to this scene suggest that the entire region is
somewhat exceptional.  Traveling through an area devoid of earthly life (rien
terïene, l. 2977), Perceval is grateful when offered lodging by the Fisher King and
so hurries off toward where the castle should be.  However, when he arrives, the
young Welsh knight finds nothing but a static landscape of sky and earth (Si
esgarde tot entor lui / Se ne vit rien fors ciel et terre, ll. 3038-3039) and, thinking he
has been duped, turns to leave.  Then, to his great surprise, he sees one of the
castle’s towers appear, as if by magic, from the earth (Lors vit pres de lui en [un] val
/ Le chief d’une tor qui parut, ll. 3050-3051).  Like Gornemans de Gorhaut’s castle –
which also materializes before Perceval’s eyes – this one defies visual and
geographical convention.61  In addition, the dwelling seems to be situated in a
                                                                                                                                                  
a continuum of time lengths, from a single point to a season to a time of fulfillment, but they all
suggest that there is an opportune time for something to occur, that there are special times
determined by God, shown by God.”
61 When Perceval first arrives at Gornement de Gort’s castle, the towers are described as being
“born” (nestre) from the rock. v. ll. 1326-1328.
95
sort of temporal no-man’s-land, for upon hearing that Perceval departed from
Beaurepaire castle that same day, the monarch is nothing short of astonished:
Si m’ait Diex, fait li preudom,
Trop grant journee avez hui faite
Vos meüstes ainz que la gaite
Eüst hui main l’aube cornee.” (ll. 3124–3127)
May God save me, said the gentleman,
you rode far too long today!
You must have left this morning,
well before the watchman had sounded the dawn.
Yet Perceval makes it clear that his departure actually occurred much later in the
day, well after the first daily call to prayer had been given (Ains estoit ja prime
sonee / Fait li vallés, jel vos affi ll. 3128-3129).62  When combined with the castle’s
striking beauty and spontaneous physical generation, “chronological flux”
surrounding its leu serves as a clear signal of its kairotic significance.63
So, although the young Welshman may have achieved a certain level of
physical proëce as a knight,64 his linguistic abilities fall well short of any similar
mastery, largely because he is unable to recognize the symbolic importance of the
rhetorical situation in which he is a player.  In fact, it is only thanks to a maiden
whom he meets on the road leading away from the castle that Perceval becomes
aware of the kairos inherent to the grail procession.  As chance would have it, the
girl is also his cousin (germaine cousine, l. 3600), though it is not clear whether her
actions are provoked by familial pity or pure spite:
                                                 
62 Prime is the morning prayer service that begins shortly after dawn.  A similar temporal
disparity occurs upon Perceval’s departure, when his cosine germaine wonders at the well-fed
appearance of his horse, saying that there is not a castle to be found for forty leagues (v. ll. 3463-
3482).  The temporal displacement of the Fisher King’s castle is reinforced by his own reference to
it as a “house where I used to be” (Une maison ou je estois, l. 3033).
63 Frappier 161.
64 See p.  87.
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Ha! Perchevax maleürous,
Come iés or mal aventurous
Quant tu tot che n’as demandé!
Que tant eüsses amendé
Le buen roi qui est mehaigniez
Que toz eüst regaigniez
Ses membres et terre tenist
Et si grans biens t’en avenist! (ll. 3583-3590)
Ah, miserable Perceval,
how unfortunate you were
when you did not ask all this,
for you would have brought such relief
to the good King who is maimed:
he would have totally regained use
of his limbs and ruled his lands,
and so much good would have come of it!
Had Perceval spoken, his question would have provided demonstrable proof (si
grans biens) of the bon leu / grant preu rapport of the prologue.65  Instead, he finds
only misery and misfortune, suggesting that one can, indeed, be too silent (trop
taire, l. 3250).  Yet if, linguistically speaking, Perceval reaps what he sows, the fact
that this blunder occurs after he has supposedly rid himself of poor linguistic
habits would overturn the aforementioned link between silence and savoir, the
hyperbolic kairotic value placed upon this missed opportunity transforming
silence into a negative linguistic entity incapable of producing anything of
positive value.
The dist, ensaignement, and the Law
Blame for the young knight’s silence is thus placed quite squarely on the
teaching (ensaignement) that he receives from Gornemans de Gorhaut, the
preudome sage (wise gentleman, l. 3247) whose advice loomed so large at this
critical time.  In fact, Perceval’s entire development from vallet galois (l. 791) to
                                                 
65 See p. 74 ff.
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noviax chevaliers (l. 1699) is a pedagogical passage that highlights a chasm
between two very different lands and their opposing laws of representation.  On
the one hand, there is the Gaste Forest (Waste Forest), where all that Perceval
knows is derived from what his mother has said:
Ma mere m’enseigna et dist
Que les puceles saluaisse
En quel que liu que jes trovaisse. (ll. 684-686, emphasis mine)
My mother taught me and said
that I should greet maidens
wherever I might find them.
As in Dante’s De Vulgari Eloquentia, maternal teaching in the Waste Forest is
transmitted orally, with repeated citations similar to the one above clearly
establishing this doxology as the region’s linguistic authority.66  The world of
Arthurian knighthood, on the other, depends much more on visual instruction:
Li preudom par trois fois monta,
Par trois fois d’armes l’ensaigna
Itant come ensaignier l’en pot,
Tant que assez ensaignié l’ot,
Et par trois fois monter le fist. (ll. 1505-09, emphasis mine)
The gentleman mounted the horse three times
and three times demonstrated the weapons,
until he had shown him all he could,
such that he had taught him enough
and three times had the young man mount.
Separated by three different permutations of the verb ensaigner (i.e., to show, to
demonstrate, to teach), the first and last lines of this passage are mirror images, a
faithful textual rendering of the imitative nature of this teaching.  If, as Chrétien
                                                 
66 Literary use of a certain form of this word in the later Middle Ages supports its fictional
meaning here: although widely varied in their subject matter, the collection of medieval tales
known as dits all proclaim to have a certain pedagogical or moralistic objective.  For a detailed
examination of the history of this genre, see Gloria K. Fiero, et al., Three Medieval Views of Women
(New Haven: Yale UP, 1989) ix-xi, 1-3.
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suggests, there is a connection between Perceval’s silence and his teaching, it
would thus seem to lie in this substitution of visual for oral input.
Despite the barren connotations of its name, the Waste Forest (Gaste
Forest) where Perceval lives with his mother at the beginning of the tale is
anything but desolate.  Every part of its initial description points instead to a
decidedly healthy abundance:
Ce fu au tans qu’arbre foilissent,
Que glai et bois et pre verdissent,
Et cil oisel en lor latin
Cantent doucement au matin
Et tote riens de joie aflamme. (ll. 69-73)
It was the season when trees flower,
that bushes and woods and meadows turn green,
and the birds, in their tongue,
sing sweetly in the morning
and everything is burning with joy.
Burgeoning plants, singing birds, green grass: all these images are standard
components of a popular medieval literary topos that helps Chrétien to paint the
forest of the veve dame as the textual locus of a pleasant, eternal plenitude.67  This
fertility is even reflected in the frontispiece of Ms FR 12576, where two large,
bulbous green stems dominate a considerable portion of the illumination that
depicts some of Perceval’s initial adventures in the Waste Forest.68  Its
                                                 
67 Similar imagery is frequent in vernacular texts of the Middle Ages, where it is often used to
represent themes of both literary renewal and abundance.  See, for example, the Roman de la Rose,
where the narrator awakens (within his dream) in a garden where the trees and bushes are filled
with novelle feuille (the pages of a flowering text) and singing birds.  Terence Scully notes the
connection between some of this imagery and the idea of joie in his article on Le Chevalier de la
Charette, “The Sen of Chrétien de Troyes’s Joie de la Cort,” in The expansion and Transformation of
Courtly Literature, (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1980) 71-94.
68 For more information regarding the illuminations of Ms FR 12576, see Sara Hindman, Sealed in
Parchment: Rereadings of Knighthood in the Illuminated Manuscripts of Chrétien de Troyes (Chicago:
Chicago University Press, 1994).  It is also interesting to note that the lower half of the
frontispiece, which contains depictions of Perceval’s arrival at Arthur’s court and his victory over
the chevalier vermeil, is devoid of these growths, bordered instead by an elaborate frame.  More
general information about the manuscripts, including the illuminations and their physical
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paradoxical plenitude is closely related to the mother’s verbal system of
transmission, an expressive rapport intimated by the rhythmic association of joie
(joy) and oie (heard) in the narrator’s opening description of the forest:
Et maintenant li cuers del ventre
Por le dolç tans li resjoï
Et por le chant que il oï
Des oisiax qui joie fasoient (ll. 86-89, emphasis mine)
And now his heart
Rejoiced for the pleasant weather
And for the song that he heard
From the birds who were making joy
Pleasure (joie) and audition (oï) go hand-in-hand in the mother’s domain,
alluding to a more profound textual link between femininity and linguistic
abundance that will only become evident once it is out of reach, after the young
squire’s departure from the Waste Forest.69
But, in spite of its omnipresent joie, the integrity of the mother’s forest is
really quite fragile.  While out for the matinal stroll described above, Perceval is
alarmed by a great noise (noise) of which he cannot espy the source.  This
disturbing clatter – really just the sound of shields, hauberks, and swords
knocking against each other – strikes the young squire as decidedly sinister:
Par m’ame,
Voir se dist ma mere, ma dame,
Qui me dist que diables sont
Les plus laides choses del mont. (ll. 113-116)
My soul,
my mother, my lady spoke the truth
who told me that devils are
the ugliest things in the world.
                                                                                                                                                  
condition is available in Keith Busby et al. eds., Les manuscripts de Chrétien de Troyes / The
Manuscripts of Chrétien de Troyes (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1993).
69 See p. 113 ff.
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Satisfactorily identified and explained by his mother’s dist, the strange and
unpleasant noise of the advancing knights initially reaffirms her authoritative
status as the dominant source of Perceval’s knowledge.  At this point, however,
he has only heard and not seen the disturbance (Li vallés ot et ne voit pas / Ciax qui
vers lui vienent le pas, ll. 111-112), and his initial appraisal is quickly cast into
doubt once he catches a glimpse of the cacophony’s source:
Einsi a soi meisme dist
Li vallés ains qu’il les veïst
Et quant il les vit en apert
Que du bois furent descovert,
Et vit les haubers fremïans
Et les elmes clers et luisans
Et vit le blanc et le vermeil
Reluire contre le soleil
Et l’or et l’azure et l’argent
Si li fu molt bel et molt gent,
Et dist: “Ha! sire Diex, merchi!
Ce sont angle que je voi chi. (ll. 125-138, emphasis mine)
As he said this to himself,
the squire then saw them
and when he saw them in the clearing
that was out of the woods
and saw the gleaming hauberks
and the clear, lustrous helms
and saw the white and the red
shining in the sun
and the gold and the azur and the silver
then they were very beautiful and pleasing
and he said: “Ah! Thanks be to God!
These are angels that I see here.
Fascinated by the shining and colorful appearance of the same objects that had
before given him such a fright, the vallet galois now decides that the beings before
him are not devils, but angels or, perhaps, even God (Diex, v. l. 174).  And while
both of these revised evaluations continue to rely on the mother’s dist, Perceval’s
inability to assimilate what would normally be a rather common scene points to
a fundamental weakness within the representational landscape of her forest gaste.
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Ironically, the source of this faiblesse is the very foundation upon which
the sustained joie of the mother’s forest is founded.  After his encounter with the
wandering knights, Perceval returns home, and his mother is compelled to
explain her son’s troubled understanding of what he has just seen.  This entails
sharing certain hidden details of his genealogy rich in knightly tradition: both of
Perceval’s elder brothers and his father, were, says the mere, successful knights,
but all died as a result of their chosen vocation.  Like the Fisher King’s wounds,
those of Perceval’s father took not only his life but also the physical and
economic signs of his socio-political status:
Vostre peres, sin el savez
Fu parmi la jambe navrez
Si que il mehaigna del cors.
Sa grant terre, ses grans tresors
Que il avoit come preudom
Ala tot a perdition. (ll. 435-440)
Your father, whom you did not know
was injured between the legs
such that his body was weak.
His great lands, his great treasures
that he held as a gentleman
were all lost.
As her only remaining son, Perceval is thus the final – though somewhat
faltering – symbol of sexual fertility and genealogical continuity in an otherwise
devastated world:
Vos estïez toz li confors
Que jou avoie et toz li biens,
Car il n’i avoit plus des miens; (ll. 484-486)
You were all the comfort
that I had, and the only thing of value
for there were no more of my people left.
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It was, in fact, to protect against the disappearance of this prized possession
(biens) that she created her forest, eliminating from it all manner of reference to
the lifestyle that had so afflicted her life with loss:
Biax dols fix, de chevalerie
Vos quidoie si bien garder
Que ja n’en oïssiez parler
Ne que ja nul n’en veïssiez. (ll. 408-411)
Fair sweet son, I had hoped
to keep you so far from knighthood
that you’d never hear tell of knights
nor ever see one.
So, like the real forests of medieval Europe, the Waste Forest is not wild, but
cultivated, a fictional construction whose existence relies very squarely on
language.70  Sheltering Perceval from both the aural and visual knowledge of his
knightly heritage, her endeavor quite literally suppresses the name of the father:
governed by a strict representational schema that banishes from its borders all
related signifiers of loss, the Gaste Forest is an attempt to (re)create a linguistic
plenum by avoiding the Law, the Name-of-the-Father.71  Its name, therefore, is
not a description, but a warning; for est gaste (outside there is loss).
The project is, nonetheless, doomed to failure, since the young squire
ultimately forsakes the aural dist of his mother’s teaching for the more seductive
visual input he now associates with chevalerie.  When Perceval returns from his
encounter with the knights, his mother tries – in vain – to reaffirm the reliability
                                                 
70 Robert Pogue Harrison, Forests: The Shadow of Civilization (Chicago: Chicago University Press,
1992) 69.  In this excellent study of the historical and literary significance of forests Harrison notes
that the earliest documented use of the word itself occur in twelfth-century France, where lands
were given a special protected status in order to reserve their use for the king, especially for
hunting purposes.
71 Lacan’s Name-of-the-Father (nom-du-père) refers not to a real (physical) father, nor to an
imaginary father, but to the symbolic father, whose appearance marks the beginning of lack and
desire in the subject.  See, for example, Jacques Lacan, Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis, trans.
Anthony Wilden (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1968) 40-42.
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and authority of her dist, claiming that angels and God are, indeed, the most
beautiful things in the world:
Biax fix, encor le di je bien
Jel di por voir, et di encor (ll. 388-389, emphasis mine)
Beautiful son, again I say it
I say it truthfully, and say again
Despite these repetitive reassurances, Perceval lashes back with a stinging retort,
affirming the superiority of his vision:
Taisiez, mere, ne vi je or
Les plus beles choses qui sont,
Qui par le gaste forest vont? (ll. 390–392, emphasis mine)
Silence, mother, for have I not just seen
the most beautiful things that exist
traveling through the waste forest?
Coupled with an angry silencing of his mother’s voice, Perceval’s departure from
the forest will thus steer him toward another type of learning, a new ensaignement
based upon the exclusion of maternal authority and its dist.
The opposition between the forest gaste and chevalerie becomes even more
striking when Perceval arrives at the castle of Gornemans de Gorhaut, the
preudome who becomes his knightly tutor.  Playing on subtle linguistic
oppositions and the sexual connotations of his chosen imagery, Chrétien tells us
that Gornemans’ towering stronghold is positioned at the mouth of a bay (gort),
where it is locked in a violent struggle against the surrounding sea (mer):
Enmi le chastel en estant
Ot une tor et fort et grant;
Une barbacane molt fort
Avoit tornee vers le gort,
Qui a la mer se combatoit,
Et la mers au pié li batoit. (ll. 1331-1334)
In the middle of the castle
was a large and strong tower,
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and a strong rampart
that faced the bay and
fought against the sea
and the sea slapped at its moorings.
The last line of defense against an angry sea, the visibly phallic strength of the
castle’s fortified tower and its defiant resistance of the thrashings from the
feminine mer are enticing symbolic representations of the pedagogical battle that
will be waged inside the castle walls, pitting the mother’s instruction against the
visual ensaignement offered by Gornemans de Gorhaut. 72
There is little doubt that Perceval could, at this point, use the training.  For
in spite of a swift victory over the chevaliers vermeil (v. ll. 1097 – 1099), this young
Welshman seems ill prepared for his new vocation.  He is, as text notes, nice
(ignorant), a lack of refinement that was so glaring in his earlier unawareness of
the laws of chevalerie.73  Furthermore, as Perceval himself admits, all he knows
how to do with his bright new outfit is put it on and take it off (Jes sai bien vestir et
retraire, l. 1392), and even this fairly simple gesture did not come naturally:
Je quidoie de vostre roi
Qu’il meüst ces armes donees,
Mais ains avrai par carbonees
Trestot esbrahoné le mort
Que nule des armes en port,
Qu’eles se tienent si au cors
Que dedans et defors
Est trestot un, si com mi samble (ll. 1134-1141)
I thought that your king
had given me these arms,
but I will have burned and
cut this dead man into pieces
before wearing a single piece of his armor,
for they cling so tightly to his body
that inside and outside
                                                 
72 For an explanation of the connection between the mother (mere) and the sea (mer), see p.  114.
73 See ll. 236 – 241.
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are as one, it seems to me.
Unable to conceive of a difference between the body and its protective covering,
the use and appearance of armor are, for Perceval, one and the same.74  This
superficial semiotic understanding is a legacy inherited from his mother, who
taught him that “it is by the surname that we know man” (Par le sornon connoist
on l’ome, l. 562).
The training offered by Gornemans focuses largely on moving Perceval
away from such an oversimplified perspective.  Among the things that his host
demonstrates how to use is the shield (escu).  One of many pieces in a medieval
knight’s armor, the shield has a rather special status, for unlike the sword or the
lance, it is simultaneously armorial and accessorial.  Held in the hand during
combat, it plays a direct role in the physical aspect of this violent encounter; the
battle finished, the shield once again becomes part of the knight’s vestimentary
ensemble, often hung around the neck, a practice emulated in the Conte du Graal
(si ot un escu a son col, l. 4822).  To these uses is added another, one that
Gornemans de Gorhaut himself demonstrates to Perceval as part of his
ensaignement:
Lors a desploïe l’ensaigne
Se li mostre et li ensaigne
Comment on doit son escu prendre. (ll. 1437-1439)
Then he unfurled his blazon,
and demonstrated and taught
how one must hold his shield.
                                                 
74 The same sort of misunderstanding occurs when Perceval comes across the knights in his
mother’s forest.  Admiring their armor, he asks if they “were born that way” (Li dist: “Fustes vos
ensi nez?”, l. 282).
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By repetition of the word ensaigne in this passage (first as a noun and then as a
verb), the handling of the shield is related to, even confused with, the
presentation of l’ensaigne, that is to say, the heraldry.  “Like so many visible
signs,” the shield is an accessory via which one knight identifies himself to
others, a nominative apparatus that signals both his status as a knight and his
membership in a particular political or familial group.75  Thus, Gornemans’
lesson teaches his student that some objects are used to signify others, that signs
are separate from things.76
In fact, the whole of Gorneman’s training is focused not on fighting, but
on representation.  Above all, what must be adhered to in chevalerie is a
confrontational mise-en-scène that governs participants’ activities.  So, when
Perceval suggests that he will resort to using his fists in the event his lance is
broken (Aprés che n’i avroit plus / Mais qu’as poinz li corroie sus, ll. 1515-1516),
Gornemans’ advises a much different course of action:
— “Amis, ce ne feriez vos mie.”
— “Que ferai dont?” — “Par escremie
De l’espee le dois requerre.” (ll. 1517-1519, emphasis mine)
“Friend, you shall not do this at all.”
“What, then, shall I do?”  “By fencing
you should pursue him.”
Encouraging strict adherence to its representational traditions, improvisation is
not allowed in Gornemans’ version of chevalerie, a world that thrives not on
innovation but imitation.  The reason for this severity only becomes clear later in
the tale, once the young knight has begun his chivalric adventures in earnest.
                                                 
75 St. Augustine recognizes the essentially lingusitc nature of these objects, noting that “banners
and military standards visibly indicate the will of the captains.  And all of these things are like so
many visible words” (II.iii.4).  St. Augustine, On Christian Doctrine 35.
76 St. Augustine, On Christian Doctrine 8-9 (II.ii.2).
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Before Perceval can leave Gornemans’ castle, the preudom offers him several bits
of last minute advice, including one final piece of information regarding knightly
combat:
Se vos venez al desus,
Que vers vos ne se poïst plus
Desfendre ne contretenir,
Ainz l’estuece a merchi venir,
Gardez que merchi en aiez
N’encontre che ne l’ociiez. (ll. 1643-1647)
If you get the upper hand
and he can no longer defend himself
or hold out against you,
you must grant him mercy
rather than killing him outright.77
Given the violence with which Perceval first acquired his armor, this clement
attitude no doubt seems rather strange to the young knight.78  He does, however,
accept these terms and abides by them on several different occasions.
If one recalls that the apprenticeship that allowed Perceval to become a
chevalier is described as an ensaignement – a semiotic apprenticeship – then these
aborted battles reveal the true reason behind the above interdiction.  A knight
manipulates signs (les ensaignes) as well as weapons.  Obviously, this rapport that
surges from the language of the Graal would be much less interesting if
Perceval’s very gestures did not so convincingly resemble the production of a
text.  Curiously, most passages that relate Perceval’s combats with other knights
are not extensively commented by the narrator, who is always in a hurry to put
an end to his descriptions of these confrontations.  Rather, they are recounted
later within the fictional framework of Perceval’s knightly development.  After
                                                 
77 Kibler 81.
78 Perceval’s defeat of the chevalier vermeil is especially bloody (v. ll. 1098-1119).
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each of his combats as noviax chevaliers, Perceval sends back a defeated adversary
to Arthur’s court, where the unfortunate foe must present himself in the same
state in which he was at the end of the battle, a practice that the text cites to us
one of the most vital rules of chevalerie:
Costume estoit a cel termine,
Sel trovon escrit en la letre,
Que chevaliers se devoit metre
En prison atot son atour,
Si come il partoit de l’estour,
Come il avoit conquis esté,
Qu’il n’i eüst ja rien osté
Ne rien nule n’i mise.
Clamadeus tot en itel guise
S’aroute aprés Engygeron (ll. 2722-2731)
In those days it was custom –
as we find it written down,
that a knight has to render himself
prisoner with all his equipment
just as he left the battle
where he had been defeated,
without having removed anything,
nor having added anything.
In just this way, Clamadeu
set off after Engygeron
Splattered with blood from wounds inflicted by Perceval’s lance and sword,
these defeated knights become living texts of the combat: sent back to the
Arthurian court, their assignment will be to recount the story of their own
defeat.79  For example, when Clamadeu arrives in Arthur’s pavilion covered in
blood (ll. 2764-2765), his seneschal (himself already a prisoner in Arthur’s court)
recognizes his lord immediately and knows exactly what happened to him just
by looking at his armor:
“Seignor, seignor, veez merveilles.
                                                 
79Curtius 302-347.  Curtius discusses this fictional “blood writing” in his chapter “The Book as
Symbol.”
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Li vallés as armes vermeilles
Envoie cha, si m’en creez,
Cel chevalier que vos veez.
Il l’a conquis, j’en sui toz cers,
Por che qu’il est de sanc covers. (ll. 2767-2772)
My lord, my lord, behold this wonder.
the squire with the red armor
sent this chevalier that you see,
you can believe me.
He defeated him, I’m completely sure of it,
because he is covered in blood.
So, the swordplay that Gornemans counsels as a substitute for direct physical
contact and the obligatory merchi that preserves the wounded adversary
transform orchestrated scenes of combat into ones of writing.  In this sense, the
knight’s activity is resolutely poetic, with physical combat just the necessary
means to a literary end.
Still, indoctrination into this realm of visual signification comes at a loss,
for it forces the vallés to renounce his mother’s teaching.  When Perceval defeats
the chevalier vermeil, he readily dons his defeated foe’s armor but scoffs at
Yvonet’s suggestion that he also wear a luxurious silk chemise underneath the
mail:
Voldriiez vos que je laissasse
Ma cotele ou aigue ne passé
Por cesti qui n’en tenroit goute?
Maldite soit la gorge tote
Qui cangera n’avant n’après
Ses bons dras por autres malvés. (ll. 1167-1172)
Do you want me to leave
my jacket which lets no water pass
for this one that wouldn’t hold a drop?
Cursed be the throat
of he who would ever exchange
his good clothes for other poor ones.
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Here, it is not a matter of keeping water (e.g., aigue, eve, mer) out, but in.  Hoping
to sustain her symbolic presence through a vestimentary keepsake, Perceval
refuses to give up the rough canvas shirt because it was made by his mother (Que
ma mere me fist l’autr’ier, l. 1163).  However, having tricked the Welshman into
pledging to obey all his advice, Gornemans de Gorhaut is able to impose this
switch upon the youth.80  While he believes that the garment offered by his host
is worth much less than his own, Perceval will not allow himself to transgress
Gornemans’ commands (commandemens, l. 1618):
-- “Et je si ferai,
Fait li vallés, ja n’en ferai
Encontre vos de nule chose.”
As dras vestir plus ne repose,
Si a les sa mere laissiez. (ll. 1619-1623)
-- “And so I will,
said the squire, I will never
oppose you in anything.”
He no hesitated no longer in putting on the clothes
and left aside those his mother had made him.
Fulfilling his own curse, Perceval’s change in appearance is followed almost
immediately by Gornemans’ admonishment for the student to control his tongue
(v. ll. 1648 - 1654).  In addition, the preudom orders him to expunge any references
to his mother and her teaching (dist) from his vocabulary:
– “Or ne dites jamais, biax frere,
Fait li preudom, que vostre mere
Vos ait apris rien, se je non. (ll. 1675-1677)
– “Now, never say, dear brother,
said the gentleman, that your mother
taught you anything.
                                                 
80 l. 1416 ff.
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Instead, he suggests that the noviax chevaliers use a new allusion when pushed to
designate the source of his teaching:
“Li vavasors, ce porrez dire,
Qui vostre esperon vos caucha,
Le vos aprist et ensaigna.” (ll. 1686-1688, emphasis mine)
“You can say that the vavasor
who attached your spur
taught and instructed you.”
The symbol of Perceval’s new chivalric identity, this spur carries a trace (es-per-
on) of the same paternity from which his mother had fought so hard to shelter
him.  Gornemans’ chivalric ensaignement is thus indeed the imposition of a law,
one that places the edenic fullness of the mother and her forest gaste under the
sign of silence and out of reach.
Silence, God, and the Mer(e)
Nonetheless, Perceval is convinced that he will relocate his mother if only
he can cross the seemingly interminable stream that runs through the fictional
topography of the Graal:
Et dist: “Ha! Sire toz puissans,”
Se ceste eve passer pooie,
Dela ma mere troveroie,
Mien escïent, se ele est vive.” (ll. 2990 - 2993)
And he said: “Alas! All powerful lord,
if only I could cross this water,
over there I would find my mother,
I do believe, if she is alive.
Sadly, Perceval is never able to make this crossing, and his mother remains dela,
always ‘over there’ on the other side, ever present in memory yet just out of
reach.  Separating the world of chevalerie from that of the mother, this water is,
like the silence that engenders Perceval’s misfortune at the Fisher King’s castle, a
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sort of conceptual and linguistic filter that both impedes and facilitates the
successful and fulfilling use of language.81
While riding through a “naked and deserted land” (terre nue et desertee, l.
1750), the young squire happens upon a castle named Beaurepaire and, taken
aback by the desolateness of the surrounding area, hastens to gain entry inside
the castle walls.  Unfortunately, like the mother’s forest, this place does not live
up to its name.82  For once inside, he realizes that the interior is equally bare, a
uniform emptiness that the narrator associates with a specific sexual lack:
Car tot par tot ou il ala,
Trova degastees les rues
Et les maisons vit decheües,
C’ome ne feme n’i avoit. (ll. 1752-1755, emphasis mine)
For everywhere he went,
he found the roads deserted
and the saw houses in ruin,
as though not a woman were there.83
There are, of course women in the castle, including the one who later becomes
Perceval’s amie, the maiden Blancheflor.  However, this imagery links more
tangible signs of loss (e.g., collapsed houses, deserted streets) to an abstract
conception of femininity as the sexualized symbol of a missing plenitude.84  The
                                                 
81 Once more, the frontispiece of the Graal manuscript seems to bear this idea out, its rather
sparse visual cues a nonetheless precise depiction of the tales’ fictional and poetic structures:
positioned on the opposite side of a bridge from Perceval and the group of wandering knights,
the mother, although visible, is already isolated within the scene, confined to an area dela
(beyond) the rest of the fiction.
82 Literally, “Good Rest,” a name that should denote a comfortable lodging.
83 This line differs depending on the manuscript consulted.  For example, in the manuscript used
by Kibler for his translation (MS Fr. 794), it finishes with home et feme (men and women), whereas
another (Bern 354) contains the variant fame.  While Méla translates this as âme (soul) in modern
French, I am inclined – given the commonaility between the other two manuscripts -- to treat it as
a variant spelling for woman.
84 Here, it would be impossible to ignore echoes from Lacan’s notion of la femme (the woman),
which he writes with the definite article crossed out not to imply that women cannot speak, but
to suggest that words are incapable of fully describing them, that they have within their beings
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nominative disruption between the surname (Beaurepaire) and the castle’s
appearance can be read as a result of this lack.85  Furthermore, Chrétien’s use of
the words degastees and decheües recall the now-absent veve dame, whose forest
was gaste and who appeared to collapse dead (cheüe morte, l. 625) upon Perceval’s
departure.  Meaning (sen) has vanished along with the Perceval’s mother, a loss
not unlike the sorplus that she strictly prohibits her son from accepting from
anyone but herself:
S’ele le baisier vos consent,
Le sorplus je vos en desfent,
Se laissier le volez por moi. (ll. 548-549, emphasis mine)
If she grants you a kiss,
I forbid you to take the surplus
For you should leave this to me.
This maternal injunction, one of the last prior to Perceval’s exit, contrasts
maternal language, which has something en plus – its sorplus – to the language of
exterior world where, as the mother explained, people are defined by the sornon,
a negation of this signifying excess.
Given their already sorry state, the castle’s residents are soon driven to the
point of starvation when the knight Clamadeu des Iles redoubles his efforts with
a new siege.  Then, just as they are about to lose both physical strength and any
hope of resisting the opposing army’s demands, a chance arrival turns the tables
in their favor:
                                                                                                                                                  
something that escapes the world of things and, thus, language.  Lacan calls this something a
jouissance supplémentaire.  “Il n’en reste pas moins que si elle est exclue par la nature des choses,
c’est justement de ceci que d’être pas toute, elle a, par rapport à ce qui désigne de jouissance la
fonction phallique, une jouissance supplémentaire.”  Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire livre XX!: Encore,
ed. Jacques-Alain Miller (Paris: Seuil, 1975) 68.
85 Perceval himself encounters a similar problem when the maiden Blanchefleur asks him where
he was the night before arriving at Beaurepaire.  For, although the young Welshman is able to
provide a multitude of details regarding the appearance of Gornemans de Gorhaut’s castle, he
does not know its name (Si sai tote l’oevre assomer / Mais le chastel ne sai nomer, ll. 1884-1890).
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Cel jor meïsme[s] uns grans vens
Ot par mer chachie une barge,
Qui de forment porte grant carge
Et d’autre vitailles ert plaine (ll. 2524 - 2527)
That very day a powerful wind
had driven across the sea a barge
heavily laden with wheat
and filled with other provisions
A divine gift from the sea (mer), this strategic shipment is also by homophonic
liaison a gift from the mother (mere), no doubt gathered from the bountiful fields
of her gaste forest.86  In fact, fluidity and femininity are closely linked, both in the
Graal and in medieval writing in general: though etymologically distinct, poets
often play on the visual and sonic resemblance of the Old French terms for water
(eve) and woman (eve).  This practice – called echolalia – is particularly noticeable
in the Conte du Graal, where the narrative pursues an imaginative, incessant
string of analogous linguistic figures.87  In this particular passage, the mer-mère
correlation becomes even more pronounced after the arrival of the barge, for
with it comes renewed linguistic congruity:
La sale ne rest mie coie
Ainçois i a joie et grant bruit.
Par le mengier font joie tuit
Que molt l’avoient covoitié (ll. 2578-2581)
The hall was no longer silent
but filled with joy and great sound.
Everyone was overyjoyed by the meal
for which they had so longed.
                                                 
86 When Perceval meets the knights passing through the forest, he leads them to a team of
harrowers (herceor, l. 300) who are preparing the land for planting.
87 Cf. Roger Dragonetti, La Vie de la lettre au Moyen Âge 176.  “L’acte de narrer est un passer, un
trespasser, un retrespasser des mêmes figures que l’écrivain accouple toujours différemment et
souvent avec d’autres plus en retrait qui échappent à l’attention du lecteur.”
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Filled with all the expected signs (e.g., food, happiness, laughter) of a good lodge
(beau repaire), the castle now truly lives up to its name.  Gone but not forgotten,
the maternal sorplus nourishes the otherwise barren relationship between word
and thing from dela, her continued influence acting as “an umbilical cord of the
symbolic.”88
Thus, despite her physical absence, the veve dame maintains a linguistic
presence throughout the tale, and nowhere is this more apparent than during the
final lines of Perceval’s story.  Occurring after a hiatus of nearly 1,500 verses, this
episode would seem to signal his return to a former state, one more akin to the
ignorant Welsh squire who roamed Waste Forest than to the proven knight so
cherished by Arthur and his court.  Still, when we rejoin the noviax chevaliers, he
has wandered the countryside for five long years, encountering numerous
strange adventures (estranges aventures, l. 6627).  This dogged pursuit of fanciful
exploits has, however, retarded the young knight’s spiritual development to such
a point that even the most fundamental theological concept is now erased from
his mind:
Perchevax, ce nos dist l’estoire,
Ot si perdue la miemoire
Que de Dieu ne li sovient mais. (ll. 6217-6219, emphasis mine)
Perceval, so the story tells us
had lost his memory so completely
that he no longer remembered God.
While the precise cause of this most severe case of catechistic amnesia is never
identified, the implication is clearly that chevalerie and religion are two mutually
                                                 
88 Alan Sheridan, trans., The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller
(New York!: Norton, 1977) 280.  These are not Lacan’s own words, but they do offer an interesting
illustration of the relationship between the Real and the Symbolic.
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exclusive pursuits.  Indeed, when Perceval encounters a group of pilgrims
returning from Good Friday services at the home of a saintly hermit (saint
hermite, l. 6303), the party is astonished to see him in full knightly regalia on a
day when such activity is strictly forbidden:
Tot cil qui en lui ont creance
Doivent estre hui en peneance;
Hui ne deüst hom qui Dieu croie
Armes porter ne champ ne voie (ll. 6297-6300)
All those who believe in him
must be penitent today;
today no man who believes in God
should carry arms in field or trail.
Accompanied by a brief summary of the Incarnation and Jesus’ resurrection,
their scolding is apparently enough to mend Perceval’s mnemonic rift, for he
turns immediately toward the hermitage and, upon arrival, dismounts, shedding
his religiously offensive garb (Et quant il vint a l’ermitage / Si descent et si se
desarme, ll. 6334 – 6335).  Welcomed by the hermit, Perceval is absolved of his
divine forgetfulness and learns to what end the grail is used, filling the
informational hole created by his earlier silence.89  With his formal acceptance of
Christian doctrine (v. ll. 6509-6512), Perceval thus frees himself from the slavery
of “one who uses or worships a significant thing without knowing what it
signifies.”90
Ultimately, God and the mother are confused in this text: the “saintly
hermit” is also Perceval’s maternal uncle and God’s own surname (Damedieu, ll.
6383, 6405) speaks to a sacralization of the feminine (dame-dieu).  Indeed, the
                                                 
89 See p. 21.
90 St. Augustine, On Christian Doctrine 84 (III.v.9).
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young knight’s religious atonement also allows him and his mother to be
symbolically – and, to some extent, physically – reunited:
Perchevax se met a jenous
Tantost qu’il entre en la chapele,
Et li buens hom a l[u]i l’apele,
Qui molt le vit simple et plorant,
Que dusques el menton colant
L’eve des oex li degoutoit. (ll. 6348-6353, emphasis mine)
Perceval knelt down
as soon as he entered the chapel,
and the good hermit called him forward,
for he saw he was humble and penitent,
and saw the water flowing from his eyes.
Flowing forth from the very organs that provoked the downfall of the mother’s
dist, this water (eve) is a visual indication of what is portrayed as Perceval’s
return to the maternal sphere. Furthermore, the hermit’s doctrinal teachings are,
like those of his mother, an oral ensaignement:
Et li hermites li conseille
Une oroison dedans l’oreille,
Si le ferma tant qu’il le sot. (ll. 6481-6483)
And the hermit whispered
a prayer into his ear,
repeating it until he knew it well.
Yet instead of getting rid of the hierarchical silence imposed by Gornemans, the
hermit’s oroison merely transposes it from the mother to God:
Et en cele oroison si ot
Assez des nons nostre Seignor,
Car il i furent li greignor
Que nomer ne doit bouche d’ome,
Se por paor de mort nes nome. (ll. 6484-6488, emphasis mine)
And in this prayer he heard
many of the names of our Lord,
all the best and holiest,
which man’s mouth should never utter
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except if he fears death.91
The only thing that should now remain unsaid – that should be passed over in
silence – is God.  But whether it is called God, the mother or femininity, we are
dealing with the same sorplus, a linguistic excess that Lacan calls jouissance.92  The
silence that was a mark of loss and separation from the mother is not eliminated,
just deified, assimilated to the nominative impossibility of the Other. By
forbidding Perceval from speaking these secret nons, the hermit accords a
positive value to silence, for instead of signaling linguistic impotence, it is the
accurate expression of all that surpasses the linguistic, all that remains dela.
                                                 
91 The Biblical reference for this passage is II Corinthians 12:24.
92 “Cette jouissance qu’on éprouve et dont on ne sait rien, n’est-ce pas ce qui nous met sur la voie
de l’ex-sistence!? Et pourquoi ne pas interpréter une face de l’Autre, la Face de Dieu, comme
supportée par la jouissance féminine?”  Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire!XX: Encore, ed. Jacques-Alain
Miller (Paris: Seuil, 1978) 71.
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Chapter Four: Silence and semence in Le Conte du Graal
(Gawain)
Est autem tacens non habens sensum loquellae et est tacens sciens tempus apti temporis.
Ecclesiasticus 20:6
Apart from the ambiguity of its final verses, one of the most puzzling
features of the Conte du Graal is its bipartite structure, which divides the tale into
the stories of Perceval and Gawain.  The transitions between these two tales are
usually rather brusque:
De Percheval plus longuement
Ne parole le contes chi,
Ainz ansez molt ançoïs oï
De monseignor Gavain parler
Que rien m’oiez de lui conter (ll.  6514-6518)
Of Perceval no longer
does the tale speak at this point.
You will have thus heard a great deal said
about my lord Gawain
before I talk of Perceval again.
Like other narrative shifts, this one marks an abrupt change in the fictional
trajectory, suddenly and almost inexplicably diverting our attention from one
protagonist to the other.  The haphazardness of this arrangement no doubt
contributed to earlier theories that the two ‘halves’ of the Graal were really two
separate texts placed into a single manuscript by a scribe who would not have
been known for his attention to detail.1  One of the first to argue against this
notion was Jean Frappier, who acknowledges that there are striking differences
between the Perceval and Gawain episodes, but asserts that these are
                                                 
1 See, for example, Martín de Riquer, “Perceval y Gauvain en Li Contes del Graal,” Filologia
Romanza 4 (1957) 119-147.
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outweighed by similarities between the two tales.2  This appraisal is refined by
Roger Dragonetti, who says that the story of Gawain serves as a “double
counterpoint” to that of Perceval by mirroring much of its fictional schema while
at the same time moving in different conceptual directions.3  If so, it would be an
example – albeit on a different scale – of Chrétien’s attempt to rimoier (to rhyme;
to take apart) his own tale.4
One of the rare moments at which these two stories seem to be in perfect
concordance is during Perceval’s return to the Arthurian court.  Meeting each
other for the first time, the two knights are instantly taken with each other, a fact
to which the young Welshman’s words clearly attest:
“Sire, bien ai oï
De vos parler en plusiors leus,
Et l’acointance de nous deus
Desirroie jou a avoir,
Se ce vos doit plaire et seoir.” (ll. 4488-92, emphasis mine)
“My lord, I have heard good things
said of you in many places
and I have been very eager for
the two of us to join together,
if this would be pleasing to you.”
This conjointure of the two protagonists is, however, short-lived. After celebration
of Perceval’s return has begun, two new characters arrive with news that shatters
the festive atmosphere, pointing once again to the protagonists’ parallel yet
                                                 
2 Jean Frappier, Autour du Graal (Geneva: Droz, 1977) 155-224. Delbouille, whom Frappier quotes
in support of his arguments for a unified narrative, echos this claim when he says that “Il existe
d’ailleurs entre les deux parties du Conte des rappels et des correspondances qui permettent
d’apercevoir les liens qui les unissent en un tout cohérent et même de discerner le sujet unique
du roman.”   Les Romans du Graal aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles (Strasbourg, 29 mars - 3 avril 1954) (Paris:
Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1956) 84.
3 “L’aventure de Gauvain se situera donc, par rapport à celle de Perceval, dans la relation d’un
double contrepoint en ce sens qu’elle progresse vers la fiction scripturale tout en doublant, d’un
semblant narratif, l’aventure de Perceval.” Roger Dragonetti, La Vie de la Lettre au Moyen Âge
(Paris: Seuil, 1980) 180.
4 See p. 78 ff.
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ultimately divergent paths.  The first, la Damoiselle aux Tresses Noires (a hideous
maiden with twisted black braids and yellow eyes), reminds Perceval of the
grave consequences of his silence during the grail procession.5  This scolding
dispensed, she goes on to provide the court with information about several
potentially rewarding chivalric exploits (v. ll. 4685-4717), including one that
would accord some brave knight the hyperbolic “prize of the whole world” (prix
del tot lo mont, l. 4701-4702). The effect of these announcements on the narrative is
immediate, as Perceval and Gawain turn away from celebratory activities to
ready themselves for their first communal aventure.  However, just as they are
ready to leave, a second visitor addresses the court, this one with a message for
Gawain. Identifying himself as the knight Guiganbrésil, he accuses Arthur’s
nephew of a serious offense:
Gavains, tu oceïs
Mon seignor, et si le feïs
Issi que tu ne desfïas
Honte et reproce et blasme i as,
Si t’en apel de traïson. (ll. 4759-4763)
Gawain, you killed
my lord, you struck him
without issuing a challenge.
Shame and disgrace and blame is yours,
thus I accuse you of treason.
Although Gawain killed Guiganbresil’s lord, he is not accused of murder, for the
law he transgressed is not judicial, but linguistic.  Having neglected to signal his
combative intentions, Gawain, like Perceval, remained silent when he should
have spoken. Citing a desire to protect his personal honors and an obligation to
                                                 
5 For these verses, see p. 92.
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abide by the laws of knightly conduct, Gawain is therefore left with little choice
but to accept his accuser’s challenge:
Et je, fait Gavains, te plevis,
Que je te sivvrai orendroit
Et la verrons qui ara droit. (ll. 4794-4796)
And I, said Gawain, swear
that I will follow you at once
and there we will see who is right.
So, just as the two heroes seemed poised to follow the same path, they are torn
apart once more:  kept from pursuing the narrative’s customary search for merveil
and estranges aventures, chivalric activity and the fiction itself seem doomed to
stagnate, mired in the legal uncertainty of Gawain’s alleged linguistic omission.
However, if Perceval’s verbal abstinence is repeatedly condemned, the text never
really passes final judgment on Gawain’s.  In fact, while the timing and
substance of these two accusations are very similar, what each story says about
silence is ultimately quite different.
Shields and Silence
Despite his good intentions, Gawain cannot immediately make good on
his promise to Guiganbrésil, for there is no straight (droit) road between Arthur’s
court and Escavalon.  Rather, one who wants to make the trip must pass by or,
more precisely, through the castle at Tintagel, a circuitous trail that makes arrival
at Escavalon less than orendroit:
Et mesire Gavains chemine;
D’errer vers Tintagueil ne fine,
Que ne pooit aillors passer. (ll. 4883-4885)
And my Lord Gawain rode off,
heading directly toward Tintagel,
for there was no other way to pass.
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Later in the same passage, we learn that there is, in fact, another path that would
not force this deviation, but the narrator says it is too far away (a set grans liues, l.
4913) for Gawain to bother taking it.6  Besides, such a detour would normally be
of great interest to our hero, since a tournament between Thibaut and the knight
Mélians de Lis is in full swing.  However, Gawain is prevented from fulfilling a
great desire (grant talent) for knightly adventures because of his pledge to defend
himself against the aforementioned allegation:
Et por che qu’il ert en redout
Qu’il fust affolez ou prix,
Ne s’est del tornoi entremis
Et si’n a il molt grant talent
Car il voit le tornoiement
Qui toz jors efforce et amende. (ll. 5102 – 5107)
And since he was afraid
that he would be injured or captured,
he did not enter the tournament,
even if he was very eager to do so,
for he saw that the tournament
was growing in size and prestige with every passing day.
Ironically, then, it is Gawain’s strict adherence to chivalric law that keeps him
from participating in the tournament, almost as if Guiganbrésil’s charge of
treason forced him to temporarily renounce his symbolic title of chevaliers.
In fact, when Gawain arrives at Tintagel, it is this very title that is called
into question, a crisis of identity resulting from the unorthodox nature of his
knightly ensaignes.  While preparing to leave Arthur’s court for Escavalon,
Gawain outfits himself with additional men and weaponry:
Set escuiers maine avec lui
Et set chevax et deus escus. (ll. 4804-05, emphasis mine)
                                                 
6 Although Gawain claims to be against any sort of back-tracking or circuitous movement (Je ne
vieng pas por retorner, l. 6617), his actions prove otherwise.  See Keith Busby, Gauvain in Old French
Literature (Amsterdam: Rodolpi, 1980) 121-144.  This is not the central feature of Busby’s study,
but he does include a dtailed summary of Gawain’s movements in the romance.
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Seven squires he took with him,
and seven horses and two shields.
Given the often violent portrayal of knightly combat in romance narrative, this
excess is perhaps reasonable: replete with broken helms, shattered swords, and
pierced shields, the availability or loss of a particular weapon is often the
deciding factor in pivotal confrontations.  This is, for instance, the case during
Perceval’s confrontation with Orgueilleus de la Lande and Gawain’s confinement
in the castle tower at Escavalon.7  However, as became clear in the story of
Perceval’s tutelage under Gornemans de Gorhaut, the shield is a very special
part of the knight’s arsenal, serving to both protect and identify its holder.8
Therefore, it is not surprising that Gawain’s heraldic surplus creates some
serious reading comprehension problems for Thibaut’s entourage.  The first
person to see the wandering knight and his two shields is an old lord who,
claims the text, is molt dote et sage (very gifted and wise, l. 4923).  Still, all his
wisdom does not allow him to correctly interpret the shadowy symbols that
appear when he perceives Gawain from afar:
Je ai, mien escient, veü
Des compaignons le roi Artu
Deus chevaliers au caiens vienent,
Dui preudome molt grant liu tienent,
Que neïs vaint un tornoi. (ll. 4933-37, emphasis mine)
                                                 
7 See ll. 3926a-3926t.  Having just received a new sword as a gift from the Fisher King, Perceval is
betrayed by his new weapon, which shatters during the battle.  Luckily, the sword taken from the
Red Knight is still at his side, and he manages to defeat Orgueilleus despite this setback.  Gawain
himself also benefits from the availability of his trusted sword Excalibur during the fight against
the inhabitants of Escavalon, where he had no other real weapons (v. ll. 5899-5904).
8 This association, originally discussed in relation to Perceval’s ensaignement at the hands of
Gornemans de Gorhaut, is also evident later in the text.  For example, when Gawain catches sight
of an unknown knight, he inquires about the identity of this chevalier by referring not to his
physical appearance but to his shield: Mais s’il vos vient a volenté / Venez jusqu’a ceste fenestre / Et si
me dites qui puet estre / Une pucele qui vient chi / S’a un chevalier avec li / Qui porte un escu de quartier,
ll. 8304-8309.
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I have, to my knowledge, seen
companions of King Arthur,
two knights coming here.
Two brave men would be of great value,
for even just one could win a tournament.
So, although he is able to discern the political affiliation denoted by these
approaching forms, even his great escient (knowledge, intelligence) does not
provide him with the intuition required to grasp the full meaning behind
Gawain’s confusing double signal.  Instead, he interprets the two shields as a
clear indication of the arrival of two knights, the certainty of his conviction
emphasized in the alliterative repetition of the leading words des (some), deus
(two), and dui (two).
He is not, however, alone in his faulty appraisal.  Unable to enter the
castle, Gawain sets up camp beneath a tree, where he ties his horse and hangs the
deus escus.  Noticing these signs of knightly presence, several young maidens
gather on the castle walls, hoping to watch two knights (deus chevaliers, l. 4967)
get dressed but are disappointed to find only one knight stationed below the
shields.  For these observers, the scene is something of an oddity, for it
contradicts all familiar images of a knight.  As she contemplates this bizarre
display, one of the maidens – Thibaut’s eldest daughter – exclaims:
Que fera il de deus escus?
Ainc chevaliers ne fu veüs
Qui portast deus escus ensamble: (ll. 4975-4977)
What will he do with two shields?
Never have I seen a chevalier
who carried two shields at the same time.
This representational excess provokes an entire series of speculative
interpretations regarding the profession of this otherwise lauded knight.  At first,
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the maidens refer to Gawain as chevalier, but once they recognize the inequality
of the linguistic equation before their eyes (2 ecus ≠ 1 chevalier), their nominative
vocabulary changes:
“Marcheans est.  Nel dites mes
Qu’il doie a tornoier entendre;
Toz ces chevax maine il a vendre.”
— “Ains est changieres, dist la quatre;
Il n’a talent qu’il departe
As povres bachelers anqui
Cel avoir qu’il porte avec l[u]i.
Ne quidiez pas que je vos mente;
C’est monoie et vaisseelemente
En ces forriax et en ces males.” (ll. 5060-69, emphasis mine)
“He is a merchant.  Don’t say any more
about his planning to participate in the tournament;
he has brought along all those horses to sell.
“No, he’s a money-changer,” said the fourth.
“He doesn’t have any desire to share
with the poor knights today
all this stock that he has brought with him.
Don’t think that I’m lying to you;
it’s money and dishes
that he has packed in those bags.
A victim of the women’s visual confusion and misunderstanding, Gawain is
transformed from an object of desire into one of spite, no longer a knight but
now a merchant or money changer, any practical justification for the two shields
rendered meaningless by his inability to participate in the tournament.9
Throughout this episode, problems of reading stem from an incompatibility
between differing approaches to signification.  One – that of the wise vavasor and
castle maidens – is really nothing more than a code, relying on “fixed correlation
                                                 
9 Robert Sturges contrasts Gawain’s misfortunes at Tintagel with Perceval’s own linguistic
difficulties: “Whereas Perceval consistently interprets other people’s signs, or fails to interpret
them, by applying to them inappropriate social codes learned in other circumstances, that is, by
ignoring the context, Gawain himself is consistently misinterpreted by others, who
inappropriately apply to him their own inflexible codes and semiologies...”.  Medieval
Interpretation: Models of Reading in Literary Narrative, 1100-1500 (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois
University Press, 1991.
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of signs to the reality which they signify.”10  The other – that of Gawain – shows
evidence of a much more flexible relation between these two semiotic poles.11
Yet even more surprising than the varied interpretations of Gawain’s
identity is his refusal to actively contradict any of them.  While he very clearly
hears all of the aspersions being cast upon him, Gawain remains speechless, a
verbal quietude attributed to his continued adherence to the binding lois of
knighthood that require his safe arrival at Escavalon:
Mesire Gavains clerement
Ot ces ramprosnes et entent
Que les dames dïent de lui,
Si a grant honte et grant anui;
Mais il pense, si a raison,
C’on l’apele de traïson,
S’estuet que desfendre s’en aille (ll. 5091-5097)
My lord Gawain clearly
heard these mockeries and listened to
what the ladies were saying about him,
and was thus very ashamed and upset.
but he thought, and rightly so,
that he had been accused of treason,
and must go to defend himself.
Hoping to maintain his honor by avoiding all jousting – verbal or otherwise –
Gawain allows his confusing display of chivalric ensainges to stand without
comment.  Once more, silence in the Graal  – like Perceval’s cautious
                                                 
10 Jacques Lacan, Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis, trans. Anthony Wilden (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1981) 61. Lacan, however, is not the only thinker to make the
distinction between codes (e.g, birdsongs, bee flight patterns, etc) and human language based on
the inability of codes to accept more than one meaning for any single sign.
11 Here, Chrétien seems to call attention to what Ferdinand de Saussure terms the “arbitrary
nature of the signifier.”  Because of it, both the signifier and signified are mutable, and changes in
either “always result in a shift in the relationship between signifier and signified.”  Course in
General Linguistics, trans. Wade Baskin, eds. Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1959) 71-78.  Indeed, the knight is rathers indifferent about his choice of shield in
the Conte du Graal, even fashioning one from a chessboard while under siege in a castle tower.
Refusing a replacement, the knight implies that this somewhat banal object is, in fact, a suitable
representational fit (Mais que tant de meschief i ot / Que d’escu point avoir ne pot / Si fist escu d’un
eschequier / Et dist: “Amie, je ne quier / Que vos m’ailliez autre escu querre, ll. 5891-5895).
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speechlessness at the Fisher King’s castle – is portrayed as the regrettable result
of laws beyond the hero’s control.  Or so it would seem.  Actually, just a few
verses later, this silent knight suddenly breaks out of his vocal stupor, driving
away a young squire sent by the maidens to plunder his excess material.  When
asked why he has not participated in the tournament, Gawain lashes out,
asserting his right to reticence:
— “Di va! fait il, a toi qu’ataint?
La chose por coi il remaint
Espoir savras tu bien encor;
Mais par mon chief ce n’ert pas or,
Que dire nel te daigneroie. (ll. 5147-5151)
— “Hey!,” he said “what is it to you?
just why I’ve stood aside,
you can still hope to learn;
but by my head, it won’t be now
that I will deign to tell you.
Gawain will, it seems, explain his actions and the story behind his deus escus, but
only when he is ready.  So, despite initial appearances to the contrary, his silence
at Tintagel is not the result of an inexperienced reaction to unknown stimuli, nor
the unfortunate result of contradictory doxologies, but a deliberate and
calculated rhetorical act.
Above all, Gawain seems to be waiting for the right moment – a window
of opportunity that will allow him to reenter the chivalric fray while preserving
his precious honor and abiding by the code of conduct to which he is bound.
However, before he can do so, his first challenge is to gain entry into the physical
confines of Thibaut’s castle: its walls are not just highly fortified but
impregnable, for all its entries have been sealed shut  (S’ot bien fait murer et
enduire / Del chastel totes les entrees, ll. 4896-4897).  This hermetic insulation is
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complete, save for one very small door so sturdy that forced entry seems
unthinkable:
Li huis fu por toz jors durer,
De coivre, fers a une barre;
En l’uis ot de fer une charre,
Tant com une charrete porte. (ll. 4904-4907)
The door, built to last forever,
was made of copper and locked by a bar;
in the door there was such a load of iron
as would weigh down a cart.
The same obstruction that has blocked Gawain’s progress toward Escavalon
since his arrival at Tintagel, this lone passage into the castle is a physical
manifestation of the narrative’s impeded progress.  But instead of trying to force
his way through the barrier, he simply waits until a group from the tournament
returns to the castle and then deftly inserts himself within their ranks:
Puis rentrerent el chastel tuit
Cil qui en estoient issu.
Et mesire Gavains i fu,
Qui aprez le route i entra (ll. 5166-69, emphasis mine)
Then returned to the castle all
those who had left it.
And my lord Gawain was there,
who entered the castle after the others.
Here, the key to success is being there, or being in the right place at the right time.
It was precisely because Gawain was there (i fu) when he needed to be that
allowed him to pass this otherwise impassable obstacle.  This opportune physical
penetration into the fictional milieu of chevalerie is also an important moment of
rhetorical kairos.12  Whereas Gawain had earlier refused to expound on the
circumstances surrounding his combative abstinence, he does not hesitate to
                                                 
12 See p. 93 ff.
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divulge this same information to the preudom who offers him lodging within the
castle’s walls (v. ll. 5185-5199).  Thus, if his puzzling sojourn in front of Tintagel
initially raises some of the same concerns as Perceval’s fateful evening at the
Grail Castle, a closer look reveals that Gawain’s silence bears witness to his
linguistic aptitude rather than ineptitude.  Tolerating ridicule and confusion only
insofar as they will bring him later glory, this knight knows how to manipulate
the voids of language to his favor, transforming seemingly useless silence into “a
state that leads to a generative condition, an emptiness that is paradoxically
full.”13
In fact, this recognition of a fullness within silence is what sets Gawain
apart from other characters.  In the moments before his return to the court,
Perceval is lost in thought over three drops of blood on a snow-covered ground.
Enchanted, he resists two separate attempts to tear him away from silent
contemplation of this sight, defeating a pair of prominent knights.  In each case,
his attacker’s physical strikes are accompanied by equally aggressive verbal
assaults.  Sagremor is the first to try:
Et dist: “Par Saint Pierre l’apostre,
Vos i venrez ja mal gre vostre. (ll. 4249-4250)
And he said: “By Saint Peter the apostle,
you’ll come now whether you like it or not!
Having failed miserably, he is followed by the bombastic seneschal Keu, who
makes it very clear that young knight’s submission will be both physically and
verbally acknowledged:
                                                 
13 Kalamaras, George, Reclaiming the Tacit Dimension:  Symbolic Form in the Rhetoric of Silence
(Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1994) 81.  Kalamaras’ study focuses on the
mystical conception of silence in Eastern philosophy, but his description is an accurate
description of its poetic significance in this section of the Graal.
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Et je l’en amenrai sanz faille
Tot a force, ou il veille ou non,
Si li ferai nomer son non. (ll. 4286-4288)
And I will bring him back without fail
by force, whether he wants to or not,
then I will make him say his name
After these two rather brutish – and ineffective – efforts to lead Perceval to the
king’s tent, Gawain offers to try his hand at bringing back the pensive knight.
He will do so, however, by using weapons quite different from those already
tested:
Diroie and prïeroie li
Qu’il venist a vos jusqu’a cha (ll. 4368-4369)
I would say and would request that
he come here to you
It is thus neither sword, nor lance, nor even verbal command that Gawain would
employ to win Perceval’s accord, but words and prayers – the polished, shining
tools of rhetoric.14  At the same time, this diplomatic proposal prompts the
sarcastic scorn of Keu, who claims that Gawain uses his linguistic weaponry to
abscond with victories and prizes that rightfully belong to other knights:
Quant li chevaliers est lassez
Et il fait d’armes assez,
Lors doit preudom le don requerre,
Et bien li loist aler conquerre. (ll. 4377-80, emphasis mine)
When a knight is tired
and has fought all he can,
then the gentleman comes to take the prize
and he truly knows how to battle.
                                                 
14 Gawain’s placating tone is reinforced by his use of the conditional tense of the verbs diroie and
prieroie, a grammatical humility that is repeated later in the same passage when he addresses
Perceval in the field: And he said: “Sir, I would have saluted you, had I known your heart like my
own.” (Et dist: “Sire, je vos eüsee / Salüé, s’autretel seüsse / Vostre cuer com je sai le mien.”, ll. 4435-
4437).
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With graceful words that he “knows how to sell well” (Bien savez vos paroles
vendre, l. 4384), Gawain is said to profit from the toil of others, not unlike the
troubadour Arnaut Daniel.15  For Keu, this deceptive and manipulative use of
language is the essential difference between a preudom (gentleman) and a
chevalier (knight).  A preudom would thus no longer denote an exceedingly wise
or brave individual, but a linguistically adept jongleur or versificator, someone
who is able to bend language and rhetorical situations to his unfair advantage.16
One of the keys to this ability is an acknowledgment of the potentially
positive value of what remains unsaid.  Thus, whereas Keu treats the young
knight’s silence as something that must be forcefully eliminated by making him
name his name, Gawain has quite a different perspective on these silent
thoughts:
“Certes, fait mesire Gavains,
Cist pensers n’estoit pas villains,
Ainz estoit molt cortois et dols! (ll. 4457-4459)
Certainly, said sir Gawain,
this thought was not cruel,
but rather very courtly and sweet
                                                 
15 This vida, a short poem which masquerades as an autobiographical vignette from the life of
Arnaut, recounts the troubadour’s somewhat specious victory in a poetic competition.  Instead of
composing his own rhyme, Arnaut steals one from his opponent (also a jongleur) by
eavesdropping on his nocturnal rehearsals.  Having commiteed it to memory, he then offers to
sing first the next morning.  Thus, “Arnaut not only mimics his rival, this other, but rather
becomes him: Arnaut himself becomes a jongleur, one who does not compose his own songs but
rather appropriates another’s words.”  Gregory B. Stone, The Death of the Troubadour: The Late
Medieval Resistance to the Renaissance (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994) 64.
16 It would also explain why, even after having trained Perceval in the ways of chevalerie,
Gornemans de Gorhaut – described as a preudom – was able to fool him with such ease.  See p.
103 ff.
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For Gawain, silence is not a threatening void, but a fullness that, like his own
language is aesthetically pleasing.17  It is this more tolerant attitude toward the
place of silence within linguistic exchange that helps him to succeed where both
Sagremor and Keu failed, as Perceval readily identifies himself to Gawain and,
later, to Arthur.18  Yet this revelation only occurs after Gawain’s intervention, a
vestimentary exchange that allows him to deliver (bail, l. 4553) the silent knight
to the court under a new guise:
Et uns suens chamberlens li trait
Une robe hors d’un sien coffre;
A vestir li presente et offre.
Quant il fu vestus bien et bel
Et de la cote et del mantel,
Qui buens li fu et molt li sist,
Au roi, qui devant son tref sist,
S’en vienent andui main a main (ll. 4538-4545)
And one of his chamberlins brought
Perceval a robe out of his trunk
which Gawain presented to him to wear.
When he was well-dressed
in the cloak and the mantle,
which suited him and fit perfectly,
the two of them came hand in hand
to the king, who was seated in front of his tent.
His traditional knightly armor replaced by the “costly garments” of Gawain’s
deftly fashioned words, Perceval’s ensuing declaration of his name attests to a
mutually dependent relationship between silence and poetic language.19  It is
                                                 
17 Just before Gawain attempts to lead Perceval back to the court, Arthur describes his nephew’s
language as cortois (l. 4415).
18 The latter passage reads as follows: By my faith, I’ll hide nothing from you / fair king, said
Perceval / I have the name of Perceval the Welshman (Par foi, ja nel vos celerai / Fait Perchevax, biax
sire rois / J’ai non Perchevax li Galois, ll. 4560-4562).
19 This is another image used by Geoffrey of Vinsauf to describe the posetic process of linguistic
rejuvenation: “In order that the matter may adopt costly garments, if the words are old, be a
physician and rejuvenate them.”  Gallo 55.  The Latin root textus (fabric, sewn) of the Old French
word for text (teste) explains the frequent figurative association of these two images in medieval
literary texts.
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only thanks to Gawain’s (re)presentation that what had been unsaid is now able
to be heard by others.20  At the same time, this quietude is also the opening
within which such fabulous paroles may be displayed; “everything spoken stems
in a variety of ways from the unspoken, whether this be something not yet
spoken, or whether it be what must remain unspoken in the sense that it is
beyond the reach of speaking.”21  Silence and poetry in the Graal thus go, quite
literally, hand-in- hand.
Silent Progress and the Law
His own identity called into question at Tintagel by others’ misreading of
the deus escus, Gawain’s predicament is really similar to the one endured by
Perceval.  And, like the vallés galois, Gawain gets some help.  For among the
disparaging voices in the castle is one opposed to pessimistic interpretations of
Gawain and his extra equipment.  Unlike the other maidens gathered on the
castle walls to marvel at the deus escus, Thibaut’s youngest daughter is not
troubled by their problematic duplicity.  Rather, among this confusing symbolic
                                                 
20 As Lacan suggests, truth is capable of being revealed only in a fictional structure.  See, for
example, Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, trans. Alan Sheridan, ed.
Jacques-Alain Miller (New York: Norton, 1977) 31-37.  Furthermore, this is consistent with
medieval views on truth.  In the twelfth century, a distinction was made -- in large part thanks to
the availability of Arabic translations of Aristotle’s most important writings -- between two types
of truth, one philosophical (based upon medieval interpretations of Aristotealian philosophy)
and the other ‘religious,’ a more readily accessible representation of similar truths.  Understood
in this way, truth is not a matter of forensic discovery and scientific certainty, but of symbolic
invention and spiritual belief, a distinction that brings it close to the domain of poetry.  Averroes
-- the period’s principal interpreter of Aristotelian texts is thus able to assert that “the excellence
of poetic narration and what brings to it the fulfilling of its goal is when the poet in his stories
and narratives writes so vividly that the audience considers what is narrated almost before its
mind and eyes, so that it both understands what is narrated, and also does not fail
simultaneously to understand things which are not narrated.” O.B. Hardison, Jr., trans., “The
Middle Commentary on the Poetics of Aristotle,” 109 IN O.B. Hardison et al., eds., Medieval
Literary Criticism: Translations and Interpretations (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1974) 89-122.
21 Martin Heidegger, On the Way to Language, trans. Peter D. Hertz (San Francisco: Harper Collins,
1971) 120.
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surplus, she detects what would appear to be an unmistakable symbol of
Gawain’s knightly vocation:
– “Voir, trop avez langues males,
Fait la petite s’avez tort.
Cuidiez vos que marcheanz port
Si grosse lance com cil porte? (ll. 5070-5073)
..................................................
Chevaliers est il, bien le samble.” (l. 5079)
Truly, you have wicked tongues,
said the little one, and you’re wrong.
Do you really believe that a merchant carries
a lance as huge as his?
..................................................
He is indeed a knight, it seems to me.
Though still quite young, this child demonstrates a burgeoning rhetorical
prowess, for with a single word (males), she calls into question the validity of the
older girls’ earlier interpretation: the males that were thought to contain Gawain’s
commercial supplies (l. 5069) are but an erroneous fantasy fabricated by the
malevolent chattering of a few males langues.  Such linguistic artistry seems to be
part of this child’s heritage, for its traces are visible upon her body, a corporeal
textuality that belies her precocious symbolic acuity:
Avec l’ainsne[e] fu la mendre,
Qui si cointement se vestoit
Des bras qu’apelee en estoit
La Pucele as Mances Petites,
Car es bras les avoit escrites. (ll. 4986-90, emphasis mine)
With the older daughter was the younger,
who dressed herself in such fetching sleeves
that she was called
the Girl with Small Sleeves
for they were written on her arms.
Thanks perhaps to this close physical tie to writing, the Girl with Small Sleeves is
able to see past superfluous signifiers that only confuse others, demonstrating an
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innate ability to see beyond language’s rhetorical packaging, to catch “the scent
of true meaning.”22
Each firmly convinced of the accuracy of her reading, the analytical
opposition between Thibaut’s oldest daughter and the Girl with Small Sleeves is
transposed onto an opposition between Gawain and Mélians de Lis, the ami of
the older maiden and chief of the forces fighting against her father.  After a
heated debate between the young ladies over which of the two knights is the
most handsome (le plus beau, l. 5392 ff.), the contradictory voice of the Girl with
Small Sleeves eventually pushes her sister to physical violence:
Lors li fiert si que toz ses dois
Li a ens el vis seelez. (ll. 5048-5049)
Then she slapped her such that all her fingers
left their stamp upon her face.
Like the openhanded blow that incites Perceval to undertake his chivalric
wanderings as the chevalier vermeil, the physical traces left by this aggression
become the painful foundation of new narrative aventures for Gawain’s
character.23  Supported in her complaint by this obvious bodily evidence, the Girl
with Small Sleeves asks that Gawain avenge not just her physical injury, but also
the shame she suffered on his behalf:
A vos di je, biax sire,
Qu’a vos de ma seror me claim,
                                                 
22 Sigmund Freud, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, v. 4:
The Interpretation of Dreams, trans. and ed. James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press; Institute of
Psychoanalysis, 1953) 142.  Here, Freud is referring to the meaning that is occluded in dreams by
the psychic censorship.
23 The seneschal Keu, enraged by a girl (pucele) who proclaims that there will be no better knight
than Perceval, lashes out violently (Et Kex saut / Cui la parole anuia molt / Si li dona cop si estolt / De
la palme en la face tender / Que il le fist a terre estendre, ll. 1048-1052).  In Perceval’s case, this loss is
replayed each time he defeats another knight.  In exchange for his life, the vanquished foe is sent
to Arthur’s court where he not only tells of his own misfortune but recalls the injustice done to
this young girl.
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Que je n’ai chiere ne ne l’aim
Car por vous m’a hui fait grant honte. (ll. 5344-47, emphasis mine)
I tell you, fair sir,
that I lay claim before you against my sister,
for whom I have no love or affection
because today she caused me great shame on your account.
While the laws of knighthood as outlined elsewhere in the Graal clearly dictate
that he honor her request, this pseudo-legal obligation is really not what pushes
Gawain to accept the young girl’s proposal.24  Rather, he is enchanted by her
advanced linguistic abilities, yielding to her demands because of their pleasing
rhetorical presentation:
Ains a trop bone enfance dite
Come pucele si petite,
Ne ja ne l’en refuserai,
Mais quant li plaist, demain serai
Une piece ses chevaliers. (ll. 5377-81, emphasis mine)
She has spoken so well
for such a little girl,
so I’ll not refuse her request.
Instead, since it pleases her,
I will be her knight for a while tomorrow.
Despite Thibaut’s claims to the contrary – he says that his daughter is niche and
fole (ignorant and foolish, l. 5358) – Gawain accords her a favor, which she uses to
ask for his participation in the tournament against Mélians de Lis.  Playing the
laws of chevalerie against each other, Gawain’s acknowledgment and adept
handling of another rhetorically significant situation thus once again turns the
                                                 
24 One of the rules quoted by each of Perceval’s three tutors -- his mother, Gornemans de
Gorhaut, and the hermit -- is a requirement to help and honor ladies (ll. 533-542, 1657-1662, 6465-
6470).
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fictional tables in his favor, an acute linguistic finesse that is the distinguishing
mark of kairos.25
This favor accorded, Thibaut instructs his young daughter to offer her
knight a gift before the tournament, suggesting one of her sleeves or a wimple.
Such an idea, however, does not please the young girl, given their minuscule size
(ll. 5415-5425).  Instead, Thibaut offers her one of his own as a replacement:
Et il fist un vermeil samit
D’un suen coffre maintenant traire,
Et si en fist taillier et faire
Une mance molt longue et lee
Et si a sa fille appelee. (ll. 5450-5454)
And he had a piece of red samite
taken from one of his coffers
and from it had tailored
a long, wide sleeve
and then he called his daughter.
Within the vestimentary substance of this offering lay crucial poetic implications.
Not only a token of support and alliance, but also a literary fabrication, this
mance noeve (new sleeve, l. 5458) provides Gawain with the textual material
necessary to resume the poetic games of Arthurian knighthood and reaffirm his
title of chevaliers.26
Given Perceval’s figurative role in the Graal as a writer of courtly ‘texts’, it
remains to be seen how divergences in rhetorical style between the two heroes
might transform the linguistic productions of chevalerie.  Before venturing a
                                                 
25 A wider definition of kairos encompasses not just an knowledge of when to speak and when to
remain silent, but an general awareness of all possible factors influencing the situational aspect of
speech, including one’s location, the audience, and even the weather.  See, for example, the
Gorgias, who is generally seen as kairos’ first and greatest supporter.  His theories, including
those found in his most famous works -- the Encomium of Helen and On What is Not -- are explored
in detail by Robert Wardy, The Birth of Rhetoric: Gorgias, Plato and their Successors (London and
New York: Routledge, 1996).
26 See footnote, p. 133.
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response to this question, we should recall that Perceval’s ‘texts’ – the
bloodstained knights sent back Arthur’s court – are covered not with signifiers,
but with signs: there is nothing to separate what one sees from what should be
understood.27  So concrete, literally attached to their source, the meaning of these
symbolic images is altogether evident, their veracity of the type Quintilian
describes in the Institutio Oratoria as inartificial (inartificiales):
To begin with it may be noted that the division laid down by
Aristotle has met with almost universal approval.  It is to the effect
that there are some proofs adopted by the orator which lie outside
the art of speaking, and others which he himself deduces or, if I
may use the term, begets out of his case.  The former therefore have
been styled inartificial proofs, the latter artificial.28
Like the blood-spattered armor worn by the defeated knights, an inartificial
proof tells its own story, graced with a visual appearance and meaning that are
one and the same.  Perceval’s ‘writing’ is thus of a relatively simple sort,
producing texts filled with readily understood and unambiguous symbols, ones
that the residents of Tintagel would surely recognize.
Even before Gawain manages to gain entry inside the walls of Thibaut’s
castle, it is quite obvious that his approach to representation is altogether
different.  Specifically, the confusion surrounding his identity in this part of the
romance shows that the deus escus and Perceval’s defeated knights do not belong
                                                 
27 In the previous chapter, see page 106 ff. for a discussion of Perceval’s “blood-writing.”  In
contemporary linguistics, the first to articulate the difference between signifier and sign --
although somewhat cryptically -- was Ferdinand Saussure.  He recognized that both the
mechanics and structural forms of linguistic signification were based on a separation and
perceived connection between words and their referents.  For a discussion of this and other related
topics in the specific context of the Middle Ages, Eugene Vance’s book Marvelous Signals: Poetics
and Sign Theory in the Middle Ages (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986) is an excellent
reference.
28 H.E. Butler, trans., The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, 4 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1976) 2: 157.  Augustine makes the same distinction, but substitutes “natural”
for inartificial and “conventional” for artificial.  Augustine, On Christian Doctrine 34-35 (II.i.1 –
II.ii.3).
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to the same linguistic category.  Whereas the story told by Clamadeu’s armor is
immediately obvious to the audience at Arthur’s court, no one, including
Thibaut’s wise vavasor, is able to understand the sense of the deus escus without
the help of Gawain’s own explanation.  Conceptually detached from any readily
accessible meaning, Gawain’s symbolic creations are artificial (artificiales) proofs,
their substance and signifying authority coming not from within, but from
without – from the rhetoric in which they are awash.
Just how this new mode of signification modifies the linguistic context of
knighthood is illustrated by Gawain’s battle against Mélians de Lis.  From the
start, it is clear that much more than just honor or pride is at stake, for in addition
to being a talented member of chevalerie, Mélians is, as Thibaut’s eldest daughter
claims, the representative of its status quo, its law:
Ainz dist: “Dames veez venir
Celui qui de chevalerie
a le los et la seignorie.” (ll. 5510-12, emphasis mine)
Then she said: “Ladies, come see
he who has of knighthood
the law and lordship.”
Despite the potential fictional significance of the battle between these two
knights, it is – like those between Perceval and his various adversaries – only
sparsely commented by the narrator, occupying a scant seven verses.  Gawain is
victorious in this contracted confrontation, unseating Mélians from his mount
with surprisingly little effort (ll. 5513-5519).  However, after having defeated his
foe, Gawain does not offer up the bloodied knight as fictional compensation for
the text’s brevity.  Instead, he opts for an alternate symbol of his triumph:
Et tent a son cheval la man,
Sel prent au frain et si li baille
A un vallet et dist qu’il aille
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A celi por cui il tornoie
Si li die qu’il li envoie
Le premier gaaing qu’il a fait
Le jor, qu’il velt que ele l’ait. (ll. 5520-5526)
Then he held out his hand to Méliant’s horse,
took it by the bridle and gave it
to a squire and told him to go
to the one for whom he participated in the tournament
and tell her that he sent her
the first prize that he had won
that day, for he wanted her to have it.
Although Mélians could hardly have denied a request to appear in front of the
court as did Clamadeu, he is left on the ground, flipped off his horse and onto his
back by Gawain’s lance.   Instead of using what would be the incontestable
inartificial proof of his victory, Gawain supplants Mélians with the knight’s
horse, a metonymic displacement whose meaningful tie to the combat will have
to be indicated by a squire who delivers the novel prize (ll. 5520-5528).  Like the
knights defeated by Perceval, this gaaing (gain; prize) has something to tell its
reader, serving as a tangible symbol of his battlefield exploits.  However, unlike
Perceval’s living texts, the gaaing cannot recount anything on its own, but instead
requires a measure of rhetorical assistance to bring its signification within the
conceptual reach of an audience.  Detached from their direct referents, Gawain’s
knightly symbols are rhetorical creations that spring forth from the tacit gap
between signifier and signified, between ensainge and knight.  This separation
paves the way for multiple readings of the same event, with four different
gaaings dispatched to four separate people after Gawain’s victory.  The new law
of chevalerie is thus founded on lack: indeed, it is because it is lacking “that allows
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it to signify something, that is to say that it can be read in an infinite number of
ways.”29
Healing Old Wounds
However, the above episode is just one of many that draws readers’
attention to the “double counterpoint” between the stories of these two heroes.30
And while Gawain is not entirely sheltered from the blatant ridicule and shame
that haunts Perceval throughout the text, much of his story can be read as an
attempt to right the wrongs of his less experienced colleague, as if the fiction
itself needed to do penance for its younger knight’s errant ways.  As mentioned
in the previous chapter, his wandering is typified by the physical distancing
from the maternal manoir toward the world of chevalerie, an estrangement that is
explicitly associated – by Perceval himself, nonetheless – with a geographical
division in the landscape:
Se ceste eve passer pooie,
Dela ma mere troveroie (ll. 2991-2992)
If only I could cross this water,
over there I would find my mother
Bolstered by the homonymic femininity of not just one, but two Old French
words for water (eve and mer[e]), this linguistic identification of the maternal as a
region beyond (dela) the normal sphere of knightly pursuits transforms
Perceval’s desire for familial reunion into a errant quest for sexual unity, an
attempt at geographical and linguistic rapprochement to a feminized Other.31
                                                 
29 Jacques Lacan, Séminaire livre XX: Encore, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller (Paris: Seuil, 1971) 37.
Translation is my own.  The original text reads: “C’est au titre de lapsus que ça signifie quelque
chose, c'est-à-dire que ça peut se lire d’une infinité de façons différentes.”
30 Dragonetti 180.  See p. 120.
31 See p. 111 ff. of the previous chapter for a more complete examination of this material.
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Paradoxically, this symbolic dislocation constitutes what is perhaps the
most compelling evidence of continuity between the two ‘halves’ of the Graal; the
same theme is also central to Gawain’s knightly aventures.  Granted a temporary
reprieve from his confrontation with Guiganbrésil following a brief
imprisonment in the castle of King Escavalon, Gawain sets off about the
countryside, presumably to search for the Bleeding Lance, which he has pledged
to deliver to his accuser in exchange for continued freedom.32  Yet this obligation
is very quickly forgotten, and Gawain forges ahead, apparently with no
particular destination in mind (Mesire Gavains tant erra, l. 6519).  But like the well-
defined chemin that leads Perceval to the cave of the saint hermite, this seemingly
aimless path has its own unique sort of trail markers, entresaignes that guide the
way, albeit toward chevalerie rather than away from it. 33  Arriving at a wide
valley, Gawain hastens toward a tree in which he notices what would appear to
be obvious signs of a knightly presence:
Au chaisne vit un escu pendre
Et dalez une lance droite. (ll. 6526-27, emphasis mine)
Hanging in the oak he saw a shield
and beside it, a straight lance.
Ironically, the representational unity of this pastoral scene is thrown into doubt
for Gawain by the sight of a palefroi norrois petit (small Norwegian palfrey, l.
6530) next to the same tree, a horse whose presence he considers to be an
                                                 
32 Having mistakenly welcomed Gawain into the castle as his guest, Escavalon is obliged to offer
Guiganbrésil’s adversary a reprieve, allowing the knight to profit yet again from the often
contradictory laws that govern chevalerie in this romance (ll. 6092-6128).
33 The pilgrims who encounter Perceval on horseback on Good Friday explain that the path to the
hermit’s cave is, unlike the featureless desert that the hero has just traversed (l. 6239), easy to
follow and well-marked with hand-knotted signposts placed among the greenery of the thick and
dense forest (le bos espés et menu, l. 6324): “We fashioned such signs so that no one who going to
see the saintly hermit goes astray.” (Tels entresainges i  feïsmes / Por che que nus n’i esgarast / Qui
vers le saint hermite alast, ll. 6328-6330).
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absurdly utilitarian supplement to the otherwise unequivocal symbols of
chevalerie displayed nearby.  Thus, just as the deus escus fascinated and puzzled
the residents of Tintagel, this arboreal merveille both shocks and intrigues
Gawain, forcing him to question if this confusing collection of signs really
belongs to a knight.  In this case, however, the narrative does not dwell on the
symbolic oddity of the sight as it did earlier, for before Gawain has a chance to
reflect on possible explanations for such a display, an answer comes into view:
Qua[nt] mesire Gavains l’aproche,
Si voit le chevalier blechié,
Qui le vis ot tot depechié,
Et ot une plaie [molt] grief
C’une espee parmi le chief,
Et d’ansdeus pars parmi les flans
Li coroit a grans rais li sans. (ll. 6550-6556)
When my lord Gawain approached her
he saw that the knight was wounded
and that he had a very serious wound
from a swordblow in the middle of his head,
and to both sides along his flanks
blood was flowing in great streams.
Nearly identical to the dolorous scene that greets Perceval on the road leading
away from the Fisher King’s Castle (ll. 3431-3482), this second sighting of a
severely injured chevaliers and his saddened amie points to an inescapable loss at
the center of chevalerie.  The intratextual repetition of this scene is further
evidence of a damning fictional legacy that exists – that stands beyond –these
knights’ individual stories.  Like the blow that maimed Perceval’s father between
the legs (Fu parmi la jambe navrez, l. 436), this knight’s gushing cranial
hemorrhage is but one in a long series of corporeal manifestations of sexual loss
in chevalerie, the blood that flows forth from it staining not only his head and
neck, but also his flanks (flans, l. 6555).  So, in spite of his superior ability to
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capitalize on the kairotic moments of chevalerie, Gawain’s winding path also
follows traces of an original absence that taints the entire Graal with its dark,
sanguine hue.
Yet whereas physical marks of separation and loss are for Perceval
immutable (les mors a mors, les vis a vis, l. 3630), Gawain’s perception of similar
categorical divisions is decidedly less rigid.  Thus, when the weeping maiden
says she is convinced of her ami’s impending death (v. ll. 6564-6566), Gawain
refuses to accept the imminence of his passing.  Instead, spurred by his desire for
information (noveles, l. 6569) about the land into which he has erred, Gawain
wakes the almost-dead by using a special chivalric gesture:
Lors torne devers l’arestuel
Sa lance et un poi l’en adoise
A l’esperon; ne pas n’en poise
Au chevalier s’il lesveilla
Car si soavet li crolla
L’esperon que mal ne li fist (ll. 6582-6587)
He then turned the tip of
his lance and pushed it carefully
against the spur; not causing any harm
to the knight but waking him up,
for he knew how to touch
the spur so that it did not hurt.
Bringing together two of this text’s most potent symbols of knightly identity,
Gawain manages to coax this chevaliers from his painful slumber.34  The substance
of this secret knowledge – how to touch the esperon without inflicting pain –
implies that Gawain is aware of a way around the linguistic loss that inflicted
                                                 
34 As was true for the Girl with Small Sleeves in the story of Gawain’s deus escus at Tintagel, the
lance is a clear indicator of knightly identity in this passage.  Elsewhere in the narrative, the spur
(esperon) serves a similar function: for Gornemans de Gorhaut, it is the visual proof of Perceval’s
membership in the order of chevalerie (ll. 1686-1688).
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Perceval after his acceptance of this symbolic accessory from Gornemans de
Gorhaut.35
Indeed, once Gawain has carried out this special therapy, the injured
knight awakens, a resurrection highlighted by the rhythmic return of his voice
(L’esperon que mal ne li fist / Ançois l’en mercia et dist, ll. 6587-6588).  However, the
news that he gets from his revived interlocutor is far from pleasant.  In fact, the
injured knight implores Gawain to turn back immediately, claiming that all who
cross from this land into the next do so at an immense risk to their personal
safety:
Car c’est la bosne de Galvoie,
Que chevaliers ne puet passer
Qui jamais puisse retorner (ll. 6600-6603)
for this is the frontier of Galvoie:
no knight can ever cross it
and return.
It was, claims the knight, his own foray into this dangerous no-man’s-land that
brought him to his present state.  Nevertheless, Gawain insists that he must
continue forward in spite any credible warnings of the danger involved.  To do
otherwise would, he suggests, be conduct unbecoming a knight:
L’en le me devroit atorner
A trop laide recreandise,
Quant jou ai or la voie emprise,
Se je de chi m’en retornoie. (ll. 6618-6621)
One could take it as
the worst sort of cowardice
if after having chosen this road
I were to decide to turn back.
                                                 
35 The receipt of the esperon is coupled with an explicit request that Perceval no longer mention
his mother.  See p. 110 ff.
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But while his desire to follow the most direct (droit) route is admirable, the
notion seems more foolhardy than honorable since the path will ostensibly lead
not to knightly glory but certain demise.  Ever worrisome to protect his precious
honors regardless of the cost, Gawain is thus poised to enter into an exploit whose
inherent futility points to the semantic suitability of his given name (Gau-vain in
Old French).36
Therefore, it is not surprising that, while on the other side of this frontier,
he encounters a maiden whose violently malevolent disposition toward knights
garners her the less than flattering moniker of malvaise pucele, or Cruel Maiden.
But as the giant knight (grans chevaliers) from whom Gawain retrieves this
maiden’s horse explains, she is much more than just unpleasant:37
Ainc chevaliers ne l’osa prendre
Issi com tu prendre le vels
Qui n’en avenist si grans doels
Que la teste en eüst trenchie[e]. (ll. 6806-09, emphasis mine)
There is no knight who has ever
dared take it like you want to now
who has not suffered dearly for it
by having his head chopped off.
Recalling the cranial injury of the wounded knight, this threatening proclamation
designates the malvaise pucele as a harrowing source physical loss, and nowhere
is the extent her hatred more evident than when Gawain attempts to, as chivalric
law dictates, come to her aid.  Having recovered the maiden’s horse, Gawain
                                                 
36 Dragonetti 184.  “Quant à la reconquête du palefroi, annoncée comme périlleuse, Gauvain en
sortira sans coup férir. En somme tout est comme signé par la vanité qui affecte le nom même de
Gauvain.”
37 Similar warnings are proffered by the knight Guriomelant (v. ll. 8599-8604), who claims that the
maiden only wishes to see Gawain drown in the deep water of the river separating the region’s
two shores and the ladies of the castle at Caguin, who also remind Gawain of her penchant for
endangering the lives of chevaliers (v. ll. 8305-8322).
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offers his hand to help her back into the saddle, only to be berated for his
gallantry:
— “Ce ne te laist ja Diex conter,
Fait ele, en cort ou tu me maingnes,
Que tu entre tes bras me taignes.
Se tu avoies rien tenue
Qui sor moi fust, de ta main nue
Ne maniie ne sentie,
Je quideroie estre honie. (ll. 6840-6846)
— “May God never let it be told,”
she said, “in the court where you are taking me
that you held me in your arms.
If you had held anything of mine
with your bare hands
or touched it or felt it,
I would considered myself sullied.”
Refusing to concede to any physical contact, the maiden’s tirade is a not-so-
subtle rejection of sexual intimacy, horseback riding a common metaphor for
intercourse in medieval literature.38  This interdiction is taken to incredible,
almost ridiculous lengths, as the servile Gawain is even forbidden from picking
the maiden’s wimple up off the ground (ll. 6880-6894).39  For all his courage and
efforts, Gawain has thus received the rather dubious prize of a female
companion who denies any and all companionship, her contrariness a far cry
from the openly affectionate attitude of King Escavalon’s sister.40
                                                 
38 See, for example, the lyric poem “Companho farai un vers qu’er covinen” by the Provençal
troubadour Guillaume IX d’Aquitaine, where the poet laments his inability to choose between his
two ‘horses.’  Jacques Roubaud, ed. and trans., Les Troubadours: Anthologie bilingue (Paris: Seghers,
1971) 66-69.
39 The wimple (guimple in Old French) was a rather intimate part of the feminine vestimentary
ensemble in the Middle Ages.  A loose piece of cloth draped over the top of the head and
covering the neck and ears, it is similar to veils worn by some of today’s Catholic nuns.
40 While a guest of Escavalon, Gawain is left in the company of the king’s sister, with whom his
relationship consists of not just friendly conversation, but also physical interaction: Mesire
Gavains le requiert / D’amors et prie et dist qu’il iert / Ses chevaliers toute sa vie / Et ele ne refuse mie, /
Ainz l’otroie molt volontiers. / Une vavasors endementiers / Entra laiens, qui molt lor nut, / Qui
monseignor Gavain conut, / Si les trova entrebaisant / Et molt grant joie entrefaisant. (ll. 5827-5836) (My
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Although Gawain shows no bodily evidence of this negative encounter,
the maiden’s denial of physical and sexual contact have the same secondary
effect on him as they did on the injured knight.  On two separate occasions, the
wildly truculent rants directed at him by the malvaise pucele are met only with
complete silence – an unusual response for the normally verbose Gawain:
Mesire Gavains tot escoute
Quanques la damoisele estolte
Li dist, c’onques mot ne li sone (ll. 6869-6871)
My lord Gawain listened to everything
that the maiden said to him,
but did not make a sound.
Et mesire Gavains se taist,
C’onques un mot ne li respont. (ll. 6902-6903)
And my lord Gawain was silent,
and did not say a single word to her in reply.
Like the sirens in classical mythology, this malevolent maiden draws in her
admirers only to revel in their suffering, an inflicted malaise that reveals itself
not only in painful physical contusions, but also in linguistic loss.  As was true of
Perceval’s visit to the Grail Castle, silence here is the verbal vestige of an absence,
the lack of sexual rapport.41
                                                                                                                                                  
lord Gawain implored her / and asked for her love and said he would be / her knight for his
whole life / and she did not refuse him / but gladly honored his requests. / In the meantime, a
vavasor / who was to bring them sorrow entered / he recognized my lord Gawain / and found
them kissing each other / and bringing one another much great joy.)
41 The idea of a “lack of sexual rapport” is a recurrent theme in Lacan’s writings.  In part, it stems
from a physical loss that occurs at the level of the subject, in the sense that by entering into the
game of sexual reproduction he not only opens himself up to life (in the form of genetic
descendents) but also to death: “This lack takes up the other lack, which is the real, earlier lack, to
be situated at the advent of the living being, that is to say, at sexed reproduction.  The real lack is
what the living being loses, that part of himself qua living being, in reproducing himself through
the way of sex.  This lack is real because it relates to something real, namely, that the living being,
by being subject to sex, has fallen under the blow of individual death.” The Four Fundamental
Concepts of Psychoanalysis, trans. Alan Sheridan, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller (New York: Norton,
1978) 205.  Onto this lack is tacked on another, one which is revealed in the symbolic gaps of
language, gaps which attest inability of the subject to fabricate a continuity, either out of his
physical dalliances or symbolic manifestations: “C’est bien en relation avec le par-être que nous
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Were the Graal itself to fall silent here instead of almost 3,000 verses later,
any suggestions of a fundamental difference between its two heroes would have
to be revised, since Gawain’s trip to the realm of Galvoie leaves him in a state
nearly identical to that of Perceval following his night at the Grail Castle.
However, only a few verses after he and his new companion cross back over the
previously impassable frontier, the narrative reverses its fatalistic course.
Returning as promised to the injured chevalier and his worrisome maiden,
Gawain once again demonstrates the extent of his great knowledge (savoir).
Ignoring the malvaise pucele’s caustic words, Gawain notices a grass whose
special powers will, as the narrator suggests, be of particularly great value to the
wounded knight:
Et mesire Gavains savoit
Plus que nus hom de garir plaie,
Et voit une herbe en une haie,
Trop bone por dolur tolir
De plaies; il le va queillir. (ll. 6910-6914)
And my lord Gawain knew
better than any man how to heal a wound
and he saw a plant in a bush,
one that was good for relieving the pain
of wounds, so he went to cut some.
Based on a mythological conception of the cosmos as one great, interconnected
totality stretching from the sublunar (earthly) world to its supralunar (celestial)
firmament, the medieval study of medicinal or magical powers contained within
various rocks, plants, and animals was part of a pseudo-scientific tradition
                                                                                                                                                  
devons articuler ce qui supplée au rapport sexuel en tant qu’inexistant. Il est clair que, dans tout
ce qui s’en approche, le langage ne se manifeste que de son insuffisance.”  Séminaire livre XX:
Encore, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller (Paris: Seuil, 1975) 44.
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whose popularity endured well into the Renaissance and even beyond.42
Albertus Magnus – Catholic saint, alchemist, and avid ‘scientific’ researcher –
wrote one of the most well known books of the genre, the Liber aggregationis43 or
Book of Secrets.  Believed to have been written in the late twelfth century, the
work is a compendium that explains the supposed magical attributes of
otherwise mundane organic specimens.  Although nearly all allude to various
far-reaching effects and sources of their power, the powers of a plant or other
organic entity are, in certain cases, associated with a specific planet and deity, its
hidden physical attributes tangible manifestations of supra-lunar influence on
earthly matter and events.  Such is the case for Vervain, a plant related to the
planet Venus.44  Encouraging optimal performance in “veneral pastimes,” the
plant is an obvious extension of the generative powers and responsibilities of the
mythological goddess for whom it was named.  However, this is only one of a
great many uses, its potential therapeutic effects covering an almost impossibly
wide spectrum of ailments.  And though today’s ever-increasing market for
                                                 
42 A quick glance at the great number of dietary supplements available in today’s pharmacies
suggests that even the advent of modern science was unable to efface these ancient beliefs
entirely: some make claims that are not so different from those made by medieval herbologists
and alchemists.
43 Literally, an anthology.
44 “The root of this herb put upon the neck healeth the swine pox, impostumes behind the ears,
and botches of the neck, and such as can not keep their water.  It healeth also cuts, swelling of the
tewel, or fundament, proceeding of an inflammation which groweth in the fundament; and the
haemorrhoids.  If the juice of it be drunken with honey and water sodden, it dissolveth those
things which are in the lungs or lights.  And it maketh good breath, for it saveth and keepeth the
lungs and the lights.  It is also of great strength in veneral pastimes, that is, the act of generation.
If any man put it in his house or vineyard, or in the ground, he shall have abundantly revenues,
or yearly profits; moreover the root of it is good to all them which will plant vineyards or trees.
And infants bearing it shall be very apt to learn, and loving learning, and they shall be glad and
joyous.  It is also profitable, being put in purgations, and it putteth aback devils.”  Albertus
Magnus, The Book of Secrets of Albertus Magnus of the Virtues of Herbs, Stones and Certain Beasts, eds.
Michael R. Best and Frank H. Brightman (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973) 21-23.  The translated
English manuscript used by Best and Brightman for their edition is from a sixteenth-century
source, although it is adequately faithful to earlier versions in Latin and other tongues.
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similar products suggests that some of Magnus’ rather extravagant claims could
conceal a certain measure of truth, even casual examination of this and other
passages from Secrets points to the essentially non-scientific nature of this
‘science.’  In addition to the exceedingly great variety of therapeutic effects
associated with each stone or plant, several have identical functions and, apart
from Magnus’ vague affirmation that one secret or another “hath been proved in
his time,” no examples of their efficacy are provided.  In fact, as the above
citation suggests, the real function of Vervain and other plants, rocks, or animals
believed to have magic forces is not medicinal, but symbolic: healing cuts,
reducing hemmorhoidal swelling, aiding in respiration, encouraging mental
activity, promoting sexual fecundity, and combating evil powers, Magnus’
secrets are really talismans used to ward off diverse secondary symptoms of a
common ailment whose catalyst is the inescapable, primal loss that is death.
Similarly, Gawain’s magical herb is simply a cure for the physical rift of
the injured chevalier, but a symbolic reunion of the text’s now disparate
signifiers of sexuality.  As Gawain prepares to apply his miracle cure to the
wounds of the injured knight, he asks for a very special contribution from his
amie:
N’avra puis garde de morir,
Ma damoisele, vostre amis,
Que de l’erbe li arons mis
Sor ses plaies et bien liie;
Mais une guimple deliie
Por bende faire i covendroit.” (ll. 6944-6949)
“My lady, your friend will
no longer have to fear death
once we have placed this plant
on his wounds and bound it tightly.
But I’ll need an untied wimple
to make a bandage.”
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Whereas the Cruel Maiden forbade Gawain from touching both her body and her
clothes, this weeping maiden stationed at the injured knight’s side readily
accedes to such contact, quickly removing the desired object and handing it over.
Chrétien takes special pains to establish the link between the maiden’s body, this
piece of clothing, and Gawain, and her response to his request denotes its
specific provenance:
— “Je vos baillerai orendroit,”
Fait cele qui n’est mie grief,
“Celi meïsme de mon chief,
Qu’autre n’ai je chi aportee.” (ll. 6950-6953)
— “I’ll give it to you immediately,”
said she who was no longer disheartened,
“this very one that’s on my head,
for I have brought no other.”
Joining this vestimentary metonym for female sexuality together with Gawain’s
magic erbe, the maiden helps to restore the symbolic possibility of sexual rapport
that was lost in the biting words of the Cruel Maiden.
In fact, the great force (grant force, l. 6937) of this plant functions not only
on the physical plane, but also the linguistic, a secondary function to which
Gawain alludes in his explanation of its therapeutic benefits:
Que la rachine reprendroit
Et li arbres teus devendroit
Qu’il porroit foillir et florir. (ll. 6941-6943)
It will regain its roots
and the entire tree will once more
be able to leaf out and flower.
Recalling both the bountiful cent doubles described by Chrétien in the prologue
and the idyllic plenitude of the Waste Forest, the leaf harvested by Gawain is also
a written page (foille) that promises a return to a lost state of linguistic fullness.
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Indeed, when the injured knight comes to, he thanks Gawain not because he has
saved his life, but because he has saved his voice:
Diex li mire
Qui la parole m’a rendue (ll. 6964-6965)
May God watch over
the one who restored my speech
Here, then, the return of speech is the linguistic manifestation of a reunification
of masculine and feminine, two sides initially torn asunder by Perceval’s
departure from the maternal forest.  The appropriate antidote for a teste trenchie
(divided text), Gawain’s bandage would seem to cover over repeated
manifestations of silence and loss that have plagued this narrative almost since
its beginning.
However, as was the case during Perceval’s deceptively triumphant
return to the Arthurian court, this joie is relatively short-lived.  After coming to,
the knight asks Gawain to capture the nag of an approaching squire so that he
and his amie might ride away and find a priest to whom the knight can confess
his sins.  Ever the obliging chevaliers, Gawain does so, and then agrees to help the
maiden onto the Norwegian palfrey and the knight himself onto the newly
acquired nag.  However, just as the maiden gets a leg up, the knight who had
seemed so weak suddenly springs to life, absconding with Gawain’s own steed:
Li chevaliers son cheval prist
Et monta sus, sel comencha
A porsalir et cha et la. (ll. 7072-7074)
The knight took his horse
and mounted, then began
to make it leap all around.
In fact, the knight whom Gawain so selflessly serves is not a complete stranger,
but another enemy.  Like Guiganbrésil, he spoils this fleeting moment of fictional
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harmony by exacting his revenge for a past injustice just when all faults seem to
have been erased.  Identified as one Greoras, he claims to have suffered great
shame (grant honte, l. 7110) when Gawain forced him to eat with dogs for a
month, with the hands tied behind his back (Avec les chienz mengier un mois / Les
mains liies triers le dos, ll. 7114-7115).  Once again, defeat is associated with a lack
of parole, only this time it is the gullible Gawain who falls silent, ridiculed by his
enemy:
Gavains, tais t’en.
Pren le ronchin, si feras sen,
Que au cheval as tu failli. (ll. 7085-7087)
Silence, Gawain!
You would be wise to take the nag,
for you’ve lost your horse.
An exact duplicate of the tableau he had found so confusing and unchivalric just
a short time before, Gawain has now assumed, albeit to his great
disappointment, the role of chevaliers blechié.45  Indeed, after falling victim to this
trick, his quotation of the following proverb draws attention the irony of the
situation:
De bien fait col frait (l. 7100)
He who sticks his neck out for someone will break it.
Writing and lack are thus inseparable in the Graal, as Gawain’s textual dressing
reopens the very wound it had tried to cover, suggesting that everything written
does indeed “stem from the fact that it is impossible to write sexual rapport as
                                                 
45 See p. 143 ff.
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such.”46  Instead of eliminating silence, Gawain has only managed to make it that
much more noticeable.
The oltre and the Great dela
This sudden, adverse turn of events could explain the fantastic but
somewhat repetitive theme of the text’s final episode.  Like the passages
commented above, those that follow have – both explicitly and implicitly – a
great deal to do with bridging gaps, with eliminating the fundamental traces of
separation and difference that scar the narrative landscape.  Accompanied by the
ever-acerbic Cruel Maiden, Gawain ambles through a region whose organic
emptiness and isolation are none too subtle reminders of the humiliating defeat
suffered at the hands of the vengeful Greoras:
Ensi s’en va sor le ronchin
Par forés gastes et soutaines,
Tant que il vint a terres plaines (ll. 7224-26, emphasis mine)
Thus he rode along on the nag
through dark and empty forests,
until he came upon flat plains.
Once again, Gawain’s pursuit of chevalerie is headed toward nowhere in
particular, if not its own tragic end, a fictional infertility reflected in the linguistic
vacuity of the surrounding landscape.  This poetic stagnation is reinforced by the
deplorable physical condition of the nag upon which the normally flamboyant
knight now rides:
Les oex ot trobles et oscurs,
Les piés crapeus, les costez durs,
Toz despechiés a esperons. (ll. 7167-7169)
                                                 
46 Jacques Lacan, Séminaire livre XX: Encore, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller (Paris: Seuil, 1975) 36.  “Tout
ce qui est écrit part du fait qu’il sera à jamais impossible d’écrire comme tel le rapport sexuel.
C’est de là qu’il y a un certain effet de discours qui s’appelle l’écriture.”
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The eyes were cloudy and dark,
the hooves cloven, and the flanks hard
and worn thin by spurs.
Recalling the gaunt physique of the palefroi ridden by the Tent Maiden, the
scarred hide of this horse is, like the recycled vellum upon which so many
medieval romances were composed, a worn surface that fails to conceal telltale
marks of its eventful past.47  With Gawain unable to advance on the back of this
sorry beast, the Graal itself seems incapable of moving beyond the failure and
loss that, with Perceval’s story, became its most distinguishing marks.
But if at first blush Chrétien’s language is uniformly negative, more
careful examination of its highly resonant internal echoes – the same sen that
fuels his covert poetic rebellion in the prologue – points to a world that, like the
Gaste Forest of Perceval’s mother, conceals a paradoxical abundance behind its
desolate appellations.  Indeed, the geographically flat lands (plaines) of this area
are, at the same time, full (plaines).48  Such homonymic assonance is more than
just simple linguistic coincidence, for beyond the deep river that bisects these
terres plaines lies a mysterious edifice that, like other castles in the Graal,
surpasses all known aesthetic standards:
Le chastiax sor une faloise
                                                 
47 After the brief encounter with his cosine germaine on the road leading away from the Fisher
King’s castle, Perceval is reunited with the Tent Maiden who, along with her horse, was punished
by her ami for Perceval’s amorous indiscretions.  Her abused and emaciated body concealed only
by tattered garments, the maiden’s appearance jibes well with her horse’s, a creature that appears
to be no more than a skeletal assemblage of skin and bones (Qu’il n’avoit se le cuir non / Tant
solement desor les os, ll. 3710-3711).  Such images are common representations of rhetorical,
linguistic, or intellectual degredation.  See, for example, Boethius’ Consolation of Philosophy, where
Philosophy is portrayed as a woman in rendered garments who complains of man’s inattention
to her teachings.
48 Others, including Kibler, who opts for the more common translation of “flat plains,” might not
agree with my interpretation of this line.  Though it is true that the more standard Old French
spelling of “full” is plein, I believe that the passages to follow will more than justify this choice.
Furthermore, there are other occurences of plaine(s) in the Graal where the meaning is clearly tied
only to a sense of abundance (l. 2527, l. 7465, l. 8006).
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Fu fermez par si grant richece
C’onques si riche fortereche
Ne virent oeil d’ome qui vive (ll. 7238-7239)
The castle, seated on a cliff,
was fortified by such great wealth
that such a fine fortress
had never before been seen by the eyes of a living man.
Still, it is not so much the building’s ostentatious architecture or exterior
decoration that attracts our hero’s attention, but its other visual richece:
El palais fenestres overtes
Ot bien cinc cens, totes covertes
De dames et de damoiseles (ll. 7243-7245)
The palace easily had
five hundred open windows, all filled
with ladies and damsels.
The same geosexual alterity that was a factor of Gawain’s earlier crossing into
Galvoie is here made even more explicit: the land dela to which he aspires is the
textual locus of a feminine presence.  Inhabited by seemingly endless scores of
women, this miraculously plentiful region also reinforces earlier allusions in the
Graal to a symbolic connection between femininity and fullness, a sexualized
excess (sorplus) that is diacritically opposed to the divisive and pervasive
sentiment of loss in the text’s masculine world of chevalerie.
Blame for this division often falls on Arthur, whose ascension to the
throne of his father is cast by other characters in the text as a tragedy.  Perceval’s
mother, for instance, paints a resolutely bleak picture of his efficacy as a
monarch:
Apovri et deshireté
Et escillié furent a tort
Li gentil home aprés la mort
Uterpendragon qui rois fu
Et peres le bon roi Artu.
Les terres furent escillies
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Et les povres gens avillies,
Si s’en fuï qui fuïr pot. (ll. 442-449)
Unjustly impoverished and disinherited
and sent into exile were nobles after the death
of Uterpendragon who was king
and father of the good King Arthur.
Lands were parceled out
and the poor were mistreated,
such that those who could flee, fled.
In spite of a passing reference to Arthur as the good king (le bon roi), these
lamentations clearly assert that his arrival failed to stem the social disintegration
provoked by Uterpendragon’s death.49  Indeed, several passages in the Graal hint
at the kingdom’s precarious condition, including the one that describes
Perceval’s first arrival at the court.  Anxious to be knighted, he is puzzled to find
the king speechless:
“Par foi, dist li vallés adonques,
Cis rois ne fist chevalier onques.
Coment porroit chevalier faire,
Quant on n’en puet parole traire?” (ll. 927-930)
“By my faith, said the squire,
this king does not make knights after all.
How could he possibly make a knight
when one can’t get a single word out of him?”
While Perceval is often criticized for his ignorance, his remarks here are, like
those of the Girl with Small Sleeves, profoundly insightful.50  Perceval’s chivalric
mentor Gornemans de Gorhaut is also surprised to hear that Perceval received
his arms from Arthur:
Ces armes, qui les te bailla?
—“Li rois, fait il, le mes dona.”
                                                 
49 Shortly after the veve dame relates this story to Perceval, she becomes the next victim of its
legacy of privation, as her son leaves the gaste forest for good, depriving her of the only remaining
symbol of familial wealth and sexual productivity.  See p. 101 ff.
50 See p. 134 f.
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—“Dona? Coment?” (ll. 1377-1379)
These arms, who gave them to you?
— “The king, he said, he gave them to me.”
— “Gave them? How?”
Like Philip and his livre, Arthur’s status as a ruler turns on his ability to maintain
authority through symbolic representations of his power.  Rendering the
necessary promotion of chevaliers impossible, lack of linguistic production is here
directly linked to the political decline of his realm,51 a silence that, we are told,
has been provoked by the contredite (contradiction, l. 947) leveled at him by the
Red Knight:
Et tant diras al mauvais roi,
Que s’il ne velt tenir de moi
Sa terre, que il le me rende,
Ou il envoit qui la desfende
Vers moi qui di que ele est moie. (ll. 889-893, emphasis mine)
And tell this to the bad king;
if he doesn’t want to pay me homage
for his land, that he return it to me
or send someone to defend it
against me, for I say it is mine.
Even more direct than the veve dame, this disenfranchised member of the
kingdom clearly designates Arthur as the mauvais roi, a criticism of his refusal to
acknowledge the feudal status of his subject.  So, within the fictional history of
this romance, the passing of Uterpendragon is the catalyst of a devastating chain
reaction that spreads a ripple of loss throughout the tale, stifling linguistic
production and, consequently, social stability.
                                                 
51 Cf. Dragonetti 188.  “Artu (art-tu?) est désigné comme le roi infans (étym. « sans parole ») par
Ygerne, ici même.  Le référent, fût-il mythique de ces noms se dissout dans l’oïr qui les désagrège
tout en instaurant des relations lointaines avec le secret de ces silences d’Artu, le roi qui mot ne
sone (v. 926), le roi souvent représenté mu et pensis («! muet » et « pensif », v. 911) ou « muet et
sourd » (v. 9198).
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It is thus nothing short of remarkable that the construction of the castle in
that attracts Gawain’s attention in the terres plaines coincides with the seminal
moment in the fictional heritage of Arthurian romance:
Quant Uterpendragons [...]
Fu mis en terre, issi avint
Que la roïne Ygerne i vint
En cest païs, si aporta
Tot son tresor et si frema
Sor cele roche cel chastel (ll. 8740-8745)
When Uterpendragons
was buried, it happened that
Queen Ygerne came here
to this land, carrying with her
all her wealth, and had erected
on this rock this castle
Like Perceval’s mother, Ygerne is physically displaced following
Uterpendragon’s death.  However, whereas the veve dame claims that this fateful
event left her poor and disinherited (apovri et deshireté, l. 442) the King Arthur’s
mother arrives in her new lands laden with treasure, which includes not only the
surplus of ladies and damsels that Gawain espies in the palace but also a wealth
of squires:
Mais il i a vallés assez,
De maintes terres amassez,
Qui por armes servent laiens;
Bien en i a plus de cinc cens (ll. 7563-7567)
But there are many squires there
who have come from many lands
to serve here and win their arms.
There are easily more than five hundred
Their numbers corresponding perfectly to the quantity of dames et damoiseles at
the castle windows, the presence of these masculine inhabitants further
strengthens the image of the terres plaines as a region excluded from the loss that
afflicts the realm of Arthurian chevalerie.
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Marvelous Metaphors
Nonetheless, as the perfect ambiguity of the word plaines suggests, the
great abundance of this netherworld exists only in potential.  A ferryman
(notonier) who shuttles passengers between the two shores tells Gawain that, in
spite of its appearance, the land is cursed by its own special lack:
Qu’eles atendent qu’il i viegne
Uns chevaliers qui les maintiegne,
Qui rendeas dames lor honors
Et doinst as puceles seignors
Et des vallés chevaliers face. (ll. 7585-7589)
They are waiting for a knight to come there
who will protect them,
who will restore to ladies their inheritences
and give lords to the maidens
and make knights out of squires.
Flush with the physical and economic components of a sexually productive and
politically active society, the land awaits a legendary progenitor, someone who
would effect the subtle linguistic transformation from plaine (flat) to plaine (full).
All these activities – restoring inheritances, performing marriages, and knighting
squires – cast the much sought-after chevaliers as an imaginary embodiment of
the master-signifier that would ensure continuity between otherwise disparate
sexual and feudal entities.52
Though fleeting, Gawain’s previous success at healing the wounds of
sexual separation suggests that he has once again positioned himself in the right
place (bon leu) at the right time.  Yet while the ferryman admits that these women
were unjustly deprived of their inheritances (desiretees a grant tort, l. 7577), he
                                                 
52 Different from blood relations, which are based upon unalterable biological links, a feudal tie
like the one between Arthur and his subjects is founded uniquely upon signifiers.  Without this
linguistic enunciation to designate a relationship, there is no actual basis for the existence of the
feudal tie or the authority of the people in question.  See p. 188 ff.
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derides the notion that an appropriate chivalric guarantor for the region might be
found, calling such wishful thinking an enormous folly (une grant folie, l. 7583).53
For if safe passage across abysmal waters to the oltre rive (other riverbank, l. 8933)
is guaranteed, the castle itself is a formidable impediment to any visual intimacy
between the puceles and Gawain:
Einsi as fenestres s’esturent
Les puceles, et si parurent
Li chief luisant et li gent cors
Si que on les vit par defors
Des les çaintures en amont. (ll. 7253-57, emphasis mine)
Thus at the windows were stationed
the maidens, and so appeared
Their lustrous heads and gentle bodies
and thus, from outside, one could see them
from the waist up.
Simultaneously exposing and concealing their occupants, the strategically placed
windows of the castle are poetic frames that reveal only the most prosaic images
of an idealized female body.54  Like the idyllic donna lauded by the Provençal
troubadours, these female residents of the oltre rive are themselves oltre (other),
partial visions of an otherwise absent femininity, incomplete manifestations of
scopic desire.55
                                                 
53 Indeed, Gawain’s present challenge does seem considerably more daunting than his earlier
foray into Galvoie.  See p. 147 ff.
54 Similar descriptions of female physical characteristics are common to medieval literature,
especially in poems of troubadours and trouvères.  “Le portrait de la dame manque de relief et de
couleur; de plus, les rares gestes qu’elle fait paraissent vagues et généraux.  Certaines expressions
se figent en clichés, donnant l’impression d’un style facile et monotone.” Glynnis M. Cropp, Le
Vocabulaire courtois des troubadours de l’époque classique (Genève: Droz, 1975) 158.
55 Lacan associates this effect of the gaze with the objet petit a, the metonymical displacement of
desire: “Generally speaking, the relation between the gaze and what one wishes to see involves a
lure.  The subject is presented as other than he is, and what one shows him is not what he wishes
to see.  It is in this way that the ey may function as objet petit a, that is to say, at the level of the
lack (—f).”  Lacan, Four Fundamental Concepts of Psyco-Analysis 104.
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By visually sequestering the one part of the maidens’ bodies that would
attest to their sexual identity, this description transforms them into sexualized
vestiges of the region’s own enigmatic excess.  They are, like the land itself,
plaines, faintly visible relics of an ephemeral plenitude that escape language’s
grasp.56  Indeed, the specular desire that incites Gawain to try and gain entry to
the castle is focused only in part on these gent cors.  Nor is it – despite his
demonstrated affinity for the tangible gains (gaaing) of chivalric activity –
centered on any material wealth within its walls.  Rather, the economic and
corporeal lure of this locale are but fictional declensions of another, more esoteric
mystery:
Ains m’en irai, si m’aït Dex,
Veoir les puceles lamont
Et les merveilles qui i sont. (ll. 7616-18, emphasis mine)
Thus, with God’s help, I will go
to see the maidens up there
and the marvels that are there.
Linked with the inherent anti-categorical connotations of the word merveilles,
femininity, or at least that part of it that exists beyond the normal faculties of
human perception and linguistic identification, is placed within the realm of the
impossible, the fantastic, the mystic.  The common etymological heritage of
merveille and the Old French verb mirer (to see; to look upon) is further evidence
that Gawain’s desire for a visual encounter with these maidens is really an
                                                 
56 As Jacques Lacan says, “la femme n’est pas-toute.” Jacques Lacan, Séminaire XX!: Encore (Paris:
Seuil, 1975) 34.  This phrase, which is usually translated as “a woman is not-all” is not an effort
on Lacan’s part to marginalize women or exclude them from participation in the symbolic order -
- he never makes any such accusation -- but rather his attempt to show that some aspect of
femininity always lies outside the confines of human discourse, an absent excess that he terms the
“supplementary jouissance” of women.
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attempt to connect with a much greater unknown, one that is not sexual, but
symbolic.
As Lucienne Carasso-Bulow notes, merveille and merveilleux describe many
different people, places, and things in Chrétien’s tales, from the mildly
provocative to the wildly sensational.57  All occurrences must, therefore, be
explored on an individual basis.  However, to structure her investigation of this
term and its myriad examples from the poet’s rich corpus, Carasso-Bulow
distinguishes between two general categories of the merveilleux, a “lower” and a
“pure.”  Within this schema, the “lower” merveilleux is generally limited to
isolated examples or small clusters of descriptive marvels (e.g., giant beings,
magical objects, exceeding beauty, etc.) whereas the “pure” includes the
additional distinction of incorporating a textual sphere “governed by magical
time or space.”58
In the case of the Roche de Canguin – the name of this land of merveilles –
poetic prestidigitation of the temporal and spatial is inseparable from larger
textual connotations of this highly significant word.  Eventually, Gawain learns
that some of the castle’s residents are not generic depictions of femininity like
those who had first caught his eye, but important members of Arthurian lore.  In
addition to Ygerne, the distinguished cast even includes his very own mother:
L’autre roïne, l’autre dame,
La grant, la bele, qui fu fame
Le roi Lot et mere celui
Qui males voies tiegne ancui,
Mere Gavain. (ll. 8749-8753)
                                                 
57 Lucienne Carasso-Bulow, The Merveilleux in Chrétien de Troyes’ Romances (Geneva: Droz, 1976).
Carasso-Bulow offers several examples of each type of merveilleux, using it as the foundation of
her investigation of this important word.  For her introduction to this framework, see pp. 35-63.
58 Carasso-Bulow 65.
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The other queen, the other lady,
the great and beautiful who was the wife
of King Lot and mother of he
whom I so despise,
Gawain’s mother.
The merveilles of the oltre rive are thus phonetically linked to the mères of
Arthurian romance that inhabit its shores, a revelation that does more than just
renew the fertile homonymic play of mer and mère that was an important element
in Perceval’s adventures.59  But as Gawain’s startled reaction to this news shows,
the truly marvelous thing about it is that his mother died well over twenty years
ago (Bien a passé vint ans al mains, l. 8756), a fate shared by other castle
inhabitants.  Here, “the proper succession of the ages of man is no longer a
concrete representation of chronological time.  Instead, it has become stuck in a
here-and-now that hints at the atemporal.”60  Caught midway between life and
death, growth and decline, past and future, these women are indeed a fitting
populace for empty-full lands where even great wealth amounts to naught,
rendered useless by the region’s stunted productivity.  Dead but somehow alive
and awake (éveillées), the paradoxical presence of these mothers (mères) reflects
poetic language into a set of mirrors that fuels the creation of linguistic
associations and contradictions in the narrative.61
                                                 
59 See p. 114 ff.
60 Paul le Rider, Le Chevalier dans le Conte du Graal de Chrétien de Troyes (Paris: SEES, 1978) 261.
The translation is my own.  Le Rider also notes that other details of the castle’s description,
including five-hundred squires whose facial hair grows at varying speeds and lengths and in
different shades of gray or white (ll. 7563-7573), reinforce the non-linear temporality of this
location.
61 While there is no suggestion that Perceval’s mother is also present at this castle, she definitely
would fit the etymological mold.  The saint hermite asserts that his nephew was saved from
further harm only thanks to his deceased mother’s continued intervention, her beautiful words
counteracting somewhat the tragic effects of Perceval’s silence.  (Mais sa parole ot tel vertu / Que
Diex por li t’a regardé / De mort et de prison gardé, ll. 6405 - 6408).
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 The fictional stage is thus set for Gawain’s greatest and potentially most
rewarding aventure, since success at piercing the mystery of the castle’s merveilles
would restore the social equilibrium and linguistic authority lost when Arthur
became king.  This, however, will not be an easy task, given the extreme
defensive measures involved, of which the most formidable are not the physical
barriers that impeded view of the maidens, but those created by linguistic
trickery (Par art et par enchantement, l. 7545).  In fact, the edifice is so fraught with
danger that, after accompanying Gawain within its walls, the ferryman laments
what he maintains will be his new companion’s certain death:
Et dist: “Sire, de vostre mort
M’anuie et pose molt tres fort,
Que unques chevaliers ne sist
En cel lit qui vis en issist,
Car c’est li Lis de la Merveille (ll. 7801-7805)
And said: “My lord, your death
upsets and saddens me greatly,
for no knight has ever sat
on this bed and lived,
because it is the Bed of Marvels
Recalling the litiere upon which Perceval’s injured father was carried back to the
Waste Forest (ll. 451-454) as well as the one used by the Fisher King, this bed
transforms a traditional location of physical copulation into yet another symbol
of the sexual division and loss.  Indeed, once Gawain is left alone on the bed, he
is almost immediately witness to the destructive potential of the merveilles that he
had so longed to see.  For if, as he had wished, they are revealed to him (Et les
merveilles se descovrent / Et li enchantement aperent, ll. 7826-7827), these arrows
(arbalestes, l. 7839) and hungry lion (lions toz fameilleus, l. 7853) bear no
resemblance to the gentle bodies or lustrous heads of the maidens he saw in the
windows.
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Nevertheless, Gawain survives the attacks and the natural plenitude of
these terres plaines is instantly restored:
Et mesire Gavains remire
La riviere et les terres plaines
Et les forés de bestes plaines (ll. 8004-8006)
And my lord Gawain looked again
at the river and the full lands
and the forests full of animals.
Clarifying the ambiguous use of plaines in terres plaines with the more resolutely
positive image of a forest teaming with fauna (de bestes plaines), Chrétien subtly
signals that the region’s curse has been lifted.  Thus, just a few moments after
Gawain recovers from the attack, the castle’s queens and maidens salute him as
the one whom they so anticipated and desired (celui que nos avomes molt atendu et
desirré, ll. 7890-7891).  And nowhere is the aim of this desire more evident than
when Ygerne, seeing their new lord seated peacefully on the Bed of Marvels
speaking with her granddaughter, exclaims:
Et pleüst Dieu que il l’eüst
Espousee, et tant li pleüst
Come a Eneas pleut Lavine. (ll. 9057-9059)
May it please God that he
Marry her, and that she please him
As much as Lavinia did Aeneas.
Designating Gawain as the source of renewed sexual productivity and social
prosperity for her family and kingdom, the old queen’s intertextual reference to
the hero of Virgil’s Aeneid soon comes to fruition,62 as he jolts the land out of its
atemporal sterility by converting the five-hundred lowly squires into knights:
                                                 
62 Having allied himself with the King Latinus, Aeneas is betrothed to the king’s daughter,
Lavinia.  However, Lavinia's former suitor, Turnus, is insanely jealous and declares ware against
him.  Eventually, Aeneas is victorious, killing Turnus in single combat.  Afterwards he weds
Lavinia and goes on to create the city of Lavinium.
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Par matin mesire Gavains
Chauça a chascun a ses mains
L’esperon destre et çaint l’espee
Et sil lor dona la colee.
Lors ot tel compaignie viax
De cinc cens chevaliers noviax. (ll. 9183-9188)
In the morning my lord Gawain
used his own hands to place on each of them
the right spur and belt their swords
and dubbed them all.
Afterwards he had a company
of five hundred new knights.
So, in stark contrast to his uncle, Gawain is wholly unafflicted by the linguistic
impotence that prevented appointment of new knights at the Arthurian court.
Showering his new subjects with all the texts’ symbolic tokens of chivalric
identity, the new monarch multiplies the signifiers of his linguistic finesse.
Not one for a tidy ending, however, Chrétien spoils the momentary bliss
by drawing the reader’s attention to a renewed sexual fissure at the foundation
of this chivalric dynasty.  Even as Ygerne and Gawain’s mother muse about the
prodigious pairing of Gawain and their female progeny, we find out that the girl
with whom he is seated on the Bed of Marvels is actually his sister:
Cele ne reconnoist son fil!:
Come frere et suer seront il,
Que d’autre amor point n’i avra
Quant li uns de l’autre savra
Qu’ele est sa suer et il ses frere
Et s’en ara joie la mere
Autre que ele n’en atant (ll. 9067-9071)
She did not recognize her son.
They will be like brother and sister,
and will have no other kind of love.
When they have learned from each other
that she is his sister and he her brother,
their mother will experience a joy
other than the one she expected.
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The joie of anticipated sexual copulation replaced by the somewhat less joyful
pleasure of familial presence, the dark scepter of incest threatens to plunge the
region back into a sterile joie like that of the Waste Forest.  In fact, the only way
that the fiction avoids collapse is by way of a rhetorical machination not unlike
that used by the veve dame.  Before learning the identity of the castle’s queens,
Gawain makes what at that time seems a strange request to Ygerne:
Mais un don vos demant et ruis,
S’il vos plaist et vos comandez,
Que vos mon non ne demandez
Devant set jors, si vos griet.” (ll. 8348-8353)
But I ask and request of you a boon,
if you are willing to grant it,
that you not ask my name
for seven days, if you please.
Like all other words in the Graal, proper names are themselves open to revision
and “can be contested at any moment in the tale.”63  For Gawain, his name is also
a harbinger of loss or discord: on no less than four separate occasions (three of
which occur prior to his arrival at this castle), he is accused, attacked, or
criticized because of it.64  With this opportune request to Ygerne, Gawain shows
once again that he is able to use silence to his tactical advantage. Some things are,
indeed, better left unsaid, for this tacit exclusion is the very condition of his
continued reign as sire.
In his monumental study of the Graal, Roger Dragonetti suggests that the
texts’ symbol of this royal usurpation is the undelivered message that Gawain
                                                 
63 Dragonetti 27-28.
64 These episodes include: Guiganbrésil’s accusation of treason, the attack of Gawain at
Escavalon’s castle, Greora’s deceitful trick, and Guiromelans’ allegations of murder.
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sends back to Arthur’s court with a squire from Canguin.65  Though the
messenger completes his journey, the contents of this letter never divulged, for it
is at this moment that the narrative makes its enigmatic halt, a textual caesura
marked by Arthur’s renewed silence:
Cist vient a grant besoing.
Je quit qu’il aporte de loing
Noveles et message a cort.
Molt trovera ja mu et sort
Le roi, tel chose puet il dire,
Qu’il est molt plains de doel et d’ire. (ll. 9195-200, emphasis mine)
This squire is on an urgent mission:
I think he comes from far away
News and a message for the court.
But he’ll find the king deaf and dumb
no matter what might be said,
for he is full of grief and anger.
His ability to speak lost in the apostrophic elision that distinguishes dire from
d’ire, Arthur’s final collapse is both a sign of the linguistic weakness and power
of silence, which Dragonetti calls the true lord of the tale, “a lack of speech that
puts the narrative in motion and forces it to interrupt itself.”66
The message sent to Arthur’s court is not, however, the only symbolic
representation of Gawain’s new role as the sovereign of fictional merveilles.
Having returned across the river from the castle, Gawain encounters the knight
Guiromelans, with whom he enters into a dialogue reminiscent of the one
Perceval was unable to grasp during his first encounter with knights.  All goes
well in this exchange until Gawain makes the following request:
                                                 
65  For his entire argument regarding the valet and his message, see Dragonetti 223-239.
66 Dragonetti 239.  The original passage reads as follows: “Il s’agissait donc de comprendre que
l’acte d’usurpation, beaucoup plus encore que la violence faite à une parole par une autre, c’est
fondamentalement la substitution abusive de la parole au silence, le vrai seigneur du récit, à
savoir ce manque de dire qui met en branle la narration et la force à s’interrompre.”
172
“Et coment a non li chastix,
Qui tant est haus et bons et biax
La d’outre dont je ving jehui,
Et s’i menjai ier soir et bui.” (ll.  8649-8652)
“And what is the name of the castle
that is so tall and good and beautiful,
there from where I came here
and where last night I dined and drank.”
Yet Guiromelans refuses to believe that such a trip was ever made, for it seems
too fabulous (trop me merveil, l. 8674) and Gawain does his best to convince his
counterpart by recounting the entire story of his adventure on the Bed of Marvels
– including details of the attack by invisible castle archers and the ferocious lion
– but to no avail.  Frustrated, he thrusts out his shield, still pierced with
arrowheads and the bloody paw of the lion, and asks:
De ces ensaignes que vos samble? (l. 8712)
What do you think of these signs?
An obvious question, since it is the same that every metaphor – coming from
elsewhere (méta-) and striking us with its singularity, its strangeness, its merveille
– asks.  A metaphor displaces a thing, signifiers, a text to somewhere else, but it
also presents (phero) this thing, these signifiers, or this text under a form other
than one which a reader would readily understand.67  According to Richard
Rorty, the effect of this gesture is interpretation itself:
The literal use of noises and marks are the uses we can handle by
our old theories about what people will say under various
conditions.  Their metaphorical use is the sort which makes us get
busy developing a new theory.68
                                                 
67 In this light, the Gawain deus escus constitute another example of a metaphor, for the
strangeness of this sign, as well as its placement just beside a castle where a powerful lord and a
law of signification rather strict rule, provoked a varied collection of theories on the part of the
young maidens.
68 See Richard Rorty, Objectivism, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers, vol 1 (Cambridge,
Eng.: Cambridge University Press) 162-172.
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It is only when Gawain stops using words, when he reverts to the silent display
of his shield that he succeeds in proving his new status as sire.  Just because one
is no longer speaking does not mean he is not Saying something. 69  The
metaphor is thus what takes hold within this verbal plaine of silence, a linguistic
clearing that allows the writer to semme et fait semence, to bring forward a sense of
that which normally escapes our grasp.  The unanswered question at the end of
the Conte du Graal is not a mistake nor an aberration, but a source poetic growth,
the textual vestige of that marvelous leu where Chrétien sows his linguistic seed.
                                                 
69 Martin Heidegger distinguishes between what he calls speaking and Saying:  “They [speech
and what is spoken] reveal themselves even now as that by which and within which something is
given voice and language, that is, makes an appearance insofar as something is said.  To say and to
speak are not identical.  A man may speak, and speak endlessly, and all the time say nothing.
Another may may remain silent, not speak at all and yet, without speaking, say a great deal.  On
the Way to Language (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1982) 122.
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Chapter Five: Being Silent and Silent Being in Le
Roman de Silence
I do not ask anyone questions, for my questions have no answer.
I know this because I live on both sides of the mirror.
— Ahmed, in Tahar Ben Jelloun’s L’Enfant de Sable
Echoing Chrétien de Troyes’ boisterous pledge to rhyme the best tale ever
told in royal court,1 the opening lines of Le Roman de Silence attempt to seduce
readers by lauding the precision of the poet’s versification:
[M]aistres Heldris de Cornuälle
Escrist ces viers trestolt a talle. (ll. 1-2)
Master Heldris of Cornwall
wrote these verses [strictly to measure].2
As in the Graal prologue, this introductory rhetorical posturing signals more than
just an attempt to gain the benevolentia of an audience.3  A nominal form of the
verb tailler (to cut, to attach), talle is the measurement of both a subtraction and
an addition.4  Therefore, the narrator’s claim that Heldris’ verses have been
written a talle assigns a paradoxical status to his composition, for within it reside
                                                 
1 The lines in question are as follows: Crestïens, qui entent et paine / Par le comandement le conte / A
rimoier le meillor conte / Qui soit contez a cort roial (ll. 62-65).  See p. 78 ff.
2 Heldris de Cornuälle, Le Roman de Silence, ed. Lewis Thorpe (Cambridge: W. Heffer & Sons,
1972).  All references to the original Old French manuscript are taken from this edition.  Two
English translations of the manuscript have been published, one by Regina Psaki, and the other
by Sarah Roche-Mahdi.  For the majority of passages, I have chosen to use Psaki’s translation.
However, I have found it necessary in certain instances to offer alternative translations, which I
signal with brackets.
3 This, in spite of the fact that Quintilian asserts that, “the sole purpose of the exordium is to
prepare our audience in such a way that they will be disposed to lend a ready ear to the rest of
our speech.” (IV.1.v) Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, trans. H.E. Butler, 1921, Vol 2 (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1976) 4 vols.
4 Indeed, as Martin Heidegger notes, this double meaning is at the very heart of language: “The
‘sign’ in design (Latin signum) is related to secare, to cut – as in saw, sector, segment.  To design is
to cut a trace.”  Martin Heidegger, On the Way to Language, trans. Peter D. Hertz and Joan
Stambaugh (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1971) 121.
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both separation and unification, difference and sameness.  Functionally
speaking, writing in the Roman de Silence attempts to cover its own absence, the
poet trying to tailor a text to the measure of that lack created by his own initial
graphic stroke.  Poetic composition becomes a process of supplementation, an
effort to, as R. Howard Bloch has suggested, fill in the holes of language.5  So,
whereas Chrétien de Troyes exploits the fragmented, open format of his text,
what Heldris prizes is quite the opposite.  His ultimate desire is to begin without
beginning, to name his object without subjecting it to the divisive, discordant
boundaries of language:
E or revenrai a mon conte
De mon prologhe faire point,
Car moult grans volentés me point
De muevre rime et conmencier,
Sans noise faire, et sans tenchier. (ll. 102-106, emphasis mine)
But now I will return to my story
and put an end to my prologue,
for great desire spurs me on
to begin my rhyme and proceed,
without discord [making noise] and without dissension.
If, as suggested earlier, language is dependent upon an alternance betwen silence
and speech as its organizing force, this seems like an impossible wish.6  How
could one speak without making noise, write without leaving a trace?  Such are
the troublesome questions that the Le Roman de Silence tries to answer.  Even if
the attempt ultimately meets with failure, its failure reveals something
profoundly important about how language and its lacks affect us all.
                                                 
5 R. Howard Bloch, “Silence and Holes: The Roman de Silence and the art of the Trouvère.” Yale
French Studies 70 (1986): 81-99.  This description could be extended to the text’s contemporary
audience.  While modern critics refer to the text by its accepted title, Lewis Thorpe notes that the
6,706 lines of verse which make up what is now known as Le Roman de Silence actually have no
title whatsoever.  Rather, this appellation appears to be the work of Heinrich Gelzer, who was the
first to discuss the romance in any great detail.
6 See p. 1 f.
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Romance and Truth
 The Old French word romanz (or romans) refers first and foremost not to a
literary genre, but to a language. Beginning with some of the first vernacular
texts written in France during the twelfth-century, it was an accepted practice to
offer translations of works previously available only in the learned tongues of
Latin or Greek. Thus, romanz was initially used to signal employment of the
vernacular instead of one of these other languages, and it is within this practice
that the poet Heldris de Cornuälle situates his work:
Comence chi tels aventure
C’ainques n’oïstes tele en livre.
Si com l’estoire le nos livre,
Qu’en latin escrite lizons,
En romans si le vos disons. (ll. 1658-62, emphasis mine)
Here begins such an adventure
as you have never heard in a book.
As the story gives it to us,
which we read in written Latin,
we tell it to you in romance [romans]7
While the story of Silence is being told in romans, it is perhaps in some respect a
re-telling, since the poet states that it comes from a story in latin escrite.  Some of
the earlier and more renowned examples of this type of literary activity are Le
roman de Thèbes and Le Roman d’Enéas, translations of Latin works by Statius and
Virgil, as well as Le Roman de Troie, an adaptation of the purportedly historical
accounts of the Trojan War credited to Dictys and Dares.8  Obviously, because of
                                                 
7 Regina Psaki, trans., The Roman de Silence by Heldris de Cornuälle (New York: Garland, 1991) ll.
1658-1662.  All accompanying English translations of quotations from the Roman de Silence will be
taken from this translation.  Line numbers are identical in this book to those in Thorpe’s edition.
Psaki’s translation is generally good, although I sometimes disagree with specific word choices.
Such differences will be noted as appropriate.
8 Guy Raynaud de Lage, ed., Le Roman de Thèbes, 2 vols., Classiques français du Moyen Âge
(Paris: Champion, 1966, 1968).  J.-J. Salverda de Grave, ed., Enéas, roman du XIIe siècle, Classiques
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their reliance upon antecedent textual matter, these compositions cannot be
considered as wholly original.
Yet nor are such texts entirely unoriginal, since modifications were often
made to their fictional matter during translation.  Paul Zumthor has cautioned
that the term translation “must be understood in a broad sense,” since these
translations were often altered somehow, whether combined, shortened, or
simplified.9  For Le Roman de Troie, this is particularly relevant, since a single text
contains a synthesis of two works.  In the prologue of this text, Benoit de Saint-
Maure explains the motivation behind its composition: it is written for cil qui
n’entendent la letre (those who do not understand the letter).  For this reason, he
states that the work must be put into romans (en romanz metre).10  As suggested,
however, this ‘written-for-the-masses’ version is not completely faithful to its
precursors, a fact to which Sainte-Maure calls attention:
Le latin sivrai e la letre,
Nule autre rien n’i voudrai metre,
S’ensi non com jol truis escrit.
Ne di mie qu’aucun bon dit
Ni mete, se faire le sai,
Mais la matire en ensivrai.
I will follow the Latin and the letter
and I would not add anything
to that which I find written.
I do not say that I will not add some good discourse
if I have the talent for it,
but I will follow the matter of the text.11
                                                                                                                                                  
français du Moyen Âge (Paris: Champion, 1925-1929).  Benoit de Sainte-Maure, Le Roman de Troie,
6 vols., (Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1904-1912).  All references to this work are taken from this edition,
with citations indicated according to their line numbers (vols. I-IV).  The English translations of
these citations are my own.
9 Paul Zumthor, Toward a Medieval Poetics, trans. Phillip Bennett (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1992) 32.
10 Benoit de Sainte-Maure ll. 36-37.
11 Benoit de Sainte-Maure ll. 139-44, emphasis mine.
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Following the original to the letter thus does not impede the writer from adding
bon dit where he sees fit.  A translation is, in this sense, also a modified version, a
re-writing of another text.  These reflections on textual composition show that, as
Jean-Charles Huchet so succinctly observes: “La littérature naît de la
littérature.”12  Literature, in the case of medieval writing in the vernacular, is
indeed born from literature.
It is within this tradition of literary renaissance that Le Roman de Silence has
its genesis: while the text’s precise date of composition is not known, most critics
place it sometime in the latter half of the thirteenth century.13 Consequently, it is
not surprising that the narrative contains allusions to other vernacular texts of
the period and adapts a significant portion of the prose l’Estoire Merlin as part of
its own fictional matter.14  In this sense, the latin escrite mentioned by the poet is
perhaps a more general reference to any adapted fictional matter, irrespective of
its language of composition.  Furthermore, the poet alludes to his writing as a
sort of conjuction (conjointure)15, in this case between truth and lie:
Jo ne di pas que n’i ajoigne
Avoic le voir sovent mençoigne
Por le conte miols acesmer: (ll. 1663-65, emphasis mine)
I don’t deny that I have joined
                                                 
12 Huchet 10-11.
13 Cf. Kelly xxi and Thorpe 1-17.  In a chronology that he advises can only serve a general
guideline and not a precise catalog of dates, Kelly places the composition of Silence in the period
of 1270-1280.  No specific justification is given for this choice.  However, this estimate coincides
with Thorpe’s, which fixes Silence in “the second half of the thirteenth century” (17).  Thorpe
bases this date on various data, including the handwriting and miniatures of the manuscript,
language of the scribe, and the dates of composition given for other works contained in the same
manuscript.
14 Thorpe 28.
15 This is a term used by Chrétien de Troyes to describe his writing in Erec et Enide.  Chrétien de
Troyes, Erec et Enide, ed. Mario Roques (Paris: Honoré Champion, 1953) l. 14.
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many a fiction [lie] along with the truth
to arrange the story better.
Like the bon dit of Benoit de Sainte-Maure, Heldris claims to add a mençoinge
only to create a more coherent tale, to improve upon the work of those who came
before him.  Now, if the lines that precede those above are considered, the
mençoinge of the poet’s writing becomes even more important.
Comence chi tels aventure
C’ainques n’oïstes tele en livre (ll. 1658-59, emphasis mine)
Here begins such an adventure
as you have never heard in a book.
The many lies are also the locus of the text’s novelty, or in Geoffrey of Vinsauf’s
terms, its source of rejuvenation.16  These artistic and rhetorical flourishes are
what set Heldris’ tale apart from its literary antecedents, referred to summarily
as the latin escrite.  Accordingly, the ‘truth’ that the ‘lie’ of Le Roman de Silence
contradicts is not an equivocal historical reality, but simply established versions
of the textual matter that it glosses.  The work of this poet thus confirms Roger
Dragonetti’s suggestion that medieval writing (including even historical writing)
is more concerned with constructing truth rhetorically than with expressing
some epistemological vérité:
C’est là un phénomène solidement établi, mais qui impliquait que
l’historiographie médiévale, largement tributaire des arts du
langage, c’est à dire de la littérature, demeurait irréductible aux
règles des méthodes modernes de l’histoire, ne fût-ce que par la
manière aussi dont les médiévaux conçoivent différement le
traitement des sources et encore du fait que leur discours historique
ne vise pas à exprimer la vérité, mais à la construire rhétoriquement
et symboliquement en vue de la persuasion.17
                                                 
16 This is another term used by Geoffrey of Vinsauf to describe his rhetorical strategies for
linguistic and literary renewal.  Geoffrey of Vinsauf, Le Poetria Nova, ed. and trans. Lewis Thorpe
(The Hague: Mouton, 1971) 55.
17 Roger Dragonetti, Le Mirage des sources (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1987) 19.
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The contradiction of textual authority creates a truth, inasmuch as the new text
with its added lies now constitutes a separate, discreet work which is even better
than those that preceded it.
Therefore, this practice of re-writing inherent to narrative romance should
not be considered as a pejorative act of transgression, but one of differentiation.
As in the case of Philip’s infamous livre, the new text depends upon the old for its
genesis, but relies on how it differs from the latter to establish itself as a discreet
literary object.  To borrow a term from the prologue to Marie de France’s Lais, the
poetic surplus is what distinguishes a text, what makes it novel.18  Heldris’ attempt
to fashion a story completely a talle thus becomes a quest to communicate
something that is true by translating the tacit fullness of silence into a profusion
of well-chosen words:
N’i metrai rien qui m’uevre enpire
Ne del voir iert mos a dire
Car la verté ne doi taisir. (ll. 1667-69, emphasis mine)
I won’t add anything to worsen my story,
nor truly will there be a word to add to it,
for I must not supress the truth.
The lies of a literary text such as Silence actually become its truth, the mark of its
literary originality.  In vernacular writing, truth and fiction are thus one, both
subject to an endless cycle of renewal and regeneration within the poet’s
language.
                                                 
18 Marie de France, Les Lais de Marie de France, ed. (Paris: Poche). Marie addresses the dynamics of
medieval textual composition in the prologue, referring to the addition of new material as a
“surplus” (ll. 1-56).
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The Politics of Signification
For a narrative that claims to “preserve the memory of Silence,” (Ki de
Silence fait memorie, l. 2658), it is somewhat surprising that its central character
does not appear until quite late in the romance, her name mentioned for the first
time at line 2067.  In addition to the prologue, the first two thousand lines of the
narrative are devoted primarily to the stories of Ebains (the king of England) and
Cador and Eufemie, the future parents of Silence.  While several critics have
addressed the amorous relationship between Silence’s parents, considerably
fewer have given serious attention to Ebains and the narrative’s political
structures.  One notable exception is Sharon Kinoshita, who develops a rapport
between politics and gender politics in Le Roman de Silence:
For under the cover of Silence’s cross dressing and refeminization,
the romance reformulates the way bodies matter in the thirteenth
century imaginary, redefining the function of the medieval nobility
as not military service but genealogical reproduction.19
Kinoshita’s interpretation is both interesting and well developed, and I do not
wish to refute her thesis.  Rather, I contend that just as political and gender issues
are allied in the text, so too, are these issues tied to the narrative’s discourse on
language and writing.  To put it another way, the feudal and gender politics of
the text are also a politics of silence and signification.
The first character presented in the tale (apart from Heldris de Cornuälle)
is Ebains, whose authority as a ruler – unlike Arthur in the Graal – is without
challenge:
Li siens conmans n’ert pas jenglois,
Car n’avoit home ens el roiame,
                                                 
19 Sharon Kinoshita. “Heldris de Cornuälle’s Roman de Silence and the Feudal Politics of Lineage,”
PMLA 110.3 (1995): 398.
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De Wincestre trosqu’a Durame,
S’il osast son conmant enfraindre
Nel fesist en sa carcre enpaindre,
Par tel covant n’a droit n’a tort
N’en issist point trosqu’a la mort. (ll. 112-118, emphasis mine)
A command from him was no idle chatter [lie],
for there was not a man in the kingdom,
from Winchester to Durham,
who, if he dared disobey the king’s command,
would not be thrown into prison,
so that, rightly or wrongly,
he wouldn’t get out again until he died.
The praise of rulers, be they historical or imaginary, is a common topos of
European literature that had its beginnings at least as early as the Punic Wars,
when political leaders began to fully realize the positive influence of rhetoric.20
In the above passage, this strategy is used to fashion the portrait of an
unmitigated aristocratic power.  Furthermore, the word jenglois suggests that his
authority has its foundation in a specific type of linguistic representation.
Derived from the Latin iactare, jenglois designates, as in the above translation,
“empty or idle speech.”  The nominal form of this word – joglerie – has a number
of possible meanings, including singing songs (as in the case of a jongleur), or
playing tricks, both of which portray language as pure artifice:  “In either case,
playing tricks, joking, and empty speech all have one thing in common - the use
of signs or symbols to point to that which is not there, to indicate absence.”21
Essentially, to jongler is to lie.  Thus, the fact that a command from King Ebains is
not jenglois implies that his words do not deceive: they name what is there
                                                 
20 Curtius 176.  In fact, as Curtius notes, many ancient leaders were themselves engaged in
literary activity.
21 Kate Mason Cooper, “Elle and L: Sexualized Textuality in Le Roman de Silence,” Romance Notes
25.3 (1985): 349.  Cooper also notes that it is fitting that joglerie is undertaken by Silence (l. 2863
ff.), since the heroine herself ‘plays a trick’ by her false appearance and name.  See p. 215 ff. for a
discussion of this episode.
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instead of what is absent.  Within the political context of the fiction, this
etymological straightness or linguistic propriety becomes emblematic of a certain
feature of the text’s discourse on language and writing that is explored through a
series of economic and symbolic exchanges among its principal characters.
The importance of economic exchange in Le Roman de Silence is first
alluded to in the prologue, where the narrator issues an angry plaint directed at
those who would hear or repeat Heldris de Cornuälle’s tale:
Ne violt qu’espars soiënt par gent
Qui proisent mains honor d’argent,
N’a gent qui tolt voellent oïr
Que si n’ont soing c’om puist joïr
De gueredon qu’il vollent rendre. (ll. 9-13)
He does not want it to be spread among people
who value honor less than money,
nor to people who want to hear everything
but don’t want to let a man enjoy
the reward they should give him in return.
Quite simply, if one wishes to hear the story of Silence, one should pay to do so.
Such appeals to the financial generosity of an audience are fairly common in
medieval literature, but it is essential to note that the poet is not only
complaining of his personal hardship.  He is also reprimanding others for their
greed.22  Whether for practical, moral, or purely rhetorical reasons, the criticism
of avarice is present in many secular and religious works from this period.  One
finds, for instance, a rather lengthy passage in Le Roman de la rose that paints a
decidedly negative picture of those persons with a lust for money.23  The same is
true of the poet’s condemnation of avere gent (l. 31) in the prologue of Le Roman
                                                 
22 Curtius 470.  One also finds “begging” poems among the Provençal troubadour lyrics as well
as in Chaucer’s poetry.  See, for example Chaucer’s “To You, My Pur and to Non Other Wight.”
23 In this case, greed is explained as the result of a “lack of love” (ll. 5120-5252).
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de Silence.  By their actions, these greedy people are said to lose both the practical
value of their money and their personal honor:
Ont torné en fiens entasser
Car qui violt avoir amasser,
Quant il n’en ist honors ne biens?
Assés valt certes mains que fiens.
Li fiens encrassce vials la terre,
Mais li avoirs c’on entreserre
Honist celui ki l’i entasse. (ll. 45-51, emphasis mine)
All this they have changed into piling up manure;
for who wants to amass wealth
when neither honor nor good comes of it?
It is surely worth less than manure.
Manure at least enriches the earth,
but the wealth a man buries
shames the one who hoards it.
Despised not because they are wealthy, but because – as their name makes clear
– they do not share their wealth with those who deserve it, the behavior of such
individuals turns great riches (biens) into something even less useful than a pile
of shit (fiens).  The emphasis here is clearly on utility: money, like any other object
of exchange, retains its value only so long as it is used.  Its worth is not located in
the material components of its physical composition, but in what these
components stand for in their passing from one person to another.  These
passages allude to a functional relationship between economic exchange and the
circulation of linguistic signifiers.  In both cases, the object is but an abstraction –
what St. Augustine might call a conventional sign – that serves as the
representation of something other than its material components.24  In fact,
                                                 
24 Conventional signs are described as “those [signs] which living creatures show to one another
for the purpose of conveying, in so far as they are able, the motion of their spirits or something
which they have sensed or understood.”  These are opposed to natural signs, which “without any
desire or intention of signifying, make us aware of something beyond themselves, like smoke
which signifies fire.”  Saint Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, trans. D.W. Robertson, Jr. (New
York: Liberal Arts Press, 1958) 35 (II.i.2 – II.ii.3).
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medieval vocabulary recognized this commonality by using the word symbolon
to refer to both word and coin,25 a verbal conflagration strikingly similar to the
one intimated in the prologue of Le Roman de Silence:
S’il a .m. mars en une masse
Trestolt icho tient il a nient,
Et neporquant perdre le crient; (ll. 52-54, emphasis mine)
If he has a thousand marks in a heap,
it doesn’t seem he has anything at all,
and yet he is afraid of losing it
Heldris’ courtly currency is mars, a term that, like its English equivalent, can
denote both a measure of money and a graphic sign.  Hoarding marks, the avere
gent impede their circulation, prizing not the functional utility of the sign, but its
idolatrous image.  They are, as St. Augustine says, “slave[s] to a sign.”26  For the
poet, whose work is based upon generating new meanings for the words he
finds (il trouve, l. 4), such behavior problematizes the activity of poetic
composition.  The honor (honors) lost in such a non-exchange is both personal
and poetic, as Geoffrey of Vinsauf’s description of the challenge and benefit of
effective metaphorical writing intimates:
Haec duo mista
Sunt et honos et onus: onus est transsumere vocem
Ut decet, est et honus cum sit trassumpta decenter.
Two things are mixed here: onus and honor – the onus of
transferring a word properly, and honor for having succeeded.27
                                                 
25 Eugene Vance, Marvelous Signals:  Poetics and Sign Theory in the Middle Ages (Lincoln: University
of Nebraska Press, 1986) 130.
26 Saint Augustine, On Christian Doctrine 83-85 (III.iii.9. – III.iii.11): “He is a slave to a sign one
who uses or worships a significant thing without knowing what it signifies.”
27 Ll 951-954.  Geoffrey of Vinsauf, The Poetria Nova and its Sources in Early Rhetorical Doctrine, ed.
and trans. Ernest J. Gallo (The Hague: Mouton, 1971) 64-5.
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By prizing the word itself instead of its power as a transferable instrument of
signification, greedy people render it sterile and useless to the poet.  One gets the
feeling that even Chrétien might not be able to sow verse in such arid earth.
The antithesis of this avaricious conduct is found in King Ebains, whose
behavior is in perfect accord with the poet’s charitable guidelines.  His land, we
are told, is a model of virtue and honor, an accomplishment which the poet
attributes to the monarch’s ability to give and hold back appropriately:
Del sien lor donoit liëment
Et moult apparelliëment;
Car cho doit cascuns prodom faire,
Doner et garder cui retraire, (ll. 129-132, emphasis mine)
He gave to them happily of his own wealth,
and very becomingly.
Every noble man should do this,
give and hold back appropriately.
Such generosity, of course, stands in marked contrast to the greed of the avere
gent, whose only reward for the poet is “a frowning face and a stingy one” (bien
laide chiere et une enfrume, l. 29).28  The specific vehicle through which Ebains
channels his fiscal control and thus maintains the concordia of his realm is the
don:
Il maintenoit chevalerie,
Si sostenoit bachelerie
Nient par falose mais par dons. (ll. 121-123)
He upheld chivalry,
and kept his young knights
                                                 
28 Thus, the poet does, in reality, use a ‘gloss’ to explain the avere gent, even though he claims to
have no need for such strategies (ll. 68-9).  By showing how Ebains’ practices (which are the exact
opposite of those discussed in the prologue) are honorable, he also shows why the greedy people
are dishonorable.  This is an oft-employed rhetorical tactic, and its use is specifically mentioned
in the Roman de la Rose: “Ainsi va des contraires choses:/Les unes sont des autres gloses;/Et qui l’une en
veult defenir,/De l’autre li doit souvenir” (Thusly go the contrary things.  The ones are of the others
glosses, and he who wishes to define one has to remember the other, ll. 21577-21580).  For a brief
description of contraires choses, see Dragonetti, Le Mirage des sources 51.
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not by deception but by gifts.
While selfish people recompense their subjects with a frowning, deceptive face,
Ebains offers gifts – don is derived from the Old French verb doner (lat. dono),
meaning to give, present, or bestow – to his loyal subjects.  If for no other reason
than the excessive repetition of its diverse forms in this part of the text (there are
no less than nine instances of don or etymologically related words in the span of
fourteen lines, ll. 122-135), this act of giving warrants further attention.
What, then, are these gifts that play such an important role in Ebains’
control of his feudal realm?  At least in part, they reflect the historical
composition and function of the fief, although the narrative ultimately adapts
this material to its own poetic ends.29  While returning to the court one day,
Ebains and his entourage are attacked by a terrible serpent who kills several of
the king’s men.  Disturbed by this loss, Ebains offers a reward to any knight who
would kill the offensive beast:
Jo lie donroie une conté
Et feme li lairai coisir
En mon roiame par loisir
Ki miols li plaira, celi pregne
Mais solement soit sans calengne. (ll. 382-386)
I would give him an earldom
                                                 
29 Economic exchange, in the form of rewards, or dons was the cornerstone of early French
feudalism.  In France, feudal society first came to the forefront during the Carolingian empire,
beginning in the early ninth-century.  For this group of rulers, feudal rewards were the logical
means to an end.  In order to accomplish their goal of spreading the doctrine of Christianity as far
as possible, a wider-reaching network of power than that offered by a traditional centralized
monarchy was required.  Such a network was found in the series of dependent relations first
established during their rise to power.  The maintenance of these older ties, as well as the creation
of new ones came to depend strongly upon economic compensation.  As Marc Bloch explains,
“Once in power, they had to reward these ‘men’.  They distributed lands to them, by methods
which we shall describe in detail later.  Furthermore, as mayors of the palace and then as kings
they had to get supporters and above all create an army.  So they attracted into their service -
frequently in return for gifts of land - many men who were already of high rank.”  March Bloch,
Feudal Society, vol. 1,  trans. L.A. Manyon (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1964) 158.
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and I would let him choose
any wife in my kingdom, at his pleasure.
He may take whichever pleases him most,
as long as she is not already spoken for.
This don, then, includes two main features: a conté and a feme.  The symbolic
exchange of a woman occurs one other time in this text, when the King of
Norway offers his daughter to Ebains as “a chattel of war” – tangible evidence of
an accord between the warring countries.30  Hence, within the context of the
fiction, it is not surprising that Ebains makes this offer.  What is interesting is
that the names of both Ebains’ queen (Eufeme) and Cador’s first choice for a
mate (Eufemie) are – like that of the father in La Vie de Saint Alexis – variations on
the word euphemism (Gk. “use of good words”).31  A substitution of one
signifier for another, these women are pleasing tokens in a symbolic exchange
realized as part of the fiction’s feudal politics.  The female body is thus
represented as a sort of human currency, one in a series of signfiers that
negotiate a transfer of power between lord and vassal.
Similarly, the conception of a conté as tangible retribution only partly
explains its textual significance: the endowment of valuable assets (e.g., a castle,
land) is not its only feature, especially in the case of a high-ranking vassal who
receives a landed fief.  To give a conté - or any such fief - also implies the
accordance of a title, a name.32  He who gives the don is therefore also he who
                                                 
30 Kathleen J. Brahney, “When Silence Was Golden:  Female Personae in the Roman de Silence,”
The Spirit of the Court:  Selected Proceedings of the Fourth Congress of the International Courtly
Literature Society (Toronto 1983), eds. Glyn S. Burgess and Robert A. Taylor (Dover, NH: Brewer,
1985) 55.
31 See p. 45 ff.
32 Marc Bloch 131.  It is interesting that during the assumed period of composition of Silence, the
feudal title became a more important feature of the don, supposedly because fewer landed fiefs
remained available for this use.
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gives a name.  Different from blood relations, which are founded on biological
links, a feudal tie such as the one created between Cador and Ebains is based
uniquely upon a cultural and symbolic system of signifiers.  This pact creates a
tie which need not exist in nature:  Cador is now ‘related’ to the king by virtue of
his new role in the monarchy.33  Without this linguistic enunciation to designate
a relation between them, there is no actual basis for the existence of a feudal tie.
In this sense, the currency of Ebains’ feudal politics is also a linguistic one.  If we
return to the avere gent of the prologue for just a moment, the inherent verbal
fault of their conduct is now obvious: responding to the committed service of
their subjects with only a muted facial expression, their crime is a crime of
silence.
Breaking this silence is thus an authoritative discursive act, the practical
and linguistic effects of which are clarified by further examination of the story of
Cador and his chosen wife, Eufemie.  A short time after the two are wed,
Eufemie’s father, Renaut of Cornwall, dies.  And although he has already been
promised the count’s land and castle by both Ebains and Renaut, Cador
immediately takes possession of them by force:
Cador a fait com hom voisiés,
Que anchois que li cuens morust,
Que folors n’i entrecorust
En tols les castials mist ses gardes.
Tels gens ki ne sunt pas coärdes. (ll. 1646-1650)
Cador behaved like a prudent man,
                                                 
33 Although Ebains refers to Cador as his “bials niés” (fair nephew, l. 532) nephew”, this reference
can not be understood as a clear indication of a genealogical tie between the two.  Before Cador
succeeds in slaying the serpent, he is only referred to as “Un vallet” (a young man, l. 391).  It is
not until after he has demanded that Ebains acknowledge his reward and thus the receipt of his
conté and his title that Ebains refers to him as his “fair nephew”.  The actual sense of the term is
therefore ambiguous, and Ebains’ remark could simply reflect the fact the he and Cador are now
affiliated by virtue of the don.
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for as soon as the count died,
to prevent any disorder from erupting
he placed guards all around the castle,
men who were no cowards.
Clearly, this act is an assumption of the material trappings of power, but it is also
the appropriation of a signifier, since Cador’s claim to Renaut’s physical
property (part of his conté) is followed by his almost immediate adoption of the
latter’s title.  In fact, the proper name Cador is mentioned only twice more,
shortly after the above passage.34  Certainly, the character li cuens (the count) is
also the character Cador in the fiction, but this former name is replaced by a new
one with his entrance into an alternative social and symbolic structure.
Throughout the more than 5,000 remaining lines of the romance, he is only
referred to as li cuens, the name he receives thanks to his newly acquired position
in the feudal politics of the fiction.  One signifier is substituted for another, with
this change in appellation mediated by a transfer of physical assets.
The metaphoric relationship between these two names is an indication of
the metonymic nature of the text’s feudal symbolic structure as a whole.  Symbolic
signification is important not only to those who receive a don from the king, but
also to the king himself.  Ebains is praised because he is a king who keeps his
honor and his knights by offering gifts.  It thus seems logical that by not giving
gifts, one could, like the avere gent, lose these things:
Car ki done derriänement
Il n’i a gré ains pert son don
Et plus avoec, son los, son non: (ll. 134-136, emphasis mine)
For he who gives grudgingly
gains no profit from it, but rather loses his gift,
and more along with it:  his reputation and his good name.
                                                 
34 Cador (l. 1657), Li cuens Cador (l. 2148).
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Note the paradox of feudal homage: he who gives grudgingly, can actually lose
his don and, the text says, his name.  While the king, by the nature of his social
position, has the power to name, he depends upon the same process to give him
his own title, his own feudal signifier.  A feudal monarch such as Ebains retains
his position and his power only as long as all the other members of this cultural
structure continue to recognize him as ‘the king.’  Indeed, Ebains also defines
himself with respect to others in the text, including the king of France: Jo sui ses
hom, il est mes sire (I am his man, and he is my liege lord, l. 4255).  Thus, a feudal
title exists solely in relation to other titles, with no one title possessesing meaning
in and of itself.  Unable able to speak as an ‘I’ on its own, the feudal subject is
quite literally “nothing other than that which slips into a chain of signifiers.”35
Since a subject can speak of himself only in relation to other subjects, identity is
always generated by displacement; he who signifies must also be signified if he
is to have any significance at all.36  The accordance of a don not only rewards
loyalty, but also perpetuates feudalism’s symbolic order by reinforcing the
identities of its otherwise faceless participants.
Law and Loss
However, as is so often the case when reading Le Roman de Silence, it is
extremely difficult in this instance to maintain a single, definitive path of
analysis.  Although the differential symbolic network described above is indeed
                                                 
35 Jacques Lacan, Séminaire livre XX: Encore (Paris: Seuil, 1975) 48.  “Le sujet ce n’est rien d’autre –
qu’il ait ou non conscience de quel significant il est l’effet – que ce qui se glisse dans une chaîne
de signifiants.”
36 I am using Lacan’s term (displacement), which itself is developed from concepts of Freud and
Jakobson, to denote the essentially associative means of definition inherent to metonomy.
Jacques Lacan, Écrits: A Selection, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: W.W. Norton, 1977) 156.
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at work in the Ebains’ feudal politics, it only partially explains the subtle
interplay of language, economic exchange, and political power in this narrative.
The same is true of the historical relationship between lineage, inheritance, and
the don.  In his book Etymologies and Genealogies, R. Howard Bloch studies the
evolution of familial structures and structures of signification throughout the
Middle Ages.37  He describes the medieval family as “a loosely defined grouping
of relatives and retainers,” a condition resulting from the equitable recognition
of agnatic (male) and cognatic (female) lines, as well as family members with no
blood or marriage ties.38  Like the aforementioned relationships of exchange
between Ebains and his feudal subjects, ties between members of such kinship
groups are defined by spatial associations: an individual’s status and the
meaning behind his name or title is created and maintained through fluid
structures of personal service to and compensatory rewards from other
individuals, rather than an immutable or static affiliation between them.39  In
Bloch’s opinion, it is a shift in how these family members identify each other as
such that points to a shift in the signifying structure of the medieval family:
The kin group as a spatial extension was displaced from within by
the notion of the blood group as a diachronic progression:  the
power of feudal princes, once established geographically, produced
a corresponding sense of the family through time.  And not just
any sense, since the “horizontal” clan, loosely spatially conceived,
took on, through increased emphasis upon time and blood, a
necessarily tighter and more “vertical” slant.40
                                                 
37 R. Howard Bloch, Etymologies and Genealogies (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1983).
38 R. Howard Bloch, Etymologies 65-66.
39 Note that the English word ‘relative’ can have either of these two connotations.
40 R. Howard Bloch, Etymologies 69.
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In other words, biological relationships became more important than functional
(feudal) ones, a realignment that greatly influenced the way in which assets
(including both tangible ones like land and intangible ones such as titles) were
transmitted.
While fictional texts are under no obligation to provide accurate
reflections of historical trends – indeed, they often do quite the opposite – it is
interesting to note that the political and symbolic structures of Le Roman de
Silence also become increasingly “vertical,” as sexuality, inheritance, and the
power of Ebains converge.  In what is perhaps the key event of this narrative, an
unnamed count and his twin daughters arrive at the court, where two young
counts are to marry the twins.  However, the identical visual appearance of these
sisters triggers a clash between their suitors over which shall receive the larger
portion of a collective inheritance:
Cho dist cascuns qui a l’ainsnee;
Por quant li uns a la mainsnee.
Mellee i ot por son avoir,
Car cascuns [violt] la terre avoir. (ll. 281-284)
Each one said that he had the elder,
although in fact one had the younger.
There was a war for the property,
for each one wanted to have the land.
Specularly indiscernible from one another, these brides make it impossible to
determine whom should receive the land and title of their father, a dispute that
eventually leads to the death of both young counts.  However, while the original
argument was centered on the women’s ages, Ebains’ venjance is visited upon
their sex:
Mais, par le foi que doi Saint Pere,
Ja feme n’iert mais iretere
Ens el roiame d’Engletiere,
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Por tant com j’aie a tenir tiere.
Et c’en iert ore la venjance
De ceste nostre mesestance. (ll. 313-318)
But, by the faith I owe St. Peter,
never again shall a woman inherit
in the kingdom of England
as long as I hold this land.
This shall be my vengeance
for this wretched situation.
Missing or ignoring the true source of the problem, Ebains avenges one loss with
another by suspending inheritance through the cognatic line.  Women have lost
the ability to inherit: what they lack – that which now determines whether or not
a person will have the right to inherit in the kingdom of Ebains – is a male sexual
organ.  In the feudal politics of Le Roman de Silence, physical lack is also a lack of
the phallus, for possession of male genetalia is now also what gives one the right
to possess and control language through the feudal title (conte).41
Furthermore, by making inheritance dependent on biological sex, Ebains’
legislative decree establishes a law within the narrative that mandates a
continuity between corporeal features and social signifiers of gender, such as
dress, name, and conduct.  Indeed, agnatic biological inheritance shares an
affinity with etymology, which seeks to establish a definite, traceable path of
meaning through time.  Just as the sense of a newer word is understood by the
meaning of those from which it developed,42 the power associated with the
                                                 
41 Lacan does not equate the phallus with the penis (although this is often a metonymic
displacement of the phallus), for it is not an object, but a signifier — the master signifier — which
allows for the metonymic and metaphoric functions of language.  Inasmuch as Ebains law
accords only males with the ability to inherit, and thus control the signifying function of the conté,
it masks over the sexual non-specificity of this concept.  Lacan, Ecrits 284-5.
42 An example of this strategy is found in De Doctrina Christiana, (II.xi.16), where etymology is
advocated as a means for understanding names in the scriptures: “The great remedy for
ignorance of proper signs is knowledge of languages.  And men who speak the Latin tongue, of
whom are those I have undertaken to instruct, need two other languages for the knowledge of
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agnatically inherited patrimoine is not validated by fluctuating horizontal
associations, but by a vertical progression from father to son.43  Ebains’
demarcation of sexual difference within familial inheritance results in a similar,
though not identical tightening of linguistic signification in the narrative.
Linguistically speaking, the twin brides are homographs: identical in appearance
but different in meaning.  Although logically faulted (the same problem could
still occur with twin sons), the king’s legislative decree strives to avoid this
situation by linking sexuality, writing, and death together in a new law of
linguistic signification.  Once all his subjects have taken an oath to abide by this
ruling, Ebains buries the bodies of the two counts, inscribing an ominous
memento mori on their coffins:
Li rois fait les mors enterrer,
En .ii. sarqus bien enserrer.
Escrire i fait: "Par covoitise
Tolt a maint home sa francise,
Et plus avoec quant s'i amort
Troter le fait jusque a la mort. (ll. 327-332)
The king had the dead buried,
Closed up in two fine coffins.
There it was written: "Covetousness
robs many a man of his nobility
and still more when he is bitten by it:
he hastens to his death.
This gesture bonds words to loss, transforming writing into a definitive mark of
difference, the visible trace of a forbidden desire.  Outlawing desire (covoitise),
Ebains hopes to avoid any further misunderstanding (mesestance) within his
                                                                                                                                                  
Scripture.  Hebrew and Greek, that they may have recourse to the original texts if the endless
diversity of the Latin translators throw them into doubt.” St. Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana,
trans. D.W. Robertson, Jr. (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1958) 43.
43 A striking graphic model of this verticality is of course the family tree, which was in use during
the Middle Ages.  In the case of Ebains, he alludes to a straightness in his lineage when he refers
to his possessions as his droiture (l. 5410), while females are said to be contre droiture (l. 672).
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feudal realm by establishing a uniformity between appearance and identity,
between words and their meaning.
Desire and the Silent Other
But just as Saint Paul suggests that he did not know sin until he knew the
Law,44 this new linguistic commandment incites its own transgression, as
illustrated by the story of Silence’s parents, the knight Cador and the maiden
Eufemie.  Respectively, these two characters are presented as idealized figures of
masculine and feminine behavior.  Cador,45 for example, has all the attributes of
the perfect knight:
Un vallet o le roi avoit,
Cador le preu, ki moult savoit.
Il ert le plus vallans de tols,
Li plus amés, et li plus prols. (ll. 391-394)
But there was a young man with the king,
Cador the valiant, who was very wise.
He was the most valorous of all,
the bravest and the most beloved.
Similarly, Eufemie is praised for her intelligence and superlative feminine
beauty, which exceeds that of all her peers:
Li cuens n’avoit enfant que li:
Tols ses païs en abeli,
Qu’el mont n’avoit plus bele mie,
Et si l’apielent Eufemie.
Des .vii. ars ert moult bien aprise. (ll. 399-403)
The count had no other child,
                                                 
44 Take, for example the following passage from Romans 7:7-9:!“What shall we say then? Is the
law sin? God forbid. Nay, I had not known sin, but by the law: for I had not known lust, except
the law had said, Thou shalt not covet. But sin, taking occasion by the commandment, wrought in
me all manner of concupiscence. For without the law sin was dead.”
45 One of the more obscure points of intertextuality in in Le Roman de Silence, it is nevertheless
interesting to note that a character named Cador also appears in the work of Geoffrey of
Monmouth and, like the Cador of Silence, he is also the quintessential knight.  For more
information on his role in this narrative, see Douglas Kelly, Medieval French Romance (New York:
Twayne, 1993) 5.
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and she graced the whole land,
for there was no lovelier creature in all the world.
Her name was Eufemie.
She was well instructed in the seven arts.
Surpassing other men and women in both physical and mental refinement,
Cador and Eufemie are the text’s rhetorical exempla of ‘ideal’ gender behavior
vis-à-vis biological sex.  Granted, some of Eufemie’s attributes and actions do not
coincide with historical tradition, but this does not mean that the character
represents an “unrealistic feminine ideal.”46  As a poetic work, Le Roman de
Silence is not concerned with creating realistic representations, for it is first and
foremost a fiction, a conjunction of truth and lie.47  Therefore, its characters should
not be construed as representations – faulty or otherwise – of a reality, but as
literary figures, the pure products of poetic artifice.  So, whether the idealized
personages of Cador and Eufemie are unrealistic is of little consequence to their
significance within the fiction.  Rather, as deliberately constructed models of
ideal masculinity and femininity, their importance lies in their role as purposeful
elements of the text’s discourse on sexuality.
A considerable portion of the narrative is devoted to the problematic
courtship of this exemplary couple, and it is through an examination of relevant
passages that its sexual/textual significance becomes more explicit.  Given their
common perfection, an amorous union between Cador and Eufemie would
perhaps seem to pose few practical problems.  Such is the reasoning used by
Ebains when he considers the possibility of their marriage:
                                                 
46 Anita Benaim Lasry, “The Ideal Heroine in Medieval Romances:  A Quest for a Paradigm,”
Kentucky Romance Quarterly 32.3 (1985) 231.
47 Recall that these are the words used by Heldris to describe his composition. Jo ne di pas que n’i
ajoigne / Avoic le voir sovent mençoigne / Por le conte miols acesmer ( I don’t deny that I have joined
many a fiction [lie] along with the truth to arrange the story better, ll. 1663-1665).
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Die lor qu’il sunt d’un eäge,
D’une bialté, de halt parage,
Et quent eäges les ivuelle,
Et bialtés n’estroit pas mervelle
S’andoi quesisent l’aparel
Qu’il en amor fuscent parel. (ll. 1267-74, emphasis mine)
Tell them that they both of the same age,
and the same beauty, and noble birth;
and since age and beauty unite them,
it would be no wonder
if both of them sought the means
to be united in love as well.
Indeed, Ebains (who is ignorant of any actual sentiments between the two
characters) is correct in his supposition, for the two are, in love with each other.
However, whereas beauty, age, and noble lineage serve to unite Cador and
Eufemie, love’s effect upon the couple is more ambivalent.
Although their desire for each other is mutual, it is this same desire that so
resolutely divides them.  Evidence of this division between Cador and Eufemie,
and thus, between the two textual poles of sexuality, is most noticeable in the
means (aparel) by which their desire for one another must be expressed –
language.  Shortly after his initial appearance in the text, Cador’s secret love for
Eufemie is revealed to us by the narrator:
Cil l’ainme et dire ne li oze,
Ainz a s’amor si fort encloze
Que nuz ne l’aperçoit en lui. (ll. 405-407)
He loved her and dared not tell her;
instead he had so concealed his love
so that no one perceived it in him.
Held in secret, Cador’s amorous sentiments are imperceptible to others as well as
the desired other.  Similarly, Eufemie loves Cador without daring to say so (Fors
lui amer sans ozer dire, l. 770).  So, the expression of desire is subjected to a mental
silencing (l. 573), a repression of its presence from discourse that perpetuates
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separation.48  Desire thus becomes the locus of an absence or lack in the verbal
exchange between the lovers, pointing to a fundamental interaction in the
narrative between it and the powers of language.
The linguistic dynamics of this relationship become even more
pronounced after king Ebains rewards Cador and Eufemie for services that they
have rendered to the crown.  Once again, they are pushed apart even as the their
stories draw them together.  As previously mentioned, Cador is accorded the
privilege of choosing as his wife whichever woman in the kingdom pleases him
the most (Ki miols li plaira, celi prenge, l. 385) as compensation for killing a dragon.
Due to smoke inhaled during this battle, he falls ill and the king summons
Eufemie, whose great ability in the seven arts qualifies her the best doctor in the
land (El pais n’a si sage mie, l. 594).  Having promised to cure the knight of his
illness, Eufemie is offered a reward nearly identical to Cador’s:
N’i a prince si riche mie
Qu’a baron ne l’ait Eufemie
Celui que miols desire et ainme,
Por c’altres forçor droit n’i clainme. (ll. 605-608)
There was no prince in the world so powerful
that Eufemie would not have him for her lord,
whichever she most desired and loved,
as long as no prior claim bound him.
At first blush, such a state of affairs might seem to clear the way for the
revelation of this couple’s hidden love.  Instead, their frustration is all the more
evident when they try to capitalize on these rewards by transposing their
silenced desire into the medium of speech.  In one of the most interesting
                                                 
48 This is the same sort of disjuncture that Freud, in contemplating the dreams and their
representations, identified as repression or censorship, which for him occurred at both psychic (in
the dream itself) and linguistic (in the patient’s recounting of the dream) levels.  Freud, The
Interpretation of Dreams (First Part) 310-338.
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passages of the narrative, the linguistic results of this attempt are presented in
poetically striking fashion. Having lost a battle to control her desirous heart,
Eufemie goes to Cador’s room to speak to him:
Vient al cambre a son ami.
Dist li: “Amis, parlés, haymmi!”
Dire li dut: “Parlés a moi,”
Mais l’Amors li fist tel anoi
Que dire dut: “Parlés a mi,”
Se li a dit: “Parlés, haymmi!” (ll. 881-886, emphasis mine)
She went into her ami’s room,
and said to him; “Ami, speak, alas!”
She should have said, “Speak to me,”
but love [Love] so troubled her
that when she meant to say “Speak to me,”
instead she told him, “Speak, alas!”
Apart from the above translation of ‘alas,’ the word haymmi in this passage has
also been interpreted as “to the middle” and “hate me.”49 Although such
translation choices are certainly justifiable, the most important feature of this
term is its literal status as a signifier of disappointment or loss.  This is because
the substitution of haymmi for the directive a mi is both a subtraction and an
addition, the replacement of an intended meaning with another.  In its overt
contemplation of this metaphoric mistake, the text ascribes the blame to Amors
(Love), who troubles Eufemie.  The fact that love is personified in this passage is
significant, since it shifts the sense of the word from an emotion that is sensed by
Eufemie to an emotional force that acts upon her, or more accurately, upon her
words.  All of this suggests that a subject’s speech can never really say what it
wants to, its request for the desired object or other subjected by its desire to a
                                                 
49 R. Howard Bloch, “Silence and Holes:  The Roman de Silence and the Art of the Trouvère,” Yale
French Studies 70 (1986) 94.  Loren Ringer, “Exchange, Identity, and Transvestism in Le Roman de
Silence,” Dalhousie French Studies 28 (1994) 10.
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series of transformations and contaminations as it passes from silence into
speech.50  Elsewhere in the text, the power of the lover’s heart is explicitly likened
to the power of fire to deform or destroy written signs:
Nient plus n’a cuers d’amant valor
De bien retenir s[a] mimorie,
Que cire encontre fu victorie
De retenir la lettre escrite. (ll. 1174-1177)
The heart of a lover can no more
retain its memory [writing]
than wax can prevail against
the fire to retain the written letter.
Burning with desire, so to speak, the lover’s heart melts its own writing
(mimorie), thereby impeding the formal expression of its silent impulses. In this
sense, language is not the means by which desire for the other can be articulated,
but rather the means by which it is betrayed, always entering into the symbolic
structures of language as a corrupted version of itself.
In Eufemie’s case, the corrupted demand (Parlés, haymmi!) as well as its
correct, but sublimated version (Parlés a mi) are also requests for Cador to speak.
Here then, desire for the other is equated with a desire for the speech of the
other,51 and Cador responds to Eufemie’s request, analyzing her confused parole:
Cis mos “amis” fait esperer
Cador qu’or para averer
Cho qu’il plus convoite et desirre.
“Aimmi!” demostre le martyre,
Le paine d’amor qu’a sofierte;
                                                 
50 Lacan describes desire as “an effect of the subject of that condition which is imposed upon him
by the existence of discourse, to make his need pass through the panes of the signifier.”  Jacques
Lacan, “La Direction de la cure et les principes de son pouvoir,” La Psychanalyse 6 (1961): 190.
51 Here, Collete Soler provides an enlightening interpretation of this dynamic, which Lacan
articulates in the article “Function and Field of Speech and Language”: “Revelation in speech is
produced between the subject who speaks and the subject who listens.  More precisely, what
produces revelation – and revelation in speech is revelation for the subject him or herself – is
interpretation.  Collete Soler, “The Symbolic Order (I),” Reading Seminars I and II: Lacan’s Return to
Freud, ed. Richard Feldstein, Bruce Fink, and Maire Janus (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1996) 42-43.
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Mais que li parole est covierte (ll. 903-908, emphasis mine)
This word “ami” made Cador hope
that now he would be able to realize
what he most craved and desired.
“Alas” showed anguish,
the pain of love that she had suffered,
only the word was hidden.
Interpreting the troubled phrase, Cador attempts to find the hidden word or
meaning of her speech.  Like the poet, Cador is a trouvère, trying to ‘find’ words
to fill in the lacunae of the empty or partially empty page.  In this passage, then,
two modes of representation are depicted.  One – feminine –  exposes an absence,
the unintelligible but meaningful residue of desire, “a metonymic remainder” as
Lacan calls it, while the  other – masculine – attempts to eliminate that absence,
to supplement its lack with signs, and thereby arrive at a revelation of the truth
behind words, the Word itself.52  Thus, in this episode, language is presented as
the means by which desire – as that which is silent – might be revealed.
However, this revelation is the truth that appears only as a product of the
‘play’ in language, not an actual signifier.  Thus, when Cador and Eufemie come
to recognize their mutual love for the first time, this revelation is achieved not
dialogically, but with a silent kiss:
Sans dire font, si com moi sanble,
De fine amor moult bon ensegne,
Car li baisiers bien lor ensegne
Et li qu’il trait paine et martire,
Et lui qu’ele l’aime et desire. (ll. 1094-98, emphasis mine)
                                                 
52 Lacan, Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis 154.  “This nodal point is called desire, and
the theoretical elaboration that I have pursued in recent years will show you, through each stage
of clinical experience, how desire is situated in dependence on demand – which, by being
articulated in signifiers, leaves a metonymic remainder that runs under it, an element that is not
indeterminate, which is a condition both absolute and unapprehensible, an element necessarily
lacking, unsatisfied, impossible, misconstrued (méconnu), an element called desire.  Cf. Cooper
352.
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They acted without speaking, it seems to me,
a very clear sign of noble love,
for the kiss taught them well;
her, that he suffered pain and martyrdom;
and him, that she loved and wanted him.
This kiss – literally a joining of langues (tongues) – is also the figurative joining of
the couple’s different representational languages (langues).  Incapable of being
expressed by either of them individually, the sign that is produced as well as
what it teaches Cador and Eufemie, remain unspoken.  This fusion of masculine
and feminine is also equated – as it was in the Conte du Graal – to a medicine,
which the text says will appear as a product of the exchange between these
lovers:
Et lui garir par la mescine
Et li avoir par lui mecine.
U cascuns d’als son per garra,
U la mecine n’i parra. (ll. 875-878, emphasis mine)
Cador must be cured by the maiden
and she must have her medicine from him.
Either each one will cure his mate,
or the medicine will not appear.
Another name for the philosopher’s stone of medieval alchemy, the medecine is
that mysterious material reputed to have the power to change ordinary metals
into gold, to perfect the imperfect, to unite the divided.53  Here, alchemical
transformation takes on the guise of sexual copulation, also a recurrent theme in
texts from that field.54  Furthermore, mecine (medicine) can be translated
                                                 
53 Saint Augustine also refers to God as the “Physician and Medicine” and suggests that textual
analysis is a medicinal exercise.  Saint Augustine, On Christian Doctrine 15 (I.xiv.13).
54  The thirteenth-century doctor and alchemical practitioner Roger Bacon speaks of the attributes
and uses of this medicinam propriam at considerable length in the Speculum alchimiae.  The Mirror of
Alchimy Composed by the Thrice-Famous and Learned Fryer, Roger Bachon, ed. Stanton J. Linden
(London: Garland, 1992). For a summary of the ideas of Bacon and other alchemists, see Gareth
Roberts, The Mirror of Alchemy: Alchemical Ideas and Images in Manuscripts and Books (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1994).
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phonetically as “maiden” or, by use of a phonetic elision, as “my sign” (me cine).
If the subject of this ‘my’ is the ‘I’ of narration  (i.e., the poet) his sign leads us
back to his desire to speak that which cannot be spoken, to name the ineffable,
symbolized here by the silent kiss of Eufemie and Cador.
Nature’s Nurturing, Nurture’s (de)Naturing
Telling the story of Silence – the eventual product of this physical
coupling between Cador and Eufemie – would thus represent an attempt to tell
the story of silence, to recreate the tacit fullness of her parents’ linguistic
copulation by eliminating the difference between presence and absence, between
desire and its linguistic signifiers.  Certain traces of this attempt are easily
discerned, including the ambiguous names used by the poet to refer the
character: li vallet qui ert meschine (the boy who was a girl, l. 3704) or simply li
vallés mescine (the boy-girl, l. 3763).55  In these confused epithets, the conflation of
the binary opposites ‘boy’ and ‘girl’ is symptomatic of a central movement in the
narrative’s thematic and poetic structures to eliminate both sexual and linguistic
difference, with the character Silence serving as its ambiguous archetype.
The initial creation of this figure of linguistic and sexual totality is carried
out by the goddess Nature who, like the natura formatrix of Alain de Lille’s
Anticlaudianus,56 decides to fashion a paragon of her creative abilities.  But
whereas the goddess of Anticlaudianus chooses to create the perfect male, Nature
here longs to fashion the perfect female form, to be distinguished from all other
                                                 
55 My own use of the word ‘her’ is marked by this same relationship, but for the sake of
simplicity and consistency, I will refer to Silence using feminine pronouns.
56 The goddess Natura in Anticlaudianus de Antirufino calls on her fifteen celestial sisters to aid
her in the creation of a perfect man.  For a detailed examination of this and other medieval texts
that incorporate the goddess Natura, see Georges Economou, The Goddess Natura in Medieval
Literature (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972).
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women – much like her terrestrial mother Eufemie – by a superior feminine
beauty:
La matere ai moult estuïe,
Si a[i] estei moult anuïe
De grosse ouvre, et de vilainne.
Or voel a cesti mettre painne.
En li sole, car bel me sanble,
Metrai plus de bialté ensanble
Que n’aient ore .m. de celes
Qui en cest monde sont plus beles. (ll. 1877-1884)
I have saved this material for a long time,
and I am very weary
of coarse and ugly work.
I want to take good care with this.
In her alone – for so I wish –
I will put more beauty together
than now belongs to a thousand
of the most beautiful women in the world.
The jealously-guarded material for this project must be free of imperfection,
equated in the narrative to a well-sifted white flour, free of any chaff or straw (l.
1808 ff.), of which the product is a fine cake:  Et de la fleur fait ses gastials (From
the flour she makes her cake, l. 1821).  Completely pure, integral, and without a
mark of difference to blemish its surface, Silence’s stark white body recalls the
state of the blank page prior to poetic composition, a silent fullness that has not
yet been transgressed by an intrusion of the written word.  Indeed, Nature
intimates that she is striving to create a lack of lack, a plenum: Cho dist Nature: “Jo
m’en duel/Si riens i falt.” (Nature said, “I shall grieve if anything is lacking.” l.
1921).
Just as a well-baked cake brings about hunger, so too, does the perfectly
white body/page of Silence induce a desire to signify, to recuperate its fullness in
writing.  Nature herself literally inscribes features onto the flawless face of her
creation:
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La bouce escrist, fait l’overture
Petite e levres a mesure
Sor le menton les dens serrés.
Ja nul si bel volt ne verrés. (ll. 1931-34, emphasis mine)
She inscribed [wrote] the mouth,
made the opening small, and the lips to match,
the teeth she set above the chin.
You will never see such a beautiful face.
Thus, the formation of Silence’s body corresponds figuratively to the genesis of a
written text which, like the poet’s verses, are made a mesure.  However, this text
is so exquisite that it will never be seen, existing in written form only as a
simulacrum of that which it names.  Beyond the descriptive powers of language,
integral only in its linguistic absence, Silence’s body is the locus of an ultimate
articulation, the Other that escapes language and whose most accurate
expression “is a circumscription of absence or emptiness.”57  To some extent,
Cador’s choice of the surname Silence for his child (l. 2067 ff.) acknowledges the
futility of an attempt to name such a figure, for this word belies its own lack.
That which cannot be signified points not to something, but to nothing, a no-
thing that cannot be directly expressed in language.
At the same time, both the absence of Silence’s perfect female body and
and her grammatically indeterminate name pose a problem for her father.
Because of Ebains’ recent law against female inheritance, Cador requires a male
heir in order to preserve the genealogical continuity of his estate: a female child
would result in forfeiture of the patrimony.  Therefore, prior to the birth of their
child, Cador suggests that, in the event their child is a female, he and Eufemie
should circumvent the law by means of a specular ruse:
                                                 
57 Cooper 346.
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Faisons li com un fil norir,
De priés garder et bien covrir,
Si le poons, del nostre engier. (ll. 1757-1759)
Let us raise her as a son,
keep and protect her closely [guard and cover her well],
if we can, with our endowments [trick].
In this way, Cador will have a ‘son’ even if he truly has a daughter, giving him a
legal successor, or at least the appearance thereof.  To do so, he must cover, or
silence, the politically disadvantageous body of his daughter by dressing her in
male clothing:
Quant li enfes pot dras user,
Por se nature refuser
L’ont tres bien vestu a fuer d’ome
A sa mesure, c’est la some. (ll. 2359-62, emphasis mine)
When the child could wear clothes,
in order to deny her nature
they dressed her all in a man’s fashion,
scaled down to her size [measure], that’s the truth.
Like the poet, who promises to tailor (tailler) his verses strictly to the measure of
the silent holes in language, so too, does Cador intend to cover the ineffable
female body of his daughter with masculine clothes, cut strictly to her measure.
Within the political drama of the fiction, Silence is a representation of the poet’s
own desire to fashion the illusion of presence where there is only absence.
This change in clothes is accompanied by a change in the heroine’s name,
a frequent occurrence in medieval texts with cross-dressing female characters.
However, whereas re-namings in other texts consist of a simple re-writing of the
original feminine names,58 this same activity in Le Roman de Silence involves the
application of both a feminine and masculine supplement to a common root:
                                                 
58 Cf. Perret 332.
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Mellor consel trover n’i puis.
Il iert només Scilenscius;
Et s’il avient par aventure
Al descovrir de sa nature
Nos muerons cest -us en -a,
S’avra a non Scilencia.
Se nos li tolons dont cest -us,
Nos li donrons natural us,
Car cis -us est contre nature
Mais l’atres seroit par nature (ll. 2073-2082)
I can find no better solution.
He will be named Silentius,
and if it happens by chance
that his true nature is discovered,
we will change the -us to -a,
and she will be named Silentia.
If we remove this -us from her,
we will give her more natural custom,
for this -us is against nature,
but the other would be according to nature.
Defying what he himself considers a natural continuity between biological sex
and outward signifiers of gender, Cador violates grammatical laws of proper
linguistic representation. A female body covered by a masculine signifier, the
child Silentius is, in the parlance of Alain de Lille, a barbarian in grammar, an
over-exaggerated metaphor that bends the rules of expression too far by
confusing gender categories, which Alain considers a defect.59  At the same time,
however, it is this linguistic defect that allows Cador to correct what in the
fiction’s feudal politics amounts to a physical one: by grafting the suffix -us onto
the radical Silence, Cador is able to confer upon his daughter, at least artificially,
                                                 
59 Alain describes homosexuality in grammatical terms: “A man turned woman blackens the fair
name of his sex.  The witchcraft of Venus turns him into a hermaphrodite.  He is subject and
predicate: one and the same term is given a double application.  Man here extends too far the
laws of grammar.  Becoming a barbarian in grammar, he disclaims the manhood given him by
nature.  Grammar does not find favour with him but rather a trope.  This transposition however,
cannot be called a trop.  The figure here more correctly falls into the category of defects.”  Alain
de Lille, The Plaint of Nature, trans. Alan Sheridan (Toronto: Pontifical Institute for Medieval
Studies, 1980) 68.  Cf. R. Howard Bloch, “Silence” 85.
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that which she lacks – a penis.  Creating the linguistic illusion of a physical
presence, Cador undermines the same exterior signifiers of sexuality upon which
Ebains’ new etymologically-inspired law is founded.
The grammatical prosthetic -us can thus be understood as the narrative’s
graphic mark of falsified genealogical continuity, an image recuperated later in
the narrative when Silence presents herself to her own father disguised as the
jongleur Malduit.  The significance of this name would be hard to miss, since it
literally means “poorly educated.”  However, despite the clue contained in this
name and the vehement claims of an old white-haired man that this jongleur is
Silence, Cador is not convinced of Malduit’s sublimated identity until he receives
written confirmation:
Sor diestre espaule li ensegne
Une crois qu’il ot a ensegne
Ormais puet li cuens bien croire:
Donc a baisié son fil en oire. (ll. 3647-50, emphasis mine)
He showed his father a mark
on his right shoulder in the shape of a cross, as a sign.
Then the count could finally believe it,
and he kissed his son at once.
The only means by which Cador is able to recognize the jongleur Malduit as his
son, this graphic mark on the body is, like the -us of her masculinized name, a
contrived signifier of familial succession.  It is also the mark of linguistic
continuity, for the inheritance that Cador wishes to pass on – his conté (earldom)
– is almost orthographically indistinguishable from the conte (tale) and his
holdings include an allowance of .m. livres (a thousand pounds/books, l. 1295).
Silence, or more precisely, Silentius is not only Cador’s son (fil), but also the
continuation (fil) of literary production for the poet.  Graced with a seal of  the
familial conté, Silence is next in line to rise to the status of li cuens – he who
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administers the conté and the conte.  So, the barbarous -us of her name and the
cross inscribed on her shoulder are marks of linguistic authority, the phallus.60
In fact, Silence’s nurturing is so complete that there is almost no trace of
femininity left, either in her or on her.  Raised by Cador’s cousin and a seneschal
of the count, Silence receives all the instruction of a male child, surpassing even
her biologically male peers in traditionally masculine pursuits like jousting and
swordplay.  In addition, her skin is deliberately altered by frequent exposure to
the elements in order to make it more closely resemble what the text deems to be
that of a male:
Sel mainne plus sovent el halle
Por cho qu’il violt faire plus malle.
Il a us d’ome tant usé
Et cel de feme refusé
Que poi en falt que il n’est malles:
Quanque on en voit est trestolt malles.  (ll. 2473-78, emphasis mine)
He [the seneschal] took him most often out in the sun,
to make him look more like a male.
The child was so used to masculine ways,
and had so refused the feminine,
that he was very nearly a boy;
what could be seen of him was entirely male.
His daughter completely covered with both vestimentary and corporeal
signifiers of masculinity (us d’ome), Cador seems to have succeeded in his
attempt to turn a girl into a boy, in naming the unnameable body of Silence.
Thus, the allegorical character Nurture (Noreture) – presented as Nature’s sworn
enemy – claims that she has completely denatured Nature’s creation (Jo l’ai tolte
                                                 
60 Here, it is interesting to note one of Lacan’s descriptions of the phallus: “Because the phallus is
not a question of form, or of an image, or of a phantasy, but rather of a signifier, the signifier of
desire.  In Greek antiquity the phallus is not represented by an organ but as an insignia; it is the
ultimate significative object, which appears when all the veils are lifted.”  Jacques Lacan, Seminar
of April-June, 1958 p. 252, quoted in Anthony Wilden, “Lacan and the Discourse of the Other,”
Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis, ed. Anthony Wilden (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1968) 187.
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desnaturee, l. 2595).  This boast proclaims not only the failure of Ebains’ laws of
sexualized representation, but also the success of the poet’s efforts to modify
language to his will: the verb desnaturer is, to borrow Geoffrey of Vinsauf’s
expression, a rejuvenated word,61 a poetic invention created by transforming the
noun nature into a verb with the addition of a prefix (des-) and a suffix (-er).
Tailoring signifiers to fit the needs of his tale, the poet transforms language into a
pliant instrument of his desire, his mescine.
That Which is Not There
 The only noticeable threat to this otherwise successful vita in camera is
Ebains’ wife Eufeme, whose unwelcome advances eventually lead to the
undoing of Silence’s vestimentary disguise and the rest of her sexual ruse.62
When Silence first arrives at the court of Ebains, she is enthralled with li vallés
mescine, a sensual attraction brought on solely by the young person’s outer
appearance:
La roïne en est molt esprise
Por sa façon, por sa bialté (ll. 3693-3694)
The queen was very taken
by his appearance and his beauty.
This admiration is unfortuante, for much earlier in the tale, Nature warns Silence
of the problems that her indeterminate sexuality will create in relationships with
members of the female sex:
.m. femes a en ceste vie
Ki de toi ont moult grant envie
Por le bialtet qu’eles i voient,
Car puet scel estre eles i croient
                                                 
61 See p. 113.
62 Edward J. Gallagher, “The Modernity of Le Roman de Silence,” University of Dayton Review 21.3
(Spring 1992): 35.
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Tel cose qu’en toi nen a mie (ll. 2513-17, emphasis mine)
There are a thousand women in this life
who will greatly desire you
for the beauty they will see in you,
and because they will think to find in you
something that is not there at all.
Reducing feminine sexual desire to a desire for the sexual member of the male
other, Nature bemoans the cose that Silence does not really have.  Rather, with
her masculine dress and the -us of her name, possession of this biological
signifier is strictly an appearance, an illusion.
This illusion however, is enough to fool Eufemie, whose understanding of
signs is based not upon their hidden word, but upon the emptiness of their visual
representation:
Seroit la roïne sanee
Kist par sanblant moult enganee. (ll. 3721-22, emphasis mine)
The queen would be healed,
who was so mislead by appearances.
This lack of hermeneutic ability allows the queen to fall in love with Silence, and
in an effort to seduce her, she feigns illness so that boy-girl will remain by her
bedside. Once there, Eufeme proclaims her love for the boy and proposes an
amorous exchange of kisses:
Por .i. baisier vos donrai .ii.
Et ne vos sanble bien estrange
Que vos avrés si riche cange? (ll. 3761-3763)
For one kiss I will give you two.
Does it not seem strange to you
that you should have such a rich exchange?
As was true in the coupling of Cador and Eufemie, kisses here are the means by
which Eufeme hopes to realize the physical union between her and Silence,
revealing the ‘medicine’ that would be the cure for her illness.  However, this
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exchange is tilted in Silence’s favor from the start, and what little Eufeme does
receive in return for her lovely and amorous kisses is not what she expected:
Li dona .i. baisier sinple,
Car il n’entent pas, al voir dire,
Con fait baisier ele desire. (ll. 3766-3768)
And he gave her one simple kiss,
and truth to tell he did not understand
what kind of kiss she wanted.
Thus, all that Eufeme encounters in her exchange with Silence is loss, for Silence
is unable to give her what she wants.  Her desire leads only to deception, for
what she desires the other is not able to give, whether this don be physical or
symbolic.
In fact, the sexual indeterminacy generated by Silence’s disguise turns her
into the narrative’s “object of universal desire.”63 In both her masculine and
feminine guises, Silence garners the admiration of a score of different characters,
both male and female: the king of France, her parents, Ebains, and Eufeme.
Thus, when she leaves the country to follow two wandering minstrels who
passed the night in the home of the seneschal, everyone laments her loss.  Cador,
who is under the impression that Silence has been kidnapped by the jongleurs,
conceives of their crime as such:
Li cuens set que li jogleör
Ont pris del mont le mireör. (ll. 3115-3116)
The count knew that the jongleurs
had taken away the mirror of the world.
Despite the fact that Cador is mistaken in his accusation, this passage is notable
for its use of the term mireör.  The image of the mirror, or speculum is a common
                                                 
63 R. Howard Bloch, “Silence” 89.
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one in medieval literature, appearing in several works of fiction from this period,
including Le Roman de la Rose.  In addition, medieval grammar generally
conceived of language as an indirect reflection of inaccessible truths, and was thus
referred to as grammatica speculativa.64  Here, what Silence reflects, or at least did
reflect before her disappearance, is the speech of others, linguistic desire.  For
without Silence, Cador’s kingdom is a land of linguistic crisis where all joie (joy)
has been lost, a joy which is essentially that ecstasy of hearing ones’ own speech
reflected back in the mirror that is s/Silence:
Quant il est lius de mener joie
Apertement, si con bien l’oie,
U quant il est lius de parler
C’on voit sa coze devorer,
Moult grieve mains par certes l’uevre
Quant on le cuer si en descuevre
Com li afaires li requiert,
Et si c’on a le coze afiert.
Mais cist nen osent faire noise (ll. 3035-43, emphasis mine)
When it is time to rejoice openly,
so that everyone hears it,
or when it is time to speak
and one sees one’s speech received eagerly,
the matter is much less painful
when one can open one’s heart about it,
as need requires it,
and speech is suitable to it.
But these lords did not dare to make any noise.
The rhyming play that associates joie, oie, and voit in this passage is a striking
portrait of the poet, whose joy is to emit signs, have these signs be heard, and see
them reflected back through the mirror of written language.  Deprived of
s/Silence – the mirror onto which linguistic desire is reflected – no noise can be
made.
                                                 
64 Julia Kristeva, Le langage, cet inconnu: Une initiation à la linguistique (Paris: Editions du Seuil,
1981) 134-42.
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Possessing this mirror, however, does not necessarily guarantee great joie.
When Silence escapes to France with the jongleurs, they are at first enthusiastic
about having the child as a companion and apprentice.  However, once Silence
has learned the poet’s trade, she very quickly surpasses her teachers, and the
audiences no longer want to listen to anyone else.  This enrages the tutors, who
accuse li vallés mescine of having stolen their poetic knowledge and, along with it,
their money:
Duree n’i puet nus avoir:
Cis a emblé nostre savoir. (ll. 3267-3268)
No one can deny it:
This one has stolen our knowledge.
Nostre damages doblera,
Car nostre avoir enportera (ll. 3277-3278)
He will double our loss,
for he will take away our wealth.
Differing by only a single letter, the savoir and the avoir of the poets are nearly
identical and, as in the prologue of this text, the wealth in question is composed
of marcs (marks, l. 3356).  Thus, the avoir that Silence steals is not only monetary
currency, but also the linguistic currency of poetic signifiers, while the purloined
knowledge (savoir), is the ability to manipulate and control them.  In an attempt
to reappropriate this treasure, the poets plot to take Silence’s head, the physical
locus of this stolen (s)avoir.  However, this plan ends in failure as Silence, who is
now a master of signs, is able to interpret a dream in which dogs attempt to tear
her from limb to limb as a foretelling of her masters’ scheme:
Silences entent et escolte.
Or n’est il pas de cho en dolte,
Que li doi culviert desperé
N’eüsscent son songe averé
Des chiens dont il avoit songié
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Se il n’eüscent le congié. (ll. 3403-3408)
Silence listened and heard.
He was no longer in any doubt
that the two desperate villains
would have made his come dream true,
the dream about the dogs,
if they hadn’t plotted aloud together.
Here then, Silence uses the same type of dream-interpretaion that Freud equates
with “hitting on a clever idea,” an inventive, poetic interpretation of the dream
material.65  Listening and hearing, Silence’s linguistic quietude is what allows her
to avoid harm: her stillness creates a space for poetic activity.66  As a result, she is
able to walk away with more marks than each of the jongleurs: Et l’enfens .c. mars
en depart/A çals en lasce plus de .c. (And the boy took a hundred marks for his
share, leaving them over a hundred, ll. 3474-3475).  It is in fact Silence – the
mirror of the world – who steals something, not the jongleurs.  Exchanging signs
with the poets, but never returning a like amount, Silence is a symbol of the
silent mirror of language that refracts rather than reflects desire.
The Silent Truth
From the moment when Silence is first given her adaptable surname by
Cador, Le Roman de Silence taunts readers with the possibility of seeing beyond
this disguise.  Like her masculine clothes, Silence’s name constitutes a
paradoxical attempt to stitch over a silent fullness and recuperate it within the
                                                 
65 Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams (First Part) 97.  See p. 3 ff.
66 Martin Heidegger suggests that both motion and stillness are vital characteristics of a poetic
‘presence.’  “What is moved is brought to the stand and position of a presencing (verbal), brought
in a bringing-forth.  This can occur in the manner of physis (allowing something to emerge of
itself) or in the manner of poesis (to produce and represent something).  The presence of
presencing, whether it is something at rest or in motion, receives its essential determination when
motion and, with it, rest as fundamental characteristics of Being originating from presencing are
understood as one of its modes.  Martin Heidegger, The End of Philosophy, trans. Joan Stambaugh
(New York: Harper & Row, 1973) 5.
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confines of language.  Silentius, which is contre nature (against nature, l. 2081)
can, says Cador, be replaced by Silentia, which would be par nature (by nature, l.
2082).  Yet in almost the same breath, we are told that removal of the suffix –us
would grant the child more natural us (natural custom, l. 2080).  Natural and
unnatural are thus not so clearly separated as other passages in the text would
have us believe.  Even the poet seems uncertain of which side of this debate he
supports.  After a particularly heated exchange between Nature and Nurture, he
interrupts the tale in order to address his audience directly: 67
Con di me tu? Qui somes nos? (l. 2416)
What do you have to say about it?  Who are we?
Often, the purpose of such interrogative exchanges is not to solicit a response but
to support a particular position or claim advocated by the poet.68  In this
instance, however, a definitive response is not forthcoming.  For while we are
told a few verses later that “Nature rules over Nurture” (Nature signorist desor
Noreture, l. 2423-2424), the fiction itself repeatedly asserts the opposite,
suggesting that beings can be “completely denatured” (tolt desnaturée, l. 2595).
                                                 
67 Though relatively rare in contemporary fiction, such deliberate breaks are often used as a
means of maintaining the attention and goodwill first established in the prologue of medieval
texts.  Like some of the other rhetorical strategies discussed in the previous two chapters (self-
denegration, brevity, etc.), such feigned dialogues are part of the poet’s attempt to obtain the
attention and goodwill of an audience a task most often undertaken in the prologue.  See Curtius’
chapter entitled “Topics of the Exordium,” where he discusses many of the poetic tools used in
the captatio benevolentiae.  Certainly, it would be easy to ascribe these intrusions to what many
consider to be the oral foundations of vernacular romance.  However, to limit our understanding
to the practical realm would be to occlude their poetical function as part of a written manuscript.
68 Such is often the case in the Roman de Silence.  See, for example, verses just before the one in
question (v. ll. 2307-2309), where the narrator offers his own, emphatic “Oïl” (Yes!) in reply to his
query.   The general rhetorical term for this category of figures is interrogatio (Gr. erotema), an
appellation which encompasses what is referred to in contemporary parlance as a ‘rhetorical
question.’  For Quintilian, this passage would be an example of what he calls communicatio, a
moment when an orator takes an audience into consultation (...quae dicitur communicatio, cum aut
ipsos adversarios consulimus..., IX, ii, 20).
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Working against itself, the narrative seems to preclude any answer to this critical
question.
That events fall so resolutely in favor of Nature during the closing
episodes of Le Roman de Silence thus  seems more than a litle suspect.
Furthermore, given the fact that Silence manages at one point to deceive even her
own father, it is somewhat surprising that Cador and Eufemie’s hoax is
discovered at all.  However, the narrative holds what amounts to a literary
trump card: the all-seeing, all-knowing Merlin.69  Thinking she has found the
perfect means to a lasting revenge of her unrequited desires, Eufeme convinces
Ebains to send the vallés mescine on a search for Merlin who, says the queen,
claimed that he could be captured only by a woman’s trick (engien de feme, l.
5803):
Mais il le pora .m. ans quierre
Anchois que il le prenge mie.
U cho n’est mie prophezie
Icho que Merlins dist adonques,
U cis revenra mais onques. (ll. 5814-5818)
But he could seek him for a thousand years,
before he could ever catch him.
Either what Merlin said then
was not a true prophecy,
or Silence will never return.
She is, of course, mistaken in her reasoning, yet another tactical error caused by
her inability to read past the exterior signifiers of masculine gender that cover
Silence’s female body.  Thus, assisted by the goddess Nature (who claims that
Merlin has also been turned from her righteous path), Silence does, in fact,
manage to capture the wizard.
                                                 
69 This is one of the traditional attributes of his fictional character.  It is the seventh book of
Geoffrey of Monmouth’s L’Estoire de Merlin that contains accounts of his various prophecies.
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Yet Silence’s unexpected return to the court does not immediately
provoke suspicion regarding her biological sex.  Rather, as Ebains’ reaction to the
arrival of the boy-girl and her captive shows, it is the veracity of Merlin’s
prophecies that is called into question:
Or est il viers Merlin espris
Por cho qu’il dist ja n’estroit pris
Se ne fust par engien de feme (ll. 6177-6179)
He was astonished at Merlin,
who said that he would never be captured
except by a woman’s trick.
Because the continuity between biological sex and appearance remains an
inconturnable truth for the king, Merlin’s soothsaying is necessarily so much
joglerie.  So, when Merlin presents the court with a whole new set of prophecies,
they are subjected to a harsh scrutiny of their content.  Most prominent among
these is the allegation that Silence fooled him with her boy’s dress (Silences ra moi
escarni/En wallés dras, c’est vertés fine, ll. 6534-6535), a claim that verified by the
disrobing of Silence (along with a nun who Merlin says is also guilty of deceptive
dress):
Li rois en est encor en dolte.
Fait Merlin fermement tenir
Et dont a fait avant venir
La nonain, sil fait despollier,
Et Silence despollier roeve.
Tost si com Merlins dist les trueve. (ll. 6568-6573)
The king was still in doubt.
He had Merlin firmly restrained
and then had the nun come forward,
and had her stripped,
and requested Silence to strip.
They found the two just as Merlin had said.
Like the other prophecies, this one is found to be accurate, with Merlin’s words
corresponding to the physical evidence uncovered by the court.  As a result,
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Ebains proclaims that the actual sexual identity of li vallés mescine can now be
seen:  Nos veöns bien que tu iés feme  (We see clearly that you are a woman, l. 6586).
The truth, it would seem, has been revealed.
However, the reliability of this proclomation as a gurantor of the truth is
questionable at best.  First, her body is never really described in the fiction, the
veracity of its sex “guaranteed by the king’s authority, not by evidence on the
body.”70 In addition, the text itself problematizes the signifying power of the
body, reducing it to yet another piece of clothing, another imperfect disguise:
Li cors n’est mais for sapelliere (l. 1845)
The body is nothing but another rough garment
If this is so, then not even nakedness reveals anything.71 Rather, it hides an
identity which cannot be signified, cannot be explicitly written or said.  In this
sense, any covering of the body is an illusion, with its propriety based upon a
body which is itself an abstraction.  So, when Silence is returned to her ‘natural’
appearance, even this appearance betrays its supplemental nature:
D’illuec al tierc jor que Nature
Ot recovree sa droiture
Si prist Nature a repolir
Par tolt le cors et a tolir
Tolt quanque ot sor le cors de malle. (ll. 6669-73, emphasis mine)
                                                 
70 Peggy McCracken, “‘The Boy Who Was a Girl’: Reading Gender in the Roman de Silence,”
Romanic Review 85 (1994): 535.
71 Silence herself alludes to this fact earlier in the tale.  Enraged by Silence’s manly lifestyle,
Nature enjoins the boy-girl to take up more feminine activities, including sewing.  Silence listens
carefully, but ultimately rejects any possibility of an identity other than the one at the level of the
signifier –us.  “My name is Silentius, I think, or I am someone else than I was.  But this I know
well, by my right hand, that I cannot be any other!  So I am Silentius, it seems to me, or I am no
one [naked].” (Silencius ai non, jo cui, / U jo sui altres qu ne fui. / Mais cho sai jo bien, par ma destre, /
Que jo ne puis pas altres estre! / Donques sui jo Scientius, /Cho mest avis, u jo sui nus, ll. 2533-2538).
Were she stripped of the name Silentius and her masculine clothes, Silence would not only be
naked, she would be no one, the source of her identity not the immutable corporeal features her
body, but rather her social comportment.  For further information on this topic, the reader is
directed to consult Roger Dragonetti’s comments on this topic in Le Mirage des Sources  50.
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On the third day after Nature
had regained [recovered] her right,
she began to reembellish
Silence’s whole body, and to remove
everything masculine about her.
One set of signifiers that simply takes the place of another, even Silence’s natural
gender appearance is an embellishment.  The verb repolir, literally the recovering
of the skin with hair, figuratively reflects the re-writing of Silence’s masculine
name that is the other mark of her supposed return to a state par nature:
Silence atornent come feme.
Segnor, que vos diroie plus?
Ains ot a non Scilensiüs:
Ostés est -us, mis i est -a,
Si est només Scilentiä. (ll. 6664-68, emphasis mine)
They dressed [rearranged] Silence as a woman.
Lords, what more should I say?
Before, her name was Silentius;
the -us was removed and -a put in its place,
and she was named Silentia.
Similar to Nature’s reembellishment of Silence’s body, the substitution of the
suffix –a is but an exchange of signifiers, with neither one able to express what
lies beneath them  Defying accurate categorization and classification, Silence’s
name is inherently non-grammatical, and any attempt to make it so merely
reveals the impropriety of the words used.
Just as the various disguises and names that attempt to enclose Silence
with vestimentary and linguistic signifiers meet with failure, so too, does the
poet’s desire to tailor his verses strictly to the measure of silence – that ultimate
articulation – end in division in resignation.  The final word in the narrative – the
one with which he ends a poem for which he claims there will be not a word left
to say – does not indicate rest or repose, but continued longing, désirent:
Beneöis soit aui le vos conte,
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Beneöis soit qui fist le conte.
A cials, a celes qui l’oïrent
Otroit Jhesus cho qu’il desirent. (ll. 6703-6706)
Blessed be he who tells the story,
And blessed be he who wrote it.
And to all those who hear it
May Jesus grant them what they desire.
Confronted with the task of naming that which is unnamable, of turning absence
into presence, the poet is only able to desire, and not name his desire, for the
fullness of silence is present only in its absence, in the termination of the poet’s
verse.
223
Conclusion
Nay, nothing, all is said.
His tongue is now a stringless instrument.
— William Shakespeare, Richard II
There is, paradoxically, much more that could be said about silence, but
the preceding chapters have given voice to a number of fundamental ideas
regarding this pervasive linguistic phenomenon.  Most notably, the critical
readings in this study have shown that silence, though unpronounced and
immaterial, plays a considerable role in the structural disposition and signifying
potential of language.  For the Middle Ages in general and French medieval
narrative in particular, its most provocative attribute is its lack of any definite
attributes: nothing and potentially everything, silence is the only signifier for that
which, by default, desire, or design, lies beyond linguistic reach.  An
indescribable no-thing serving the expressive purposes of priests and poets alike,
its empty volume may – similar to Saint Augustine’s precious vasa – hold all
manner of content, from the solemnly sacred to the unabashedly profane.1  The
specific import of silence in La Vie de Saint Alexis, Le Conte du Graal, and Le Roman
de Silence is therefore intimately tied to each text’s unique combination of
thematic material, cultural influences, and compositional structures; the gaps
between its words are just as distinct as the words themselves.
Yet while particular fictional, social, and structural imperatives in each of
these vernacular romances make a uniform definition of silence impossible, there
are important similarities in how all three conceive of and communicate this
                                                 
1 See p. 26 ff.
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‘presence of absence.’  At a most basic level, textual manifestations of silence are
perceptible in the physical lacunae – missing lines, torn pages, and forgotten
words – so characteristic of medieval manuscripts.2  Indeed, compositional
anomalies abound in the narratives studied here: the list compiled by Lewis
Thorpe for his edition of Le Roman de Silence alone fills five complete pages.3
Although such gaps are in many cases unintentional, it is often extremely
difficult to draw the line between compositional mishap and poetic
manipulation.  What appears to be a chance textual defect may, after further
consideration, seem the tacit reflection of a carefully plotted fictional construct.
This is, for example, true of the Graal conclusion, where an overt structural lack
in the narrative’s final verses is also part of a more deliberate commentary on the
intricate architecture of linguistic expression.4  But whether the result of
accidental defacement, scribal error, or deliberate modification, these visible
silences all attest to a fundamental instability at language’s very core, what Lacan
calls the fissure (la faille) of human discourse – a representational chasm between
our unconscious desires and their manifest expression.5
                                                 
2 The theoretical relevance of such issues is by no means confined to medieval literature.  In fact,
our newest forms of ‘textual’ diffusion have much more in common with medieval models of
writing than with contemporary publications.  Like medieval manuscripts, an Internet website or
electronic text is highly susceptible to modifications over time, a temporal evolution of writing
that is now considerably more accelerated than in the Middle Ages.  The activity commonly
called surfing is really nothing more than reading, with the added risk that pages may disappear
or passages may be modified or amended between consultations.
3 Lewis Thorpe, ed., Le Roman de Silence (Cambridge: W. Heffer & Sons, 1972) 236-240.
4 Analysis of this passage from the Le Conte du Graal is spread throughout chapters three and
four, but particularly on p. 162 ff.  A similar thing happens a passage from the Hildesheim Alexis
in which a line that would have contradicted much of the surrounding thematic development
regarding the saint’s ascetic motivations is – though present in other Old French manuscripts of
La Vie de Saint Alexis – ‘missing’ from L.  See p. 65 f.
5 For Lacan, this fault marks an intrusion of unconscious, sublimated desires in the symbolic
order.  See p. 2 ff. for a more detailed explanation of the rapport between silence and the
psychoanalytic unconscious.
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These cracks in the textual and fictional facades of writing also have a
very significant effect upon how a narrative is read and understood.  In fact, the
question of whether or not such textual silences are intentional is ultimately
irrelevant when it comes to the reception and comprehension of a medieval
manuscript.  As one half of the linguistic matrix within which the poet positions
a text, his silences deserve no less attention than his substantive signifiers.  When
we, as readers, come upon these grammatical and thematic impasses, the rends
in narrative fabric must somehow be pieced together if we are to catch a glimpse
of what Jeremy Bentham calls “a discourse of indefinite length.”6    Therefore, the
moments at which the text loses hold of itself are also the moments at which the
act of reading becomes most crucial.  Indeed, a willingness to participate in the
interpretational evolution of medieval narrative is for the narrator of Le Roman de
Silence essential; in the opening verses of his prologue, he admonishes those who
control the text to keep it from falling into the hands of people who “have no
idea of what it shows” (Ne sevent preu a quoi il monte, l. 8).  A sort of vantage point
from which readers are invited to survey the fictional landscape, writing’s lack is
its true creative locus, a space from within which new textual and linguistic
relationships may be envisioned and brought into view.
Silence is, in other words, the linguistic guarantor of fictional longevity, a
structural flexibility that allows a narrative to be continuously renewed through
the minds and voices of its readers.  In this sense, silence is the mark of the poet’s
                                                 
6 Jeremy Bentham, 68.  Although Bentham on the fictional significance and interpretive
usefulness of words, his remarks point to a continuity between silence and fictional meaning:
“And thus it is by bringing into view other words, in the character of words of which, though not
pronounced, the import was meant to be conveyed by the word which was pronounced, that a
single word may be made to have the effect, and thus, as it were, comprise the import of an
indefinite number of other words...”
226
most stinging failure as well as his greatest success: although it signals that point
at which efforts to name and explain the silent unknown of his fictional material
are abandoned, the fact that something remains unsaid also leaves the way open
for future attempts to bring it into language.   Furthermore, because it is to
readers that these textual blanks implicitly call for new interpretations and ideas,
his also represents the textual space in which the subjectivity of the reader takes
hold.7 “To read,” says Roland Barthes, “is to struggle to name,”8 and it is within
this nominative struggle that one may experience something akin to the childish
game of hide-and-speak that is for Freud and Lacan such a telling illustration of
the subject’s rapport with language.9  For when a subject names a thing that had
previously been passed over in silence, or gives voice to a new idea, or proffers a
new explanation to an old mystery, there is both gain and loss.  As in the scene
from Le Conte du Graal in which Perceval first pronounces his own name,
discovery is followed by deception.  What was a subjective (personal) expression
soon becomes the property of all, itself liable to be the subject of revision and
commentary. Both intimate and alienating, silence will, in the end, always win
out  But it is only by taking a chance, by opening oneself up to the harsh sting of
                                                 
7 Brown’s interpretation of Hamlet’s final words offers a similar interpretation of the significance
of literary silence: “A more acceptable answer might be that the audience, and each individual
member of that audience, is left to interpret as they wish, according to their own “business and
desire, / Such as it is” (I.v.136-37).”  “The most unequivocal impression given by the hero at the
close of this tragedy is that his mind is unvanquished: his imagination is still exploring strange
shapes and future eventualities – what is still unkown, and even silence itself.”  John Russell
Brown, “Multiplicity of Meaning in the Last Moments of Hamlet,” Connotations 2.1 (1992): 16-33.
Also see Mark Taylor, “’The Rest isSilence,’ Or Is It?  Hamlet’s Last Words,” Upstart Crow 17
(1997): 78-86.  Yoshioka Fumio, “Silence, Speech, and Spectacle in Hamlet,” Shakespeare Studies 31
(1996) 1-33.
8 Roland Barthes, S/Z, trans. Richard Miller (New York: Hill and Wang, 1974) 92.
9 I am, of course, referring to the Fort! Da! episode that is more fully explored earlier in this study.
See p. 8 ff.
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criticism that the subject of language can assert himself, sharing new ideas and
inspiring even more.  I hope this dissertation has done just that.
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at the Comparative Literature Graduate Student Conference at Harvard
University.  Shortly thereafter, Evan left Baton Rouge to participate in one of the
department’s teaching exchanges, working as a university lecturer in the English
Department of the Faculté de Lettres in Besançon, France.  While there, he also
co-founded an English club and served as its faculty adviser.  Returning to Baton
Rouge from France in the fall of 1997, he defended his thesis, Tailoring the Text:
Sexuality and Writing in Le Roman de Silence, and received the Master of Arts
degree in May of 1998.  From January of 1998 to August of 1999, Evan lived in
Strasbourg, France, working as an account manager in the private sector.  In
August of 1999, he returned to Louisiana State University to pursue his doctoral
degree, and in the fall of 2000, was hired by the French Studies Department as a
full-time instructor.  Since then, he has completed his first major publication, a
translation of Ollivier Dyens’ book Metal and Flesh (MIT Press) and presented a
paper at Brown University’s Equinoxes conference.  In May of 2002, he defended
his dissertation, Reticent romans:  Silence and Writing in La Vie de Saint Alexis, Le
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Conte du Graal, and Le Roman de Silence.  Evan is currently teaching in the
Department of Modern and Classical Languages at the University of Saint
Thomas in Saint Paul, Minnesota.
